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 A purpose of the study was to analyze the construction of reality around the 
Georgian media democratization movement in 2010-12. The qualitative analysis of 
movement statements (n=17) and in-depth interviews with movement activists (n=12) 
found that the movement relied on mobilizing master frames linked to the concept of 
democracy: free speech, access to information, fair elections, transparency, plurality, and 
devised an innovative frame, it concerns you. The movement pursued two goals with its 
framing efforts: improvements in the media environment and mobilization of citizen 
participation.  
 The quantitative analysis of news stories about the movement (n=552) by six pro-
opposition, pro-government, and independent news organizations found that the news 
organizations used movement-advanced frames, and, in general, used more mobilizing 
than demobilizing frames. The marginalization of the movement, a dominant mode of 
news coverage of social movements based on the literature, did not occur. However, the 
study found differences in coverage based on news organizations’ ties with the 
government and the opposition, or lack thereof. The pro-opposition and independent TV 
stations covered the movement more frequently, aired reports at better viewing times, 
gave greater voice to the activists and their key frame, it concerns you, and used more 
mobilizing frames (the pro-opposition station), than the pro-government TV. The pro-
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opposition newspaper used a more positive tone and lengthier stories, and the 
independent newspaper more frequent coverage, than the pro-government newspaper. 
However, the pro-government newspaper featured the coverage more prominently and 
used activists’ key frame more often. Both pro-government news organizations used 
government sources more often, than other media, and focused on those movement issues 
that were eventually endorsed by the government.  
 In-depth interviews with news journalists (n=5) in these news organizations found 
that journalists in the pro-opposition and independent media supported movement issues, 
engaged in supportive reporting, and approved of advocacy journalism when press 
freedoms were in danger. Journalists in pro-government media supported most of the 
movement’s demands, but were suspicious of political motives behind movement 
activism (the movement mobilized ahead of the Parliamentary Elections 2012) and did 
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 Social movements and activism are on the rise in Georgia. Grown out of protests 
over violations of civic and human rights in past years, activist groups have moved from 
disorganized expression of grievances to sustained and coordinated collective action. 
While there are a few activist groups around the country, the groups pursuing a broad 
agenda of democratic rights and values, with backing from major local human rights 
organizations and democratically-minded citizens, are by far the best organized and 
articulate. These groups are engaged in coordinated and sustained collective action and 
are emerging as social movements. They cluster together, forming the force of 
democratization in the country1. The proposed study intends to analyze one of these 
movements, which we call the media democratization movement, and its activism to 
democratize the media sector of Georgia carried out from 2010 through 20122. 
                                                 
1 The term is admittedly broad. Many groups see themselves as contributing to 
democracy, but few interpret democracy holistically, as a system of rights and values. 
2 MDM activists, interviewed by this study, referred to their struggle variously as “media 
advocacy”, “media activism, and “a coalition.” The literature has referred to speech and 
media rights movements as “free speech movements” (Postigo, 2012), but also as “media 
democratization movements,” especially, in the developing world (Mauersberger, 2012). 
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 The democratization of media became a pressing issue before the 2012 
parliamentary elections in Georgia, in which the government’s control of the country’s 
biggest TV stations created uneven and unfair competition among those running for 
elected office (IREX, 2013). The media democratization movement’s activism to ensure 
greater transparency of broadcast media ownership and equal access to diverse content 
produced spectacular results. The government introduced legislative amendments in the 
broadcast and election laws to require the disclosure of ownership structure in the 
broadcast outlets, and mandatory distribution of all broadcast signals by cable operators 
during the two months prior to Election Day. Georgian citizens gained immediate access 
to both government and opposition campaigns and the plurality of factual information 
and opinion. The Parliamentary Elections of 2012 were held in a free and fair 
environment, and resulted in “the first peaceful, democratic transfer of power since the 
country’s independence in 1991” (U.S. Department of State, 2012). The government 
ceded power to a coalition of opposition parties. 
 While media democratization movement (MDM)3 employed a range of 
institutional and extra-institutional tactics, it has greatly benefited from securing 
extensive and mostly positive media coverage. The activists produced effective frames 
that resonated with the public and, arguably, members of the media. The movement 
presented proposed media reforms as serving citizens’ democratic right to free speech, 
access to plural sources of information and transparency, a strategy that has proven 
successful in other countries (Mauersberger, 2012). The frames fit well with Georgian 
journalists’ professional values of free speech, access to information, and transparency. 
                                                 
3 The media democratization movement will be abbreviated as MDM in this study. 
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The media democratization movement partnered with the media by forming a coalition 
with journalists’ associations and watchdog groups. 
 The purpose of this study is three-fold:  1) to identify the dominant tone and 
frames of coverage of the Georgian media democratization movement across the 
dominant news organizations in the country, 2) to analyze whether and perhaps how 
political factors and frames constructed by the media democratization movement 
influenced the news coverage, and 3) to interpret meanings attached to the media 
democratization movement by movement actors and the news media. At a more abstract 
level, the study intends to enhance our theoretical knowledge about how media covers 
social movements, and how social movements can influence news coverage. Current 
theory holds that movements opposed to the status quo have little leverage over news 
coverage, and that they generally receive negative and marginalizing media coverage 
because the media tend to protect the status quo (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Gitlin, 
1980). This study will explore if some media outlets in transitional political and media 
systems, such as Georgia, are likely to report on social movements in a fair and 
substantive manner. The core argument is that dynamic changes in emergent 
democracies, such as Georgia, lead to great disparities among political elites and the 
media, and the emergence of a new type of independent media, open to change. These 
media are new forces in civil society, and were outside the circle of social and political 
power during the previous, totalitarian regimes. In general, these media develop and gain 
strength as a result of the process of transition (Spark, 2008). These media occupy 
disadvantageous positions in relation to other media and thus experience undue 
government control and unfair business practices (Freedom Forum, 2011, 2012, 
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Transparency International – Georgia, 2011). These media are expected to question the 
status quo rather than support it, and sympathize with social movements advocating 
change. Social movements in these environments have the independent media, but also 
pro-opposition media, as their allies against the government and the system.  Since 
media’s support for the status quo is the key premise of negative coverage of social 
movements (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Gitlin, 1980), media sectors that oppose the 
status quo are not expected to be negatively biased towards social movements. Social 
movements that manage to exploit tensions in the “media-state dynamics” 
(Mauersberger, 2012, p. 588) and differences in the media (Weaver & Scacco, 2013) 
have a chance to gain good access to audiences and fair coverage. 
 In more established and stable political and media systems, productive interaction 
between social movements and media and fair coverage of social movements are rare. 
Media propaganda (Herman and Chomsky, 1988), media hegemony (Gitlin, 1980), and 
media and conflict theories (Olien et al, 1995), developed in the 1970s and onwards, 
explain media’s negative framing of social movements by media’s entrenched ties with 
the elites and their interest in maintaining the status quo. In the media and community 
conflict perspective (Olien et al, 1989, 1995), media act as “guard dogs” for the elites, 
helping them fend off challenges emanating from social movements. The media 
propaganda model (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) considers the media to be an integral 
part of the elite hegemony, opposed to any change in the existing social structure and 
order advocated by social movements. Gitlin (1977, 1980) explained that structural 
influences, emanating from elite ownership of the media, interact with aspects of 
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journalists’ professional codes (fetishism of facts, objectivity, newsworthiness) and 
invariably lead to negative and marginalizing framing of social movements.  
 The protest paradigm, advanced by Chan and Lee (1984), builds on Gitlin’s ideas. 
It posits that journalists’ coverage of protests is determined by their ideologically-based 
“reporting paradigms,” which inform “where to look (and where not to look), and … 
what to discover” (p. 187), and whether to support or denounce protests. These reporting 
paradigms tend to emphasize social controversy or violence surrounding protest 
activities, rather than the issues being protested. Yet, contrary to strong hegemony 
models, the protest paradigm seems to suggest that an ideologically-inspired “reporting 
paradigm” might offer positive news coverage of protest that is ideologically aligned with 
the movement at hand. More recently, scholars found greater diversity in the coverage of 
protests. As Weaver and Scacco (2013) argue, the recent trend of media diversification, 
fueled, in part, by the diffusion of the Internet and media’s greater ideological posturing, 
leads to greater opportunities for social movements to secure neutral and even positive 
media coverage. This idea is echoed in Harlow and Johnston (2011), who found that the 
coverage of Egyptian protests in social media and blogosphere broke away from 
formulaic, marginalizing coverage. This holds true in other non-Western contexts 
(Mauersberger, 2012; McCarthy et al, 2008; Yuan, 2013). In these contexts, those outlets 
in the media landscape oriented towards social change are more sympathetic towards 
movement causes. 
 By quantitatively analyzing Georgian newspaper and TV news content, the study 
will look for instances of negative and demobilizing news coverage of the media 
democratization movement in 2010 through 2012, as predicted by the Western political 
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science and political communication literature, across the dominant news media in the 
country’s news ecosystem. It also intends to examine the extent to which the media have 
employed “mobilizing” frames. The study hypothesizes that negative coverage of the 
media democratization movement will appear in pro-government news media. However, 
it hypothesizes that opposition-aligned news media will provide positive coverage of the 
movement. The study will explore the nature of coverage of social movements in the 
independent news media. The divergent news camps are expected to grant different levels 
of prominence to the movement in terms of the length and substance of the coverage and 
to use different sources and frames. The study expects to find frames pushed by 
movement actors in the news coverage of independent and opposition-aligned news 
media. 
 The qualitative part of the study will further clarify the construction of meanings 
around the media democratization movement. What were its goals and mobilizing frames 
it has used? What was the rationale behind framing choices? The study will answer these 
questions by interviewing activists and activist journalists4 in the media democratization 
                                                 
4 The term “activist journalist” refers to professional journalists, working in the media, 
who joined the media democratization movement and openly engaged in activism as 
volunteers. “Activist journalist” is different from “news producers” and “news reporters,” 
the terms reserved for professionals working in the media but not engaged with the 
movement.  The study has interviewed both “activist journalists” and “news producers” 
and “news reporters.” 
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movement. Interviews with news producers and reporters will answer the question about 
their possible support of the movement through advocacy reporting.  
 This study relies on the framing theory and social constructivist framework to 
explain how social actors, such as social movements and media, engage in meaning 
construction, that is, framing, to advance their interpretation of issues in the discourse 
(Entman, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). The critical perspective informs the 
study’s conceptualization of social movements, political elites, and media as potential 
parties in social conflict, engaged in mobilizing and demobilizing framing (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988; Gitlin, 1980; Olien et al, 1995). 
 The study hopes to make important contributions to the scholarly literature on the 
news media’s interaction with social movements in non-Western contexts. In these 
contexts, Western structural and ideological models may not apply, as ownership patterns 
are different, political ideologies are not fully formed, social movements and independent 
media maintain close ties, and some types of news media are more susceptible to 
government control efforts than others. Independent media have emerged as strong 
mobilizing forces in the color revolutions in Georgia and other formerly Soviet republics 
(Manning, 2007). Their role in less radical collective action, such as lobbying for 
democratic improvements in the media and electoral process, warrants attention. Greater 
understanding of the successful media democratization movement in Georgia will help 
media scholars understand more fully the news media’s interaction with social 
movements in transitional democracies and, in general, the role of social movements and 
media in democratic transformation.  
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 The first chapter of this dissertation provides background on the media 
democratization movement. The chapter will also outline the media and political 
environment in the country. The second chapter deals with the concept of framing, its 
psychological and sociological roots and its current uses in mass media and political 
communication studies. Further, the second chapter summarizes the current thinking 
about the framing of social movements in media, including critical perspectives on 
media’s role in the functioning of social movements, and the framing strategies applied 
by social movements to reach their audiences, including the media. The third chapter 
outlines the hypotheses and research questions advanced by the study and the methods it 
used. The fourth chapter presents findings and discusses the qualitative analysis of 
movement statements and in-depth interviews. The fifth chapter presents quantitative 
findings and discussion of the media coverage of MDM. The sixth chapter synthesizes 
findings in chapters four and five, and presents conclusions. 
 Before proceeding to the discussion of the substance and scholarly knowledge in 
the area of proposed analysis, the author wishes to acknowledge her personal 
involvement in the media democratization movement in Georgia, understanding this may 
have influenced the selection and treatment of the subject of this study. 
Media Democratization Movement 
 In modern politics, social movements are increasingly seen as engines of social 
innovation and change, counteracting forces of social control as embodied by the state 
(Goodwin, 2013). Emergent movements in Georgia, united around the democratization 
agenda, have scored some spectacular victories in their struggle to secure rights to free 
press and information, free and fair elections, and freedom of political assembly. These 
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freedoms make the country one of the most progressive transitional democracies of the 
former Soviet Union. These movements cluster together, and form the force of 
democratization in the country. Georgia’s democratization movements are political 
rights-oriented programs. They advocate for new rights but also for the protection and 
implementation of the constitutional rights promised to the citizens of Georgia. While 
democracy, as a system, enjoys widespread popularity in Georgia5, with groups across 
the political spectrum voicing support, only some of these groups, united by the 
democratization agenda, interpret democracy holistically, as a system of rights and 
values, and act consistently in its service.  
 The origins of these movements can be traced to the declaration of Georgian 
independence from the Soviet Union and the installation of a democratic system of 
governance in April, 1991, but their roots are deeper. These roots reach back into the 
distant past to the courageous and daring activism of Soviet dissidents and Georgia’s 
national liberation movement. By employing the master frames of human and citizen 
rights, constructed across years of struggle, emergent movements tap into Georgians’ 
long standing desire to secure rights and freedoms, withheld during almost two centuries 
of Imperial and Communist rule.  
                                                 
5 The recent public opinion poll by the National Democratic Institute in Georgia 
established that 13% of Georgians considered freedom of speech and independence of 
media as the most important issues facing the country, ahead of jobs and territorial 
integrity (Navarro & Woodward, 2013) 
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 The media democratization movement has emerged out of a long-standing goal of 
democratically-minded groups to open and improve the Georgian media environment and 
the media themselves. The country has a partially free media system (Freedom House, 
2013), which means censorship and other repressive tools are not in place, but the 
government still has the power to manipulate the media. The former governments have 
maintained close ties with the owners of nationally-distributed TV stations; if a station 
owner did not cooperate with the government, the government often helped find the 
station new “loyal” owners. Government’s control of big media businesses has allegedly 
stripped independent newspapers and broadcast stations of advertising funds 
(Transparency International - Georgia, 2011), and its manipulation of the broadcast 
regulatory body led to withholding licenses from unwanted stations in the past (Freedom 
House, 2011). 
 Over the years, the media democratization movement has pressed the government 
for reforms to improve the media environment. The democratization of media became a 
pressing issue ahead of the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Georgia, which was regarded 
as a litmus test for the young Georgian statehood and its democratic credentials. 
Democratically-oriented groups have been actively advocating for a peaceful and 
constitutional transition of power through competitive, free and fair elections. However, 
the government was suspect in his desire to use all available means, including the 
bureaucratic apparatus and the control of country’s biggest TV stations, to create an 
uneven ground for contenders. Government-dominated major broadcast stations provided 
news to 95% of the population, while access to alternative news outside big cities was 
poor (Caucasus Resource and Research Centers, 2009). 
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 The media democratization movement has focused on two goals, transparency of 
ownership and equal access to diverse media content, as key to its action program. Not 
only were these goals important for the freedom and health of the media system, they 
were essential to holding free and fair elections. Letting the audience know who stood 
behind media messages and bias, while simultaneously providing it with diverse sources 
of facts and views, equalized the chances of both the government and opposition forces 
for a successful campaign. The movement was fully aware that the access to diverse 
content was a prerequisite for meaningful and deliberative process (Dahlgren, 1995).  
 The recent activism started around summer 2010, when activists formed informal 
working groups and sketched the program of media democratization (S. S., personal 
interview, March 12, 2014; Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014). As the first step, 
these groups started identifying problems and putting pressure on the government to 
introduce changes. The government started discussing, and, in April, 2011, enacted 
legislative amendments requiring the disclosure of the ownership structure in broadcast 
media. Next, the activists initiated a coalition of major local human rights organizations, 
professional journalists’ unions, media development organizations and pressure groups, 
with the backing of the Open Society Georgia Foundation, also known as the Soros 
Foundation. On April 13, 2011, the Coalition for Media Advocacy was officially 
launched. “We publicly declare that we will take all appropriate measures to improve the 
media regulatory legislation, establish control over the implementation of all laws and 
protect the rights of journalists and the financial independence of the press,” stated the 
founding document. The coalition was made up of key non-governmental organizations, 
including the Georgian Young Lawyers Association, Transparency International -- 
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Georgia, Civic Development Institute, Non-governmental organization for Civil Society, 
Media Club, Open Society – Georgia Foundation, Eurasia Partnership Foundation, and 
the independent journalists’ associations, including the Georgian Regional Media 
Association, Georgian Regional Broadcasters Association, Regional Broadcasters 
Network and the Georgian Charter of Journalism Ethics. These non-governmental 
organizations and unions occupied a position similar to that held by advocacy, pressure 
and interest groups in Western societies, which hold critical middle ground between 
political elites and the public and represent the views of a particularly engaged segment 
of the public (McCluskey & Kim, 2012). The coalition became the social movement 
organization (SMO) in the media democratization movement.  
 That the Coalition for Media Advocacy brought watchdog organizations and 
media unions together was one of its best strategies. This helped forge ties with the 
independent media, but also with the pro-opposition media, which were the members in 
the unions. The independent media, have always supported the democratization cause. 
The first independent media organizations were started by democratically-minded young 
journalists, who distanced themselves from the Soviet media and their propagation of the 
Soviet system, and by activists from civil organizations (Topuria, 2000).  Over the years, 
independent media and civil sector groups have existed almost symbiotically, with human 
rights groups lobbying for the freedom of the press and the press emphasizing a human 
rights agenda. The independent media have relied on the support of the civil sector 
organizations when faced with legal troubles and government pressure.  
 The coalition started a sustained, high-tension, high-profile campaign which used 
a range of institutional and extra-institutional tactics, from the It Concerns You campaign 
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to legislatively enforce a mandatory distribution of all TV stations around Georgia to 
active denouncement of government’s media policies and violations of journalists’ rights 
in the news media and protest rallies outside government buildings. From April, 2011 to 
October, 2012, the Coalition for Media Advocacy actively lobbied the government for 
media reforms: it made regular statements on the progress of its media democratization 
movement; it was visibly engaged in all cases of media rights violations; it engaged in 
direct action, staging protests, and worked to secure supportive statements and actions 
from international human rights watchdogs and friendly governments. The coalition 
engaged in effective negotiations with the opposition and the government. This activism 
produced spectacular results. The government agreed, in June, 2012, to adopt into law the 
“must-carry” rule, requiring cable operators to carry all broadcast signals during the two 
months prior to Election Day. These were major improvements, contributing to greater 
freedom, diversity and viability in the Georgian media (IREX, 2013). 
Georgia: The Overview of Political and Media Systems  
 To put the media democratization movement in context, this study will describe 
Georgia’s political and media environment. Georgia is one of three nations in the South 
Caucasus. Its transitional political system has been variously described as “centralized” 
(Laverty, 2008), “hybrid” (Freedom House, 2011), and “flawed democracy” (Zielis, 
2010). The country of 4.5 million inhabitants secured independence on April 9, 1991, 
shortly before the Soviet Union declared itself defunct.  The first years of independence 
were marred by street violence, military coups and civil wars. The wars in Abkhazia and 
Ossetia, territories of Georgia, resulted in their secession and de-facto independence. In 
the late 1990s, Georgian politics stabilized, but economic chaos and widespread 
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corruption delayed development. In a defining historical moment, Georgians staged mass 
protests against rigged parliamentary elections and deposed the “neo-patrimonial 
government” of President Shevardnadze in November 2003 (Laverty, 2008).  The event, 
which became known as the Rose Revolution, brought to power the government of 
Michael Saakashvili.  Saakashvili, who served two terms as the President of Georgia, and 
his team of young politicians launched an impressive program of reforms with the near 
total backing of the population.  These reforms helped radically reduce corruption, 
streamline the government apparatus and produce sustained economic growth.  On the 
negative side, the government’s weakening of the Parliament and the civil sector, 
imposition of control on independent television stations and harassment of political 
opponents and business owners damaged the country’s human rights record.  The 2008 
war with Russia over disputed territories led to the questioning of government’s 
leadership and a new burst of activism. In years following the war, political life became 
extremely polarized (Caucasus Resource and Research Centers, 2012). The opposition 
parties formed a coalition, initiated by billionaire philanthropist and political newcomer 
Bidzina Ivanishvili, in April 2012, which defeated President Saakashvili’s National 
Movement party in the 2012 Parliamentary Elections and the 2013 Presidential Elections.  
 Georgia’s social movements. In the tense and polarized political environment 
ahead of the 2012 parliamentary elections, citizens and organizations in Georgia’s civil 
sector stepped up activism, engaging the public in the discussion of social and political 
problems. Coalition building became a good strategy to follow. The activists organized 
around human rights and civil society agenda pushed for greater individual and political 
rights, the civil sector’s role in public affairs, and institutionalization of liberal, secular 
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values. Other groups have formed conservative agendas, and introduced hard-core 
nationalist and chauvinist discourse. Church-based conservative groups follow an agenda 
premised on strengthening the Georgian Orthodox Church and repealing liberal reforms, 
such as gay and abortion rights. They have distanced themselves from the mainstream 
civil society organizations, which they criticize as grant-driven, Western projects.  
 Georgian media environment. Georgian media outlets reflect the political and 
social flux in the country. Pending research on Georgia’s media system, the country 
clearly belongs to the type described as “television-centric.” The comparative media 
research (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, Norris, 2002, Shehata & Stromback, 2011) defines 
media systems by “the relative roles of print and electronic media” (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004, p.24).  In Georgia, newspaper readership is meager (with leading dailies selling up 
to 10,000 copies and weeklies no more than 35,000 copies), while TV reaches 95% of the 
population (Caucasus Resource and Research Centers, 2009, 2012, IREX, 2013). TV-
centric systems are more common in “pluralist and polarized” political systems (Norris, 
2002, p. 84).  
 Politically, the news media are one of the most influential institutions in Georgia 
(Caucasus Resource and Research Centers, 2012). Big TV stations have mass viewership.  
Print press, with its limited circulation, targets the elites.  The media are deeply polarized. 
In the recent years, they have “essentially split into two opposing camps, leaving little 
room for neutrality and balance in the news” (IREX, 2009, Introduction section, para. 1). 
The Georgian media are assessed as “partially free” (Freedom House, 2013).  
There is greater independence in the print press than in the TV sector. Most newspapers, 
magazines and radio stations are free and independent.  The Internet is free. Unlike 
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Western media, in which the nature of ownership (profit-oriented firms, community 
media, public media) and ideology (conservative, liberal, and centrist) are key influences 
on news reporting (Scheufele, 1999), the Georgian news coverage is best explained by 
news organizations’ level of dependence or independence from the government or the 
opposition.  
In 2010 through 2012, three TV stations, Rustavi 2, Imedi and Georgian Public 
Broadcaster, dominated the market, spreading their signal around the country via 
terrestrial lines. Rustavi 2 and TV Imedi, and, to a lesser extent, the Georgian Public 
Broadcaster, supported the government. The popularity of these TV stations stemmed 
from their accessibility around the country at no material or technological cost to viewers. 
Smaller independent TV stations were either stationed in Tbilisi or in regional centers 
and were unavailable to large parts of the population.  Two Tbilisi-based stations, 
Kavkasia TV and Maestro, voiced opinions of the opposition. Ahead of the Parliamentary 
elections 2012, the key opposition figure, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, started the 9th 
Channel on April 30, 2012. Maestro, Kavkasia and 9th Channel distributed their signals 
via cable and satellite, and reached primarily the population in Tbilisi and other big cities. 
Private ownership of TV stations has been “non-transparent” (Freedom House, 2012). 
The ownership of the biggest TV station, Rustavi 2, was not clearly stated, while another 
big station, TV Imedi, was the object of a legal battle over ownership. The Georgian 
Public Broadcaster, Georgia’s only publicly funded TV station, has been much criticized 
in the past for having grown “more friendly with the authorities” (Eurasia Partnership 
Fund, 2012; Freedom House, 2012). 
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 Newspapers enjoy the most freedom in Georgia, apart from Internet-based media. 
They provide diverse views, but reach a tiny segment of the population. Tbilisi-based 
dailies Resonance, 24 Saati and Kviris Palitra, lead the list of serious print newspapers. 
They have loyal readership, diverse content and modern management.  Other popular 
newspapers -- Alia, Akhali Taoba, Versia and Asaval-Dasavali -- have less stringent 
professional standards.  Tbilisi dailies carry much political content, and engage in 
ideological posturing. Regional newspapers come out once a week. Precise data on 
newspaper circulation are not available, but in the regions sales rarely reach 4,000 copies. 
Local newspapers outside of Tbilisi and Internet-based publications are less politicized 
than Tbilisi-based dailies (Mikashavidze, 2010).  
 Economically, the Georgian media face many challenges. The media business is 
hampered by limited advertising. Newspapers rely on newsstand sales. Most news 
organizations are poor and cannot invest in development. News journalists, with the 
exception of few TV personalities, have moderate incomes, are not unionized, and often 
do not even have labor contracts. Politically, Georgian journalists, as a group, are 
considered to be powerful and influential. While the public views journalists as mostly 
biased and manipulated by the government and the opposition (Caucasus Resource and 
Research Centers, 2012), journalists’ self-concepts stress independence, professional 
esteem and civic responsibility (Mikashavidze, 2009).   
 Georgian media legislation is liberal and progressive. Article 19 of the 
Constitution states: “Every individual has the right to freedom of speech, thought, 
conscience, religion and belief.” Article 24 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of 
media and information. The Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression, adopted after 
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the Rose Revolution in 2004, is the key legislation guaranteeing freedom of the press. It 
has replaced the earlier law on the Press and Other Means of Mass Media, introduced 
shortly after independence in 1991 (Freedom House, 2005). The 1991 law abolished 
censorship of the press and introduced some other guarantees for free speech (IREX, 
2001). The 2004 law improved the legislative framework by decriminalizing libel, one of 
the most widely used tools against free press in repressive regimes (Freedom House, 
2005). The law on broadcasting, adopted in 2005, established rules for obtaining licenses 
for air frequencies and the code of conduct for broadcast entities. The Georgian National 
Communications Commission (GNCC) regulates the broadcast sector and is in charge of 
implementing the Broadcast Law (IREX, 2005). Provisions that are pertinent to the 
freedom of press and information are included in other legislation, such as the Election 
Law, the Administrative Code, and the Criminal Code (Mikashavidze, 2009). 
 While Georgia has exemplary media laws, governments in the past have done 
little to ensure they are implemented. Government-controlled courts have rarely ruled in 
favor of greater media freedoms (IREX, 2005). One of the most controversial cases of 
selective enforcement of media-related laws happened during the 2012 election 
campaign, when the police seized, on court orders, 140,000 satellite dishes that had been 
distributed to viewers by Maestro TV, an opposition-leaning TV station, and Global TV, 
an opposition-owned programming distribution company. The antennas were needed to 
transmit the signal of Maestro TV and Channel 9, another opposition-aligned station, to 
the regional population to break the government’s effective stranglehold over nationwide 
news. Prosecutors claimed that Ivanishvili, the opposition leader, paid for the distribution 
of the satellite dishes, which the courts ruled amounted to vote buying. The prominent 
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rights advocacy groups described the move as illegal. The satellite dishes were returned 
to the television companies immediately after Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream Coalition 
defeated the ruling party in the October 2012 elections (Freedom House, 2013; IREX, 
2013).  
Chapter Summary 
 The Georgian political and media environment is in transition from totalitarianism 
and authoritarianism to democracy. Before the watershed Parliamentary Elections of 
2012, the system was deeply polarized and divided. The chapter has outlined key 
characteristics of Georgia’s political and media systems. Georgia’s media system is 
television-centric and has uneven patterns of freedom, professionalism and independence 
in the media. The 2012 elections consolidated Georgia’s democracy by facilitating the 
democratic transfer of office through free and fair elections. Georgia’s activists moved 
from spontaneous protests to sustained and coordinated action, built around the agenda of 
democratic rights and values. The media democratization movement mobilized around 
2010, and stepped up activism in 2011 and 2012 -- ahead of the 2012 Parliamentary 
elections – to press for greater transparency of media ownership and mandatory 
distribution of all broadcast stations, including opposition-aligned stations, around the 
country.  






Concept of Framing 
 Definitions of framing and the framing Process. In exploring the research 
questions and hypotheses introduced earlier, this study will rely on the framing theory, 
rooted in the social constructivist perspective. Social constructivism posits that there is no 
single, “objective” reality, but that there are multiple, socially constructed and perceived 
realities. These realities are continually created, reproduced and recreated by human 
beings (Berger & Luckman, 1967; McQuail, 2005). Frames are tools used in constructing 
and perceiving the reality.  
 The concept of framing is widely used in the fields of psychology, sociology, 
political science, linguistics and mass communication. As a downside to its breadth and 
popularity, the concept of framing lacks theoretical and empirical clarity. The definition 
provided by Entman (1993) captures the sociological approach to framing.  According to 
Entman, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for 
the item described” (p.52). Frames, in his view, are products of framing, and exist in at 
least four locations: a) communicator, who consciously or unconsciously uses them in its 
text, b) text, c) receiver and d) culture, which is “a stock of commonly invoked frames” 
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(p. 53).  Entman proposed to treat framing as a paradigmatic approach explaining just 
how a communicated text exerts its power6. 
 Next, Entman (1993) defines framing effects. In his view, framing effects are 
salience-based. By highlighting certain aspects and diminishing others, framing makes 
some aspects more salient, i.e. “more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to 
audiences,” than others, and increases the probability that a receiver perceives, processes 
and stores information in memory (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Making the element salient 
would not necessarily lead to effects. Salience is achieved if frames connect with 
receivers’ schemata, which may or may not happen. Therefore, the presence of frames in 
text does not guarantee their influence. When effective, framing “determines whether 
most people notice and how they understand and remember a problem, as well as how 
they evaluate and chose to act upon it” (Entman, 1993, p.54). 
 Framing in mass communication studies. Mass communication studies are 
primarily interested in framing done by the media. Scheufele (1999) offered the model of 
media framing process. He divides the process into frame building, frame setting, 
individual-level framing processes and a feedback loop between individual and media 
frames. Frame building refers to processes whereby media frames are influenced by 
                                                 
6 D’Angelo (2002) argued against a single paradigm of framing. In his view, there existed 
at least three framing paradigms: a) the cognitive model, in which frames are embodied 
in the thoughts and words of those affected by a text, b) the constructionist variant, which 
emphasizes creation of frames as interpretive packages, c) the critical paradigm, which 
sees frames as the reflection of values of the elites and tools of hegemonic influence. 
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various influences, such as journalist-centered, organizational routines (Gans, 1979; 
Schoemaker & Reese, 1996) and external influences. Frame setting is concerned with the 
transmission of framing effect. The literature is looking into two explanations: that 
framing transmits salience, making certain frames more accessible for individuals to 
retrieve from their memory, and that what gets transmitted is frames’ importance, 
resulting in higher perceived importance of frames for an individual. Individual-level 
effects of framing include media’s influence on individual frames, that is, schemata, and 
the links between individual frames and various behavioral, attitudinal and cognitive 
variables. Finally, a feedback loop refers to the interaction between individually-held 
frames and the way individual journalists frame media content.  
 Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) connected the framing process with three stages 
in the news process: news production, news consumption, and news effects. The news 
production stage is described in frame building. Broadly speaking, news production is 
contingent upon sociological, economic, critical and psychological factors, and so are 
news frames. Building frames refers to journalists and other elites advancing their 
“modes of presentations” (p. 12) in an effort to relay information in ways that best fit the 
audience schema. According to Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007), journalists are not 
trying to spin or deceive receivers of information. They rely on the use of frames to 
reduce complexity of information and meet time and space constraints. Unlike an agenda-
setting effect, which refers to “whether we think about an issue”, framing describes “how 
we think about an issue” (p.14).  Framing effect comes from the description of an issue or 
a label attached to it. Contrary to Entman’s (1993) view, Scheufele and Tewksbury 
(2007) argue framing relies on applicability effect rather than salience effect. 
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Applicability effect refers to the fit between news frames and concepts attached to an 
issue in a receiver’s own mental schema of the issue. 
 Sociological perspective on framing. The definitions of framing originating in 
sociology stress human agency and purpose behind framing, and are primarily interested 
in framing of contentious issues by social actors, such as social movements, 
governments, specialists, and media. Media are seen as both producers of frames and 
sites of framing contests. A framing contest is a contentious process to construct a 
definition of an issue. Framing is defined as “signifying work or meaning construction” 
(Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614; See also, Gamson et al, 1982; Snow et al, 1986; Snow & 
Benford, 1988). While frames operate at different levels, sociology is primarily interested 
in the meso and macro levels of framing. In a seminar study (1989), Gamson and 
Modigliani explained how issues are framed and how “issues cultures” are created (p. 2). 
In their view, public discourse produces various frames of an issue, and frames’ relative 
“careers,” i.e. progress relative to each other, determines issue culture. Individuals’ 
interpretation of that issue and any related events depends on their pre-existing 
knowledge, held in cognitive schemata, which are heavily influenced by issue culture. 
Frames originate in various discourses, such as media, specialist, challenger (social 
movements and interest groups), and policy-maker discourses. While media discourse is 
not the only contributor of frames, it is the only platform for the various discourses to 
interact and contest for the issue definition. It is also the key link to public opinion, both 
in terms of its formation and reflection. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) also discuss 
media framing technique. In their view, media tend to organize information in 
interpretive packages to give meaning to the reported events. Each interpretive package 
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contains a frame, or an interpretive angle, a range of positions within that angle, and 
supportive devices, such as catchphrases, metaphors, causal links and other symbolic and 
reasoning devices.  
 Scheufele and Iyengar (2012) have raised concern about the sociological 
perspective on framing and similar approaches in the mass communication literature. 
They described the dominant sociological approach as “emphasis framing,” which, in 
scholars’ views, is different from the original concept of framing in experimental 
psychology (Kanneman and Twersky, 1977). The original concept, “equivalence 
framing,” is defined as differential presentation or labeling of identical information. By 
contrast, “emphasis framing” refers to selective presentation of different content 
elements. Scheufele and Iyengar (2012) think these two approaches to framing cause 
confusion and inconsistency in the literature. The scholars themselves adhere to 
“equivalence framing.”  
 Psychological perspective on framing. Lakoff clarifies frames are “mental 
structures that shape the way we see the world” (2004, xv). This definition obviously 
refers to the cognitive-level frames, which, for clarity’s sake, are termed as “schema” in 
this study. The definition by Tannen (1993) also refers to the cognitive processes, 
whereby frames act as structures of expectation. “On the basis of one’s experience of the 
world in a given culture (or combination of cultures), one organizes knowledge about the 
world and uses this knowledge to predict interpretations and relationships regarding new 
information, events, and experiences (Tannen, 1993, p. 16). Tannen (1993) traces the 
lineage of the term “frame” to Bateson (1972), who used it to describe a meta 
communicative message about what was going on in a situation, and to Goffman (1974), 
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who defined frames as “schemata of interpretation,” helping people to “locate, perceive, 
identify and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences” (p.21).  
 Political and critical perspectives on framing. Nelson and colleagues (1997) 
define political framing as "the process by which a source defines the essential problem 
underlying a particular social or political issue and outlines a set of considerations 
purportedly relevant to that issue" (p. 222). Because frames create certain definitions of 
reality and cause audiences to have different reactions, they play a role in how power is 
exerted. Frames are therefore highly contested in the political discourse (Entman, 1993).  
 The text, in Entman’s view, is “the imprint of power,” identifying actors and 
interests that contested for its domination (p. 55). The contestants aim to sponsor the 
dominant frame, which refers to the meaning most heavily supported by frames in text 
and congruent with most common audience schemata (Entman, 1993). According to 
critical perspective scholars, dominant frames reflect the elite views and are used as tools 
of the hegemonic power (D’Angelo, 2002; Gitlin, 1977; Herman & Chomsky, 1988).  
Social Movements 
 Social movements as forces of change. Social movements are agents of social 
change and innovation in a society. Historically, social movements have been responsible 
for the majority of progressive legislative and cultural changes. Goodwin (2013) defined 
social movements as “conscious, concerted, and sustained efforts by ordinary people to 
change (or preserve) some aspect of their society by using extra-institutional means” (p. 
391). Other definitions (Lofland, 1985; Snow & Benford, 1992) interpret social 
movements more broadly, as an extra-institutional but also institutional collective action, 
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underscoring that movements often utilize institutional channels of decision-making and 
pressure.  
 Ideas about movements have evolved across time, from earlier theorizing about 
movements as fearsome deviations from normality, dangerous mobs (LeBon, 1897; 
Mackey, 1841[1980]) and irrational, contagious behavior (Blumer, 1969; Park, 1924) to 
understanding the rationality behind their formation and action (Olson, 1966). Current 
literature on social movements relies primarily on three theoretical perspectives: the 
social psychological or constructivist perspective, the conflict perspective and the 
functionalist perspective. The social constructivist approach is focused on meanings and 
perceptions. The conflict perspective emphasizes destabilizing factors, such as social 
inequalities and social change (Markovsky, 2011), and is particularly useful in studying 
the issues of power, domination and social conflict. The functionalist perspective treats 
social movements as sub-structures of an interconnected system, and focuses on their 
function, such as social movements’ role in the setting of political agendas or in the 
formation of new political parties. This study draws its ideas from social constructivist 
and conflict perspectives, as relevant to complex, multilayered interaction between social 
movements and media.  
 Social constructivist perspective. The Social constructivist perspective on social 
movements posits that social movements affect social change by influencing the 
construction of individual and shared social reality. This approach pays close attention to 
individual-level, micro processes, meaning-making, beliefs, identity and other cultural 
orientations. The approach has gained greater currency in the social movement literature 
as the importance of meanings, symbols and knowledge grew in post-industrial 
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“knowledge societies.” In this environment, movements attain their goals by asserting 
and maintaining the control over societies’ symbols and self-understandings (Goodwin, 
2013). The adoption of the constructivist approach has also been a reaction to hyper-
rationalism of earlier theories, such as the resource mobilization theory, and their neglect 
of social psychological and ideational factors (Cohen, 1985; Gamson, 1988; 
Klandermans, 1984).  
 Benford (1993) argued in favor of the constructivist approach to social movement, 
stressing the importance of meaning-making associated with interpreting and perceiving 
grievances, collective identities, structural opportunities and resource availability for 
action. Movements “frame” and articulate the grievances and ways to attend to them for 
potential recruits, supporters, by-standers and targets. Framing, which is synonymous 
with “meaning construction,” is the essential process in social movements’ operations 
(Gamson, 1982; Snow & Benford, 1992, p.614). 
 Arguing against cost-benefit calculations as the sole basis for involvement in 
collective action, as posited in the rational choice and resource mobilization theories, 
Gamson (1992b) emphasized the importance of collective identity, collective 
consciousness and solidarity, which helped “to blur the distinction between individual 
and group interest, undermining the premises on which such utilitarian models operate” 
(p. 57). He urged to consider cultural and ideational elements in the micro-mobilization 
and other social movement processes to explain movement dynamics.  
 Klandermans (1997) further articulated the role of social construction of 
collective meaning for the transformation of individual and collective discontent into 
collective action. He introduced the concepts of “consensus mobilization” and “action 
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mobilization”. The former refers to the generation of ideological or consensus support for 
a collective action, and “implies a ‘struggle’ for the mind of the people”, while the latter 
refers to the generation of behavioral support for the collective action, and is “a ‘struggle’ 
for their resources – their [people’s] money, time, skills” (1997, p. 7). To achieve both 
types of mobilization, a social movement must tap into the attitudes and ideologies of its 
target audiences (Klandermans & Tarrow, 1988, p. 10).   
 Conflict perspective. Championed by Marx, conflict perspective on social 
movements emphasizes the conflict between social groups. Resource mobilization theory, 
theories of social revolutions, and breakdown theories of social movements all have roots 
in conflict perspective (Markovsky, 2011).   
Media and Their Framing of Social Movements: Demobilizing Frames 
 Media as agents of social control. If social movements are forces of social 
change, the media’s role in a society has long been recognized as a force of social 
scrutiny and social control (Duster & Manza, 2013, p.455). This understanding dates 
back to 18th and 19th century ideas about the press as the Fourth Estate of power, 
exercising oversight over other branches on behalf of the public (McQuail, 2005). This 
view is still widely held, but is contested. Critical scholars suggest that the mass media 
today support corporate power, militarism, and the interests of the wealthiest elites 
(Klinenberg & Wachsmuth, 2013). The essence of right-wing criticism is mass media’s 
“leftist agenda,” geared towards promulgation of liberal, post-modern values of 
feminism, environmentalism, global culture, and acceptance of homosexuality and 
atheism (Klinenberg & Wachsmuth, 2013). What connects these criticisms is the belief 
that the media do much more than just pass along facts to the public. The key question, 
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pertinent to this study, is about media’s motives and “purposes which underlie the 
strategies of creating one reality instead of another” (Molotch & Lester, 1974, p.111; 
Tuchman, 1978). 
 Media’s “watchdog” function. The beliefs about media’s watchdog function, the 
oldest and most widely-held way of thinking about the press (Boyce, 1978; McQuail, 
2005), treat the media as an independent, powerful institution, exercising control over 
branches of power on behalf of the public. The media monitor and scrutinize society, and 
circulate facts and information for the formulation of public opinion that holds the 
government accountable and exercises democratic self-rule. This thinking still dominates 
the public policy and public opinion about the press, justifying many legislative and 
practical freedoms and privileges available to the press corps.     
 Organizational and structural perspective – gatekeeper studies. Gatekeeper 
studies appeared as media scholars started paying attention to internal and external 
factors influencing news reporting (Gans, 1976; Schoemaker & Reese, 1996). These 
factors are journalist-centered influences (journalists’ ideologies, norms, and values), 
organizational influences (journalistic routines, ownership patterns) and external 
pressures (political actors, authorities, interest groups and other elites). The gatekeeper 
studies emphasize media’s role in defining what makes news. In his seminal book, 
Deciding What’s News, Gans (1979) applied the concept of perspectives (Mannheim, 
1936) to the work of the news media and concluded that journalists and the news media 
saw “the country from their position in society,” that is, their class perspective (p.3). 
Media’s lack of interest in grassroots politics and social movements and hyper-emphasis 
on the government and politics stemmed from the perspective of journalists and editors, 
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who typically held educated, white, middle class views (Gans, 2011). The framework of 
organizational routines and professional standards of journalism shaped how that 
perspective was expressed in the news. The journalists were also guided by a set of 
structural preconditions, such as working for profit-making firms and having to capture 
the interest of large, not very informed and not very interested audiences in a limited 
amount of time and space. These conditions led journalists to compress and simplify 
news, emphasize the conflict and drama, and attempt to remain neutral on controversial 
items. Deficiencies in coverage, such as an excessive attention to government’s doings 
and wrongdoings, stereotypes, atypical happenings and extreme behavior, and the lack of 
analysis and reflexivity, stemmed from these conditions. The gatekeeper studies are 
criticized (Gamson, 1991) for treating media as “isolated worlds” and failing to embed 
them in the broader political and economic context. 
 Media as “guard dogs” of elites. The influence of structural orientations on 
media’s coverage of social conflicts (Tichenor et al, 1970; Olien et al, 1989, 1994, 1995) 
is elaborated in the media and social conflict theory and its perspective on the media as 
“guard dogs.” The theory posits that the media protect power structures, acting as sentries 
for powerful elites. Unlike the media hegemony perspective, “guard dog” perspective 
puts media outside the power structure, but subservient to this structure. In homogenous 
and consensual structures, such as small local communities, (Olien et al, 1995) media’s 
alliance with the local elite prevents reporting on social conflict. In more pluralistic 
structures, such as big cities, the presence of several power groups, each protected by its 
own “guard dog” media, leads to greater likelihood of social conflict reporting (Olien et 
al, 1995).  Grassroots movements rarely get covered unless their actions threaten those in 
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power, as the media are focused on the elites. The “guard dog” perspective rejects the 
belief about media’s watchdog actions on behalf of the larger public, as well as the more 
submissive role as a “lapdog” of power or media’s membership in the powerful elite 
(Olien et al, 1994, 1995). 
 Media propaganda model. Media propaganda model, rooted in the political 
economy perspective, views media as an integral part of the power elite (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988), entrenched in political and economic relations. Herman and Chomsky’s 
propaganda model posits that the role of media is to inform, entertain and ingrain citizens 
with national values and to suppress dangerous oppositional perspectives. While 
propaganda is ubiquitous in totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, in developed 
democracies the propaganda is less manifest but nonetheless pervasive. The 
concentration of media ownership in the hands of small but powerful elites, media’s 
excessive reliance on advertising income and on government officials and corporate 
leaders for information, coupled with the power of governments and corporations to 
subdue and discipline critical media, all contribute to media’s instrumental participation 
in the elite rule (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Media’s opposition to social movements 
stem from their interest in preserving the existing institutions and social order. The media 
propaganda model is criticized for overestimating the deterministic role of power in 
media production, and rejecting the opportunity for social movements to advance their 
messages through the media (Ryan, 1991). 
 Media hegemony perspective. Relying on Gramschian ideas of hegemony, the 
media hegemony perspective views media as part of the hegemonic cultural power. 
According to Gamson’s (1991, xiii) description of the hegemony, “the dominant culture 
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works its magic in ways so subtle that the operation of power is thoroughly veiled.” 
Gitlin (1977) analyzed media practice in great detail, and the patterns of media’s 
reporting about social movements, and concluded that the way media shaped and 
“certified” (p. 797) the reality for social movements left no chance for their success. The 
media diminished importance of social movements and crippled their development. Gitlin 
offered a two-part explanation: one deals with journalists’ unspoken “journalistic codes,” 
rooted, at the level of practitioners, in their assumptions about “objectivity,” 
“newsworthiness,” “timeliness,” and their “fetishism of facts” (p. 793); the second 
explanation is structural as the codes journalists use reflect media’s integration with the 
power elite and their interest in maintaining social stability and the status quo. A typical 
coverage of a social movement starts with the media raising the awareness of a 
movement and popularizing it, but the media focus on movement’s style and manner 
rather than its issues; Next, the media polarize a movement by contrasting it with more 
moderate groups while also trivializing, stereotyping, and marginalizing it; Finally, when 
a movement gains the power and its “facts will be speaking very loudly for themselves,” 
the media “seals off” a movement by censoring most of its news or barring it from 
airwaves (p. 797). Among demobilizing frames used by the media against movements are 
overemphasizing movements’ reliance on violence, flashy symbols, imagery, and radical 
rhetoric, and stressing protesters’ emotional deviance (Gitlin, 1977, 1980). Gitlin 
concludes that social movements are “caught in a fundamental, an inescapable dilemma:” 
if they use radical tactics, they are marginalized and trivialized by the media, their issues 
‘sealed off’ and the movement obscured. If they adopt moderate tactics, they are 
assimilated in hegemonic politics, and their effectiveness, their ‘oppositional edge is 
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blunted’ ” (1980, p. 291). Gitlin thinks more moderate movements, which appear to be 
working within the system, get more favorable coverage but stand a lesser chance to 
defeat hegemonic powers. While recognizing the role of power in the production of news, 
media hegemony perspective recognizes active contestation of meaning in the media, 
thereby allowing greater agency for social movements to counter-hegemonic forces 
(Ryan, 1991).  
 Protest paradigm. The protest paradigm is an idea, based on Gitlin’s views 
(1977, 1980), that the media marginalize movements by relying on generic “reporting 
paradigms” or frames of coverage, which draw attention away from movements’ core 
concerns and demobilize their supporters. This formulaic coverage is structurally and 
ideologically-based. The more structurally and ideologically aligned the media with the 
ruling class, the stronger their tendency to cover social movements negatively to weaken 
their challenge.  
 In their seminal study credited with the emergence of “the protest paradigm,” 
Chan and Lee (1984) found that journalists covered civil protests through ideological 
prisms, which informed journalists “where to look (and where not to look)… what to 
discover,” (p. 189) “what type of cause-effect relationship” to anticipate (p.199), and how 
to treat protesters. The more ambiguous the conflict and the more radical the protest, the 
more journalists relied on generic frames of coverage. Chan and Lee (1984) analyzed the 
coverage of teachers and student protests over the closure of the Golden Jubilee School in 
Hong Kong, and found that the leftist, centrist, and rightist newspapers covered the 
protests in radically different ways. The rightist newspapers, supported by neighboring 
Taiwan, gave the protests sharply critical coverage. They marginalized the protests by 
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claiming they uprooted social order and traditional morality, politicized them by asserting 
the protesters were manipulated by external political powers, and supported 
government’s repressive measures. The leftist newspapers, linked to the Chinese 
authorities, were more supportive of the protests, putting the blame on the government. 
The centrists, Hong Kong’s rising independent, profit-oriented media, were most likely to 
frame the protests in terms of their substance, focusing on the issue at hand.  
 Over years, the “protest paradigm” came to denote not just ideologically-based 
coverage, but negative, marginalizing coverage of social movements. This interpretation 
of Chan and Lee’s (1984) original idea developed in the political and media environment 
of the 20th century United States, in which the media were ideologically and structurally 
homogeneous and closely aligned with the ruling elites, while social movements were 
perceived as the leftist threat to the status quo. The emergence of right-wing, 
conservative movements, and greater structural and ideological pluralism in the media 
(Weaver & Scacco, 2012) prompted 21st century scholars to re-visit and re-interpret the 
protest paradigm. 
 Of special interest to the proposed study is the scholarship on factors that trigger 
or mitigate media’s negative coverage of movements. The literature describes a range of 
factors, from the level of deviance of a protest to its size, location, tactics and strategies. 
In Western contexts, protests against the status quo get negative, demobilizing coverage 
more often than the protests that support the status quo. 
 The level of deviance best predicted the activation of demobilizing framing in the 
study of U.S. –based protests by Boyle and colleagues (2009). More radical protests were 
more likely to be framed episodically and less likely to feature protesters as sources. In a 
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comparative study of domestic and international protests, Boyle and colleagues (2012) 
supported the earlier finding that protest tactics influenced the coverage. More radical 
tactics were covered more negatively. Among other findings, political protests were 
treated more critically than protests over social issue. 
 Entman and Rojecki (1993) found the media used eight “framing judgments” in 
their coverage of the American nuclear freeze movement. The media produced mostly 
negative coverage, describing the protesters as emotionally charged, diffuse, nonpolitical, 
and marginal groups, which lacked expertise, public support, and partisan and strategic 
thinking, as well as any leverage over the power in Washington. Characteristically, the 
negative coverage intensified as soon as the movement gained strength, triggering its 
downfall. Entman and Rojecki (1993) linked the activation of the marginalizing coverage 
to certain stages in movement’s diffusion, echoing Gitlin’s (1977) observation that the 
media are more favorable towards movements in their early diffusion stage and become 
negative as movements gain strength.  
 Movements’ strategic decisions have a major bearing on their coverage in the 
media. Noakes and Witkings (2002) tested both the strong hegemony model, suggesting 
that the injustice claims advanced by challenging groups are systematically prevented 
from gaining media access and reported within the negative, protest paradigm, and the 
indeterminacy model, which posits that social movements are in greater control of their 
own media access and coverage. The framing study of the Palestinian liberation 
movement in the New York Times and the Associated Press found that none of the models 
held a superior explanatory power, and that the two models appeared to have worked 
together. Overall, the coverage was negative, as predicted by the hegemony model. 
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However, some of the strategies and tactics, such as grassroots uprising Intifada, and 
entering into negotiations with Israel, generated wider and more positive coverage, as 
predicted by the indeterminacy model. 
 Demobilizing frames. Western scholarship has accumulated rich descriptions of 
various marginalizing techniques used by the media to denigrate social movements. 
Gamson and Modigliani (1989) found politicizing protest was one of the ways to 
marginalize a movement and reduce its protest to a “dyadic conflict” with a government 
(p. 17). TV imagery of protesters as deviant individuals wearing bandanas and playing 
Frisbee and guitar was another technique of marginalization. McLeod and Hertog (1992, 
1999) developed a typology of marginalization techniques. The most frequently used 
techniques were emphasizing protesters’ deviant behavior and appearances, violence at 
protest events, disapproval of protests by the public and the official version of events. 
Protesters were rarely featured in this type of coverage. Dardis (2006) improved the 
typology, and tested a hypothesis that marginalization devices were used in both negative 
and positive contexts for social movements. Rejecting media’s pre-determination to cover 
protests negatively, the scholar nonetheless found that demobilizing frames were 
predominantly linked to the negativism towards the protest. Dardis concluded his 
findings did not suggest the media tended to treat protests “unfairly in general,” but 
media’s use of certain reporting devices in the negative context led to “perceived 
negative coverage” (p. 130). In the author’s view, this type of coverage led to potentially 
negative consequences for social movements, such as public’s perception of protests as 
violent and “treasonous gathering of idiots” (Dardis, 2006, p. 131).  
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 In the realm of electoral politics, Lupien (2013) described the marginalization of 
supporters of presidents Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Evo Morales of Bolivia in the 
qualitative analysis of Bolivian and Venezuelan newspapers. Unable to contest public 
support for these leftist governments, rich media owners used marginalizing frames 
against their supporters to discredit the governments “from below.” These supporters, 
who were predominantly working class poor, were described as “lumpen,” 
“unreasonable,” “uneducated,” “emotionally bound to leaders” (pp. 230-231) and 
generally incapable of making good and rationale choices for their countries. The author 
theorized that the high concentration of ownership in the South American media and 
entrenched elite interests were the factors behind the negative coverage, lending support 
to the hegemony model. 
 Di Cicco (2010) introduced a concept of “public nuisance paradigm” (p. 135) to 
describe a qualitatively new type of protest coverage, stressing bothersome, impotent and 
unpatriotic nature of protests as a form of political participation. The coverage 
emphasizes traffic jams, upset commerce, and various other costs to non-participating 
publics. This type of demobilizing framing stresses ineffectiveness of collective action 
and indifference to protests among the governments and publics. Protests are also framed 
as “unpatriotic” and potentially harmful for the country.  
 Most studies stress the consequences of marginalizing coverage of social 
movements for the public sphere and for grassroots’ participation in politics. By 
analyzing the confrontation between pro-life and pro-choice movements, Husting (1999) 
demonstrated that the media radicalized and polarized both movements, used war 
rhetoric, and placed both groups outside the realm of normality. The protesters were cast 
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as different from “viewers like us” (p. 159) and “normal Americans” (p. 171). On the 
issue of abortion rights, the media spoke from a nonexistent centrist position, which 
opposed both stands and the protest in general. Mindful of media’s role in shaping the 
shared sense of reality among the public, the author expressed his concern that 
demobilizing framing placed dissent outside normal American political expression and 
the public sphere. 
  Recent scholarship on media’s coverage of social movements. The 
proliferation of the Internet and other major changes in the 21st century prompted 
scholars to revisit framing theories of media and social movements. Weaver and Scacco 
(2013) analyzed the framing of the Tea Party in popular evening programs on CNN, Fox, 
and MSNBC, and on the AP newswire. Based on Chan and Lee’s (1984) original idea 
about ideological influences on protest coverage, Weaver and Scacco hypothesized that 
the Tea Party’s coverage would vary across ideological lines. Indeed, the coverage of the 
Tea Party depended on the ideological hues of the channel. MSNBC, a channel 
ideologically least aligned with the Tea Party movement, used delegitimizing frames 
significantly more often than others, while Fox, as ideologically most aligned with Tea 
Party movement, and was least likely to marginalize the movement. MSNBC’s selection 
of marginalizing frames was consistent with the protest paradigm, and involved de-
emphasizing the movement’s causes and issues, ridiculing its members, and asserting the 
Tea Party movement was at odds with the public and was controlled by the political 
elites. While CNN also used delegitimizing frames, it was the most neutral of the three 
cable channels in the study. The authors proposed to re-visit the claim (Gitlin, 1980) that 
conservative movements, supporting the status quo, would be covered positively. The 
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authors call for the update of the protest paradigm to apply in a new, politically polarized, 
ideologically-colored, fractured media environment.  
 Edgerly and colleagues (2011) described ideologically-based coverage of the 
major protest demonstrations over immigration rights. The discourse analysis of 
newspapers and niche TV stations found demobilizing frames dominated the coverage. 
While the protesters, mindful of the “protest paradigm,” managed to mitigate some of the 
marginalizing techniques -- the protests were not ignored but widely covered, and 
described as peaceful — they failed to advance their messages along the two chosen 
themes, economy and legislative rights. Newspapers, which reduced the event to episodic 
and tactical coverage, provided so-called “negotiated reading” (p.12) of the protest such 
that the reporting at times complied and at other times diverged from protesters’ intended 
meanings. Critical TV pundits gave protesters’ messages a “resistive reading” (p. 19), 
altering intended meanings of protesters. Friendly pundits gave protesters’ messages an 
“aligned reading” (p.19). They offered the context, explained the movement’s goals and 
issues, and generally focused on the intended meanings of the movement. The study 
supports the earlier claim that ideologically-aligned cable TV channels in the U.S. vary in 
their coverage of social movements. 
 Outside Western contexts, Yuan (2012) applied qualitative framing and discourse 
analysis to the coverage of a major Shanghai fire in a Chinese party newspaper and in 
three privately-owned Chinese metro dailies. The scholar found that the party organ and 
independent dailies used different frames of the event. The dominant frame in the party 
organ emphasized government’s rescue effort and support drawn to the victims, 
downplaying the failure of the quality assurance systems and possible system-level 
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corruption leading to the accident. The dailies, by contrast, drew a picture of human 
suffering and criticized the system. On the rationale that media’s selection of frames is 
contextualized and determined by the structural characteristics of their respective 
audiences, the author linked the divergent frames to the structural characteristics of 
newspapers’ divergent online communities: the officialdom and the older generation 
raised in communist ideals as readers of the party organ, and liberal, white collar, young 
urban professionals as readers of the dailies. 
 McCarthy and colleagues (2008) analyzed the likelihood of covering protests in 
the first years of Belarus’ post-Soviet independence. Four ideologically diverse 
newspapers, formerly partisan Soviet Belarus, elective organ’s the People’s Daily, 
formerly Komsomol7-owned the Banner of Youth, and Soviet intellectuals’ favorite the 
Star, differed in the likelihood of covering protests. Other factors influencing 
newspapers’ coverage of protests were the size of the protest and the political standing of 
protest sponsors.  
Framing by Social Movements: Mobilizing Frames 
 Social movements’ interaction with media. Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) spell 
out organizing principles of social movements’ interaction with the news media and the 
outcomes for both parties. Structurally, the relations between social movements and the 
media are asymmetrical, and follow power-dependence pattern. Culturally, the parties are 
more equal in the contest for meanings. Social movements’ dependence on the news 
media stem from their need for media to mobilize supporters, validate a protest, and 
expand the conflict in which they are contextualized. On the flip side of the relationship, 
                                                 
7  Komsomol was the youth wing of the Communist party in the Soviet Union. 
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news media need social movements for stories, but the need is not very high. Social 
movements are rarely treated as a beat, and have to compete hard with stories originating 
in the government and other institutions.  
 According to Lipsky (1968), movements maximize their exposure through 
communications media, which filter information that is available to followers, targets of 
protest, and reference groups of protest targets. When media coverage is extensive, 
reference groups’ perception of the protest is positively influenced, and the targets of 
protest are more likely to dispense rewards, symbolic or material. Social movements are 
typically interacting with four constituencies: followers, the media, third parties, and 
targets of protest. Those movements that represent powerless classes and lack bargaining 
power try to use protest as a tool to strengthen their bargaining positions. They typically 
try to activate third parties. Their protest often is aimed at eliciting sympathy and support 
among the groups that are referent groups of targets of protest. This is one of the few 
ways in which the powerless groups can create bargaining resources to bargain with their 
targets. Movements also woo interest groups. These groups, by virtue of their being part 
of the political process, possess sufficient bargaining power and influence and can greatly 
help powerless groups. In general, the protest is highly indirect process in which 
communications media play critical roles (Lipsky, 1968).  
 Social movements and news media, along with other actors, are involved in 
negotiations over frames and meaning. These framing contests offer greater opportunities 
to movements. One of the success strategies is moving issues from the uncontested realm 
of factual coverage, which journalists considered objective and fully devoid of frames, to 
the contested realm of opinion and interpretative content (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). 
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 To win the contest for dominant cultural meanings, social movements engage in 
framing. Benford and Snow (2000) define framing by social movements as meaning 
construction through contentious process, involving human agency and purpose. The 
product of social movement’s framing are collective action frames, which simplify and 
condense “the aspects of ‘the world out there’” (p. 614) in such a way as to recruit and 
mobilize supporters and demobilize opponents. Framing, then, is an enabling instrument, 
used by social movements for mobilization and other goals (Snow et al, 1986).  
 Mobilizing frames. Social movements design and promote mobilizing frames, 
such as collective action frames and master frames. According to Benford and Snow 
(2000), collective action frames are movement-specific frames, and are shaped according 
to the tasks they serve. There are three types of tasks: a diagnostic task refers to 
identifying and articulating the responsibility for a social problem; a prognostic task is 
the articulation of a solution or a plan to deal with a problem; a motivational task stresses 
problem’s severity, urgency, and infuses efficacy and sense of duty among supporters and 
potential recruits. Framing is associated with three types of processes: discursive 
processes articulate and amplify frames; strategic processes help align frames with the 
audiences and the political and cultural context; and contested processes are framing 
contests between mobilization and demobilization frames and internal social movement 
disputes over frames.  
 There are several variable features to collective action frames. The frames vary in 
terms of their attribution of blame or causality; the emphasis on internal or external 
causes of problems; rigidity versus flexibility, that is, whether they articulate a problem 
more narrowly or in a more elaborated way; and mobilizing potential. While elaborated 
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frames possess greater mobilizing power, so do frames that have resonance, that is, a 
power to strike a responsive chord with people (Snow & Benford, 1992). Resonance 
depends on empirical credibility and experiential commensurability, that is, frames’ 
believability and relevance from the vantage point of individual experience, and narrative 
fidelity, also called cultural resonance, that is, centrality of frames’ ideas and meanings to 
the belief systems of audiences, and their fit with cultural narratives and myths. The 
greater a frame’s flexibility, inclusivity, scope and resonance, the greater is its influence 
and mobilizing potential.  
 Master frames. More inclusive and flexible frames, which also possess greater 
interpretive scope, resonance and power, evolve into master frames (Benford & Snow, 
2000). Master frames are generic frames, which serve a purpose of punctuating, 
attributing and articulating social problems, but they do so at a higher level than 
movement-specific, collective action frames. Punctuating involves identifying and 
highlighting problems and injustices; attributing involves identifying sources of a 
problem and assigning responsibility for future action towards ameliorating the problem; 
articulating involves pulling together events and experiences in a meaningful thread such 
that “what was previously inconceivable, or at least not clearly articulated, is now 
meaningfully interconnected” (Snow and Benford, 1992, p. 138). Master frames, when 
effectively coordinated with movement-specific frames, strengthen a momentum for 
mobilization (Johnston, 1991; Noonan, 1995; Snow, 2004). Snow and Benford (1992) 
argue that master frames, as “ideational webs” (p. 142), can support the emergence and 
course of a movement and of the larger cycle of protest (Tarrow, 1983). An innovative 
master frame can provide a good reason for collective action and spur tactical 
   
44 
 
innovations. Sometimes, movements become progenitors of master frames for later 
movements, providing ideational anchoring. Master frames advanced by the American 
civil rights movement have inspired and served movements in later years (Snow & 
Benford, 1992).  
  Sociopolitical and cultural influences on social movement framing. Benford 
and Snow (2000) stress the influence of contextual factors on social movement framing. 
Among factors that amplify or constrain mobilizing frames are political and cultural 
opportunities and the audiences of social movements. Political shifts, such as conflicts in 
the elites or lessening of repressions, strongly influence social movement framing 
(McAdam et all, 1996), affecting the meaning and relevance of frames. These influences 
are mutual, with frames shaping how individuals perceive political events and 
opportunities, identity, injustices and needs in the society.  Shifts in cultural “stock of 
meanings, beliefs, ideologies, practices, values, myths, narratives and the like” (Benford 
& Snow 2000, p. 629) also affect social movement frames and their resonance. Again, the 
influences are mutual, with the cultural stock replenished and altered by social movement 
frames.   
 Mobilizing frames are strongly influenced by target audiences of social 
movements. There is a consensus in much of the communication literature that the targets 
affect the form and content of a message. Since social movements have multiple targets, 
such as the government, potential supporters, media, or other movements, they attempt to 
craft frames that are meaningful to them and are influenced by these multiple targets. The 
audiences influence how movements devise and, from time to time, modify their 
mobilizing frames (Benford & Snow, 2000).  
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 Zuo and Benford’s (1995) study of the Chinese democracy movement illustrates 
how social movements design mobilizing frames to respond to political and socio-
cultural context and the needs and actions of the audiences. By analyzing frames that 
accompanied the emergence and growth of the 1989 Chinese democracy movement, the 
first major independent political movement in the People’ Republic of China, the scholars 
concluded that the movement profited from successfully shaped and aligned frames. 
These frames resonated with the millions of bystanders and turned them into active 
protesters. The movement’s framing stressed culturally salient values among Chinese 
citizens and their everyday experiences, while also targeting the state by stressing the 
protest was patriotic, nonviolent and Confucian in spirit. The protesting students, whose 
initial demands were for more democracy and freedom of expression, re-aligned their 
frames to denounce corruption and state profiteering to enhance the scope of protest and 
draw in the general population. After the state deployed counter-frames of “turmoil,” 
“plotted conspiracy,” and “violations of the constitution” (p. 143), the students re-aligned 
their frames again to neutralize the state. The new frames alluded to three major cultural 
value sources: service to society in the Confucian tradition, communism and national 
patriotism. The authors concluded that in repressive, totalitarian regimes, effective 
framing is more important and influential than in other contexts. Once successfully 
connected with belief and knowledge systems of the target population, frames trigger 
mobilization, which occurs at a faster pace due to similarity and typicality of grievances 
among millions of repressed individuals.  
 Noonan (1995) provided insightful analysis of the master frames used by the 
Chilean women’s movement to fight for their rights and for the return to democracy 
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during Augusto Pinochet’s authoritarian regime. This historical study provides empirical 
support of the importance of well-chosen, resonant frames, modified to respond to shifts 
in the environment. While the feminism frame served Chilean women well in the 
beginning of the 20th century, it lost its cultural resonance after the leftists came to power 
and advanced a more general “class oppression” frame. In response to the void, women 
developed the “maternal” master frame, which emphasized the importance of women as 
mothers in their families and in the larger family - the nation. With the arrival of 
Pinochet’s repressions and “disappearances” of tens of thousands of Chileans, the 
maternal frame opened up new opportunities for protest. In fact, it was the only possible 
framing strategy in this authoritarian context. Women framed their activism and 
opposition to the government as maternal search for “disappeared” sons, husbands and 
loved ones, and as a traditional, maternal duty to care for a family. The “maternal” frame 
resonated with Pinochet’s own conservative values and the emphasis on traditional 
feminine roles. Thus, women used the “maternal” frame to successfully subvert the 
regime. When the struggle reached a high point, several oppositional movements, 
including women’s groups, came together under a new “return to democracy” master 
frame. This new master frame was elaborate and flexible to incorporate many different 
movements, including the groups that were not rights-oriented (the urban poor) but 
started including human rights in the broader definition of life necessities. 
 Fuchs (2013) studied the women’s movement in Poland and its effective use of 
the “law” master frame. The law and rights discourses have been used by the political 
opposition in the Eastern Europe since the 1970s, and were highly resonant among the 
Polish public. The women’s movement has successfully deployed the “law” master frame 
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to advance its abortion rights agenda. A media discourse over the reforms proposed by 
the movement was broad and predominantly supportive. 
 Markowitz (2009) described a case in which social movements’ mobilizing 
frames failed to fit the socio-cultural context. In the late 1980s, Tajik and Uzbek national 
liberation movements, called Popular Fronts, adopted the imported master frame of 
“secessionist nationalism”, successfully deployed by the Baltic and Georgian liberation 
movements. However, the frame failed to serve the goals of these movements because 
ethnic, regional disputes and violence in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan made the idea of 
nationalist unity irrelevant and marginal. Both movements failed to see the changes in the 
political context and adapt their mobilizing frames. As a result, the Uzbek and Tajik 
governments charged the movements with instigating ethnic violence and marginalized 
and repressed them with tacit support from the public.  
 Mauersberger (2012) analyzed the adoption of a new and progressive media 
legislation in Argentina, advocated by the Coalition for Democratic Broadcasting. The 
new law on audiovisual broadcasting, adopted in October, 2009, tightened media cross-
ownership limits, diversified regulatory structure and guaranteed equal access to airwaves 
for public, private and private non-profit media. In the scholar’s view, the movement’s 
success in promoting the law was due to an unusually broad participatory process, which 
included coalition building with the members of media, “potent framing of media 
regulation as a matter of democracy and the changing media-state dynamics that 
disrupted the long-standing mutually supporting ties between the dominant media group 
and the government” (p.222). 
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 The problem the movement set out to address was the high concentration of 
media ownership, which prevented access to diverse sources of information, a 
prerequisite for meaningful deliberative processes (Dahlgren, 1995). In August 2004, the 
Argentinean Forum of Community Radios organized the Coalition of Democratic 
Broadcasting, bringing together more than 300 national and international social actors, 
movements, unions, academics, and activists. The coalition framed its agenda, called “21 
basic points for the right to communicate,” under “discursive umbrella” of democracy 
and human rights (p. 593). These points defined communication as a right and an 
essential service for the social, cultural, and education development of the Argentine 
people. The coalition dismissed the view that broadcasting was merely a commercial 
business, and stressed that the plurality and diversity of ownership was vital to 
democracy. The frames of human rights and democratization proved to be highly 
resonant among the audiences, and more capable than, for instance, socio-economic 
frames, of uniting diverse groups around a common media and communications agenda. 
A high profile of human rights organizations in Argentina amplified the frames and made 
it easier for the coalition to communicate its claims to the government. Borrowing the 
discourse of the coalition, President Fernándes said the proposed law was “an old debt of 
democracy” and called on the government to endorse it.  
 The coalition successfully dealt with the challenge emanating from the powerful 
Argentine media organizations. The Argentine media have been known to have a “strong 
tendency … to be controlled by private interests with political alliances and ambitions, 
which seek to use their media properties for political ends” (p. 177). By presenting media 
monopolies as a danger to democracy, the movement sought to neutralize its biggest 
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opponent, the powerful Clarín media group. The Clarin group was capable of blocking 
and marginalizing the coalition efforts. The coalition emphasized that the broadcasting 
spectrum was a public resource, and that market mechanisms and interests of big 
businesses had to be pushed back. The coalition managed to successfully exploit the 
disruption of “long-standing cooperative relationship” and “logic of understanding 
between government and dominant media” (Becera & Mastrini, 2010, p. 625) during 
President Fernándes’ term in the office. 
Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter, I have reviewed the literature on framing theory as the proposed 
theoretical framework for the study and outlined major theories of social movements and 
media. I have also summarized the current thinking on media’s framing of social 
movements and social movements’ use of media for mobilizing.  
 The section on framing theory provides several conflicting definitions of the 
concepts “frame” and “framing.” This study relies on Entman’s definition of framing as 
an act of selecting and highlighting the aspects of a perceived reality. This definition is 
consistent with the sociological stream of the framing literature (Benford & Snow, 2000; 
Gamson, 1982, 1989; Snow et al, 1986), and its reliance on “emphasis framing.” The 
emphasis framing refers to the selection and presentation of different elements of 
information rather than the presentation of the identical information under different 
labels, as in “equivalence framing” (Scheufele & Iyengar, 2012). It is this author’s view 
that equivalence framing, as a method, is more appropriate in experimental studies. 
Drawing on emphasis framing, the study will attempt to clarify how the Georgian media 
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selected and highlighted certain aspects of the news related to the media democratization 
movement in order to produce mobilizing or demobilizing effects on the audiences.  
 The proposed study is interested in the framing that occurs at the issue level 
(Johnston et al, 2996), and, primarily, in frames that exist with a communicator and in a 
communicated text (Entmnan, 1993). The issue at hand is media democratization in 
Georgia. Based on the insights reviewed in this chapter, different media organizations are 
expected to frame in different ways. Some media, hypothetically, will present the 
proposed reforms as serving the people’s right to know, while others may describe them 
as an interference with the free market or as a pointless protest by marginal groups. 
 The study will analyze the media democratization movement’s framing decisions, 
that is, frames that exist with a communicator (Entman, 1993), and media’s framing of 
the movement, found in a communicated text. The text is Georgian newspaper and TV 
stories. 
  The section on social movements outlined the key perspectives in the sociological 
and political communication literature on social movements. The study will rely on social 
constructivist and conflict approaches. The social constructivist idea that meanings and 
reality are socially constructed helps explain how framing shaped the reality around the 
media democratization movement in Georgia. The outcome of this effort is understood 
and hypothesized as a success of media activists in constructing the issue of media 
reforms as a necessary step towards greater, rights-based democracy. The second 
approach that informed the proposed study emphasizes social conflict. This perspective, 
reviewed in the section on social movements, and media propaganda, media hegemony 
and “guard dog” media theories (Gitlin, 1980; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Olien et al, 
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1995), reviewed in the section on media, are all rooted in conflict. The section on media’s 
coverage of social movements is organized around the idea that “journalists do not 
simply report on news, they actually help create and change it”, thereby setting the 
context for making events in the world intelligible (Schudson, 2003, p.11). Media’s social 
function is to scrutinize and control. But is the media acting on behalf of the public or on 
behalf of elite, powerful groups? The studies in the gatekeeper tradition stress journalists’ 
role in producing news, and note the influence of organizational values and routines, 
while “guard dog media,” media propaganda and media hegemony models emphasize 
structural and ideological influences and the issues of power. This section provides an 
overview of these views as necessary to understand media’s framing of social 
movements. The conflict perspective helps conceptualize the deployment of mobilizing 
and demobilizing frames in the coverage of the media democratization movement as the 
reflection of a conflict between divergent interests in the issue. Reforms to democratize 
media had powerful opponents in Georgia, such as the government and government-
aligned broadcast media. The movement had supporters, such as the political opposition 
and opposition-sponsored media, geared towards political change. Hypothetically, the 
independent media, held in disadvantageous position by the government and therefore 
interested in greater fairness in the media sector, were also aligned with the media 
democratization movement. The study anticipates that the conflict played out in the 
media, resulting in different frames of the media democratization movement in different 
news organizations. The conflict is expected to have also influenced the media 
democratization movement’s framing decisions. 
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 The author takes a close look at the dominant view in the literature that the media 
tend to demobilize movements by de-emphasizing their causes and marginalizing their 
supporters. The literature explains this tendency with media’s alliances with the elites 
against challengers, such as social movements, and journalists’ reliance on certain 
narrative structures, emphasizing drama and conflict. However, the literature also seems 
to suggest that the media that are ideologically aligned with social movements tend to 
cover them with greater fairness and substance. Acknowledging the influence of power 
on the media, and journalists’ tendency to rely on formulaic reporting and demobilizing 
framing of social movements, this study rejects the deterministic role of power in media’s 
coverage of social movements. The study anticipates fair and substantive coverage of the 
media democratization movement in the media outside government-controlled segment. 
Following Ryan (1991), the author theorizes that active contestation of meaning in 
pluralistic and partially pluralistic political and media environments allow social 
movements some opportunity to attain fair coverage.  
 The section on mobilizing framing by social movements discusses framing 
strategies, which help secure media interest, subvert opponents, and mobilize supporters. 
The section focuses on the elaboration and diffusion of mobilizing movement-specific 
and generic master frames. The importance of framing for social movements’ goals is 
stressed. The social movement framing studies reviewed in this section demonstrate the 
importance of effective, culturally-aligned master frames, and the need to adapt and align 
frames with the context (Markowitz, 2009; Noonan, 1995; Zuo & Benford, 1995). Based 
on these findings, the study theorizes that the Georgian media democratization 
movement’ frames were intended to resonate with culturally powerful themes of free 
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speech and democracy. The movement frames were hypothetically resonant with multiple 
audiences, including members of the media, to whom free expression and transparency 
were deeply-held professional values.   






Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 Qualitative analysis of movement statements and in-depth interviews. The 
first part of the study qualitatively analyzed materials produced by the Georgian media 
democratization movement to identify mobilizing and demobilizing frames. These 
materials were movement statements, produced between April, 2011 and October, 2012 
(see Appendix C for the list of statements). The study also conducted in-depth interviews 
with the activists of the media democratization movement, most of whom were the 
members of the Coalition for Media Advocacy (SMO), to clarify the rationale behind the 
framing decisions. Activist journalists8 participating in the Coalition for Media Advocacy 
were asked about their understanding of the movement frames, and the movement’s 
coverage in the media. A thematic analysis was used to identify common themes in 
interview responses. The study posed the following research questions: 
 RQ1: What mobilizing frames were advanced by the movement? 
  RQ2: What were the goals of the media democratization movement?   
                                                 
8 The term “activist journalist” refers to professional journalists, who joined the media 
democratization movement, and is different from “news producers” and “news reporters,” 
the terms reserved for professionals not engaged with the movement. 
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 RQ3: What was the rationale behind framing choices? 
 RQ4: What were the experiences of activist journalists and news journalists while 
covering the movement? 
 Quantitative Media Content Analysis. The study theoretically argued that 
political factors, such as news organizations’ ties with the government and the opposition 
(or lack thereof) would influence their application of mobilizing and demobilizing frames 
in the coverage of MDM. Pro-opposition media would be interested in change and 
willing to cover social movements positively. Pro-government media would be interested 
in the maintenance of status quo and either ignore or negatively cover social movements. 
The study posed a research question if the independent media, if and when they 
experienced government pressures and unfair competition from government-controlled 
media, would also be sympathetic towards the challengers of the system, such as social 
movements, and cover them positively. 
 Based on these theoretical conjunctions, this study hypothesized that: 
 H1: Pro-government media are more likely to use a negative tone (H1a), 
demobilizing frames (H1b), not use movement-advanced frames (H1c) and use 
government officials as sources (H1d) in the coverage of the media democratization 
movement. These media will cover the movement less frequently (H1e), more briefly 
(H1f), less prominently in terms of assigned page space or airtime (H1g) than pro-
opposition media. 
  H2: Pro-opposition media are more likely to use a positive tone (H2a), mobilizing 
frames (H2b), activists as sources (H2d), in the coverage of the media democratization 
movement. These media will cover the movement in greater length (H2f), and more 
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prominently in terms of assigned page space or segment of airtime (H2g) than pro-
government media. 
 The study posed the following research question: 
 RQ5: How do independent newspapers cover media democratization movement 
in terms of the tone (RQ5a), demobilizing versus mobilizing frames (RQ5b), using 
movement-advanced frames (RQ5c), sources (RQ5d), frequency (RQ5e), length (RQ5f) 
and prominence of page space and airtime assigned to the coverage (RQ5g)? 
Methodology 
 To analyze the nature of media coverage of the media democratization movement, 
the study a) carried out the qualitative content analysis of mobilizing statements produced 
by the media democratization movement; b) conducted in-depth qualitative interviews 
with activists and activist journalists about their understanding of the goal, framing 
decisions and media coverage, and with news producers and reporters about their 
understanding of the movement and their experiences on the beat; c) conducted 
quantitative content analysis of news media framing of the media democratization 
movement. 
 Qualitative analysis of mobilizing and activist interviews 
 Analysis of movement statements. The study qualitatively analyzed statements 
produced by the Coalition for Media Advocacy, SMO9 of the media democratization 
movement. The purpose of this analysis was to identify mobilizing frames used by the 
movement, and assess their effectiveness in terms of their replication in the media 
coverage. The materials were all statements by the Coalition for Media Advocacy made 
                                                 
9 Social movement organization is abbreviated as SMO throughout the text. 
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from April 13, 2011 (the day of launch of the Coalition) to October 1, 2012 (Election Day 
2012), and carried by www.media.ge, an industry publication, in full. The study analyzed 
17 statements. The statements were downloaded from the website, www.media.ge.  
 The coding proceeded as follows: a coding frame was developed to comprise 
several mobilizing master frames described in the social movement literature, heeding on 
de Vreese’s (2012) advice to use frames described in the literature in the interests of 
building generalizable knowledge. In the pilot phase (Schreier, 2012), part of the material 
was coded to test the coding frame. The text that did not correspond to any of the frames 
was coded as “other,” and re-coded to identify other frames described in the literature or 
any new frames. The coding frame was then revised before the coding proceeded. The 
coding produced a list of frames used by the Georgian democratization movement in its 
statements (see Appendix D). QD Miner, a qualitative analysis software package, was 
used in the analysis. 
 In-depth interviews. The study conducted 17 in-depth, semi-structured qualitative 
interviews with coalition activists, including activist journalists, about their 
understanding of the goals of the media democratization movement (RQ2), its framing 
strategies (RQ3), and activist journalists’ coverage of the movement (RQ4). The purpose 
of this exercise was to understand the rationale behind the framing decisions, perceived 
goals of the movement, and personal meanings attached to the media democratization 
movement and activism in general. The study also interviewed five producers and 
reporters in news organizations sampled for the content analysis of the Georgian media’s 
coverage of MDM about their views about MDM and the activism, in general, and their 
experiences on the beat (RQ4).  
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 Personal interviews were conducted in Tbilisi, Georgia, by an interviewer hired 
and trained by the study. The interviews were transcribed and analyzed thematically. The 
thematic analysis involved reducing data by assigning codes to paragraphs and grouping 
thematically related sections together to arrive at common themes. This process is 
described in Schierer (2012) as “reductive coding.” Filing data under various thematic 
codes is also described in Weiss (1994), and labeled as “local integration.” The analysis 
produced a rich description of activists’ meanings and interpretations. Further in the 
process of analysis, the researcher grouped themes into sections on the basis of mini 
explanatory theories -- the process labeled a “vertical integration” (Weiss, 1994). These 
mini-theories were derived based on logical theorizing and supported by evidence in 
interviews.  Next, the material was categorized into bigger sections, based on mini-
theories, supporting evidence and any dissenting evidence that was found in the 
interviews.  
 Quantitative content analysis of news media content. The study used 
quantitative content analysis as the method to look into the coverage of social movements 
in the content of news media.  
 Media Democratization Movement. The study operationalized the coverage of 
media democratization movement as the coverage of the Coalition for Media Advocacy 
(SMO), the It Concerns You (the movement’s campaign), the “must carry” regulation to 
ensure unlimited distribution of TV broadcasts by cable operators and the regulation to 
disclose media ownership structure and financial data (movement’s key proposals), and a 
special case upheld by the movement to lift the government’s ban on the distribution of 
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TV Maestro’s antennas ahead of the Parliamentary Elections 2012. The coverage of these 
organizations, actions and issues was treated as a proxy of movement’s coverage.  
 Selection of media organizations. The study analyzed the content of three 
newspapers, daily 24 Hours, daily Resonansi and daily Alia, and their weekend edditions, 
Weekend, Mteli Kvira and Kronika, respectively. These newspapers have had varying 
degrees of financial and ideological independence from the government or the 
opposition: 24 Hours has received public funds for the publication of government decrees 
and other public information, and perceived to editorially support the government (TI-
Georgia, 2011). 24 Saati has publicly denounced the allegation of its links with the 
government (Tsiklauri, 2011, December 16). Alia has been radically critical of 
Saakashvili’s government, and was less critical of the opposition during the Elections 
2012 (Caucasus Resource and Research Centers, 2012). The Georgian Public Broadcaster 
and other government-controlled national television stations have accused Alia of 
accepting funds from the opposition -- the allegations Alia had vehemently denied 
(Tsiklauri, 2012, October 1). Newspaper Resonansi held a middle ground: it has been 
vocal about government’s transgressions without leaning heavily towards the opposition. 
The study categorized these newspapers as pro-government (24 Saati), pro-opposition 
(Alia) and independent (Resonansi)10.  
                                                 
10 This categorization is based on newspapers’ and TV stations’ perceived editorial bias, 
documented by industry watchdogs (Freedom House, 2009-11) and on the monitoring of 
these newspapers’ coverage of the 2012 elections (www.mediamonitoring.ge). None of 
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 Alia appears on weekdays other than Monday, with weekly Kviris Kronika 
distributed on Mondays. Alia has 16 pages, and Kronika 40 pages (www.alia.ge). The 
circulation of newspapers was 10,300 issue for each newspaper (www.alia.ge). The two 
newspapers produced 258 issues per year. Resonansi prints five days a week, Tuesdays 
through Saturdays, with weekly edition Mteli Kvira published on Mondays 
(www.resonansdaily.ge), to the total of 310 issues per year (Matsne.ge). The circulation 
of newspapers was 6,000 copies each. 24 Saati prints five days a week, with weekly 
edition Weekend published on Fridays and no print on Sundays. 24 Saati and Weekend 
produce 310 issues per year (www.matsne.ge).  
 The study also analyzed TV coverage of the media democratization movement in 
three TV stations, pro-government Rustavi 2, pro-opposition 9th Channel, and 
independent Kavkasia. The ownership in Rustavi 2 has always been in the hands of 
government-linked businesses. The current general director of the company is the former 
minister of education. At different times, business partners of former ministers of defense 
and economy were at the helm of the company. The 9th Channel was launched in April 
2012 by the key opposition figure, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, and closed shortly after 
the elections. TV Kavkasia was included in the sample as an independent TV station.  
 The content of these news sources was downloaded from the Terramedia 
database. The institutional search engine of the database was searched for all materials 
under “the Coalition for Media Advocacy,” “It Concerns You,” “media,” “television,” 
                                                 
the newspapers or TV stations have explicitly endorsed either the government or the 
opposition in the 2012 campaign or at any other times. 
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“radio” and “press” to identify news stories in the broad area of media issues. (A more 
precise keyword search would leave some materials unaccounted due to the limitations of 
Terramedia’s search engine.) The study identified these preliminary populations: 312 
stories in daily 24 Saati and weekly Weekend; 300 stories in daily Alia and weekly Kviris 
Kronika; 410 in daily Resonansi and weekly Mteli Kvira; 543 stories in Rustavi 2 (pulled 
from news program “Courier’ at 08:00, 09:00, 10:00, 11:00, 12:00, 14:00, 15:00, 16:00, 
17:00, 18:00, 20:00, 21:00, Business Courier at 13:00, and weekly Courier P.S.); 2031 
stories in 9th Channel (news program “News” at 08.00, 09;00, 10:00, 11:00, 12:00, 14:00, 
15:00, 17:00, 18:00, 19:00, 20:00, 21:00); and 558 stories in Kavkasia TV (news program 
“Today” at 17:00, 19:99 and 20:30). Next, the study searched these preliminary 
populations by more focused keywords “Maestro TV,” “antenna ban,” “media 
ownership”, “ownership transparency,” “financial transparency,” “must carry” “must 
offer” “cable signal distribution” in the word software. The search resulted in 23 stories 
in Alia, 42 stories in 24 Saati, 87 stories in Resonansi, 105 stories in Rustavi 2, 186 
stories in 9th Channel, and 139 stories in Kavkasia. Due to the limited amount of 
newspaper stories, the study did not put any stories aside for the training, and used stories 
about the media democratization movement in another newspaper, Akhali Taoba, instead. 
The study set aside a training sample of ten stories from Rustavi 2, 9th Channel and 
Kavkasia. After the training sample was set aside, the final sample was identified as 23 
stories in Alia, 42 stories in 24 Saati, 87 stories in Resonansi, 95 stories in Rustavi 2, 176 
stories in 9th Channel, and 129 stories in Kavkasia. The randomly selected sub-sample of 
91 stories was set aside for the intercoder reliability test.  
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 Timeline. The study analyzed materials produced between July 1, 2010, the 
approximate time first informal groups of the media democratization movement 
organized and started exerting pressure on the government (S. S., personal interview, 
March 12, 2014; Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014) and October 1, 2012, 
Election Day.  
 Analysis of content. The study analyzed media texts for the presence of master 
frames identified in social movement studies. The study looked for both mobilizing and 
demobilizing frames, and for the use of frames devised by the movement. The study also 
recorded the tone of articles and TV stories, their use of sources, genre, and frequency 
and prominence of coverage.  
 Mobilizing and demobilizing master frames. The study analyzed the text in order 
to identify mobilizing and demobilizing master frames. Mobilizing master frames were 
conceptualized as frames launched by the media democratization movement or its 
supporters to punctuate, attribute and articulate the problems in the media sector and 
mobilize supporters. The study drew from the typology of social movement master 
frames by Benford (1997). The rights master frame (Benford, 1997; Benford & Snow, 
2000; Snow & Benford, 1992; Williams & Williams, 1995) referred to human rights and 
freedoms; The injustice master frame (Benford, 1997; Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson et 
al, 1982) accentuated injustices that a movement intended to address; The injustice frame 
interpreted happenings as supportive of the conclusion that an authority system was 
“violating the shared moral principles of the participants” and provided “a reason for 
noncompliance” (Gamson et al, 1982, p.123); The democratization master frame has 
been generally applied in the context of democratic transformation (Mauersberger, 2012; 
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Nounah, 1995) to accentuate the right of a society to live in the system of rights, values 
and practices known as democracy; The rule of law frame shaped issues in legislative 
terms, and was often invoked in transitional contexts to press changes in the legal system 
as a proven tool against the authoritarian regimes (Fuchs, 2013); The free speech frame 
denoted commonly understood and universally held values of free speech, expression, 
and access to information (Postigo, 2012, p.1183); The transparency frame underlined 
the need for greater transparency and sincerity as opposed to conspiracy and 
manipulation in the conduct of public affairs. In this study, transparency was expected to 
frame the need to access information on private media ownership and other aspects of 
their business. The frame has been deployed in an earlier study about the protests in 
Georgia (Manning, 2007).  
 After the analysis of movement statements, the study replaced the transparency 
frame by access to information – transparency frame to account for the meaning attached 
to the frame by the activists, and added fair elections and access to information – 
plurality frames, frequently used by the activists in their statements. The study added 
these frames to the code book. The category other was for any other master frames (see 
the codebook in Appendix A).  
 The study looked for the presence of demobilizing frames. These frames were 
conceptualized as counter frames and marginalization frames deployed by movement 
opponents and the media to denigrate and demobilize movements. In general terms, 
demobilizing framing de-emphasize movement’s cause, including the issues that 
legitimized a protest, and shifted the focus to the protesters, described as deviant, 
antisocial and marginal (Weaver & Scacco, 2013). The study used demobilizing frames 
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identified in the literature on social movements and media (Chan & Lee, 1984; Dardis, 
2008; Di Cicco, 2010; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). The Support for status quo frame 
(Chan & Lee, 1988) referred to the expression of support for the status quo government’s 
measures against social movements; The hinders free business frame was an adaptation 
of the free market master frame (Mooney, 1991), which referred to the free market 
forces; The hinders country, unpatriotic frame involved the argument that developmental 
goals of countries overrode other concerns, such as the respect for human rights, and that 
activism was unpatriotic (Di Cicco, 2010); The immoral, goes against tradition frame 
was an articulation of the morality and tradition frame (Chan & Lee, 1988). In this frame, 
protesters’ actions and demands contradicted traditional moral, religious, cultural values; 
Politicizing, also called dyadic conflict and strategic frame (Gamson & Modigliani, 
1989) defined a protest in political or partisan terms, as an action motivated by the pursuit 
of power. The frame also ascribed a protest to external manipulations rather than 
spontaneous reaction to sociopolitical deficiencies; The violence frame described protests 
as lawless situations, anarchy (Dardis, 2008), vandalism, police confrontations and 
arrests; The freak show (McLeod & Hertog, 1999) was an appearance-based frame, 
which emphasizes physical oddities among the protesters; The romper room/ idiots at 
large frame focused on demonstrators’ immaturity and childlike behavior, and their 
inability to tackle the complex issues they were advocating (McFarlane & Hay, 2003, 
p.223); The carnival referred to the coverage of movement’s direct actions as carnivals, 
theatrical performances, shows, and celebrity events; The unfavorable polls, statistics, 
generalizations, eye-witness accounts referred to the use of public opinion polls, 
statistics, eyewitness accounts to show public opposition to a protest and to claim that 
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protesters did not speak for the majority of people; The counter-demonstrations showed 
counter-demonstrations against social movement, typically, street protests parallel to 
activists’ protest; The bothersome/disruptive frame accentuated disruptions of traffic, 
upset commerce, and various other public costs of street protests (Di Cicco, 2010); The 
impotent, ineffective, counterproductive frame referred to the ineffectiveness of a protest 
(Dardis, 2008) (see codebook in Appendix A.) 
 Sourcing. The study analyzed the media’s use of sources. The idea was to make a 
distinction between the coverage in which social movement activists and their supporters 
were given a voice from the reporting that relied on official sources and accounts. The 
coders were instructed to register the use of sources from among coalition activists and 
journalists participating in the coalition, other non-profit sector representatives, other 
journalists, government officials, opposition MPs, non-parliamentary opposition, 
international community representatives, ordinary citizens and other sources. 
 Tone. The study analyzed the tone of media content.  The coders were asked to 
determine whether each paragraph in a newspaper or a TV story was negative, positive or 
neutral toward the media democratization movement. The story at hand was coded as 
positive or negative if two-thirds of paragraphs pointed in either direction. If not, the 
story was coded as balanced. 
 Coding. Two trained coders hired for the analysis coded the stories after three 
weeks of training and subsequent adjustment of the coding instrument. They double-
coded 91 articles for the intercoder reliability test. The intercoder reliability was 
satisfactory. All variables except three had a Knipendorff’s alpha above .80. Three 
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variables, “tone – positive,” “sources – activist journalist” and “mobilizing frame - free 
speech” had Knipendorff’s alpha above .70 (see Appendix E).  




Movement Statements and Interviews with Activists: Qualitative Analysis 
  
 The purpose of the qualitative study was to identify frames constructed by the 
media democratization movement and clarify the rationale behind framing choices and 
movement goals in interviews with the activists and activist journalists. The study carried 
out the qualitative content analysis of movement statements and the thematic analysis of 
in-depth qualitative interviews with activists and activist journalists. In addition, the 
study interviewed news producers and reporters who had covered MDM about their 
attitudes and experiences on the beat.   
 The chapter starts with the analysis of statements issued by the media 
democratization movement. This section is titled Part One: Movement Statements. Part 
One will identify dominant mobilizing frames and seek rationale behind framing choices. 
In Part Two: In-depth Interviews, we analyze in-depth interviews with activists, including 
activist journalists, to refine the analysis of activists’ framing choices, which starts in Part 
One. In Part Two, we will also explore how activist journalists’ involvement in the media 
democratization movement may have affected their coverage of the movement and 
whether and how news producers’ and reporters’ professional values of press freedom 
and access to information influenced their coverage of the movement. The study will link 
meanings attached to the media democratization movement by news professionals to the
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tone and frames found in the quantitative content analysis of the coverage of media 
democratization movement, which is provided in the following Chapter Five.   
Part One: Movement Statements 
The study qualitatively analyzed the materials produced by the Coalition for 
Media Advocacy and other activist groups with which the Coalition joined forces. The 
purpose of the analysis was to identify mobilizing frames advanced by the activists, as 
per RQ1. The study analyzed statements released between April 13, 2011, the day the 
Coalition was launched, and October 1, 2012, Election Day. The statements documented 
activists’ positions on issues and demands and were typically distributed among civil 
sector organizations, international watchdogs, diplomatic missions, government offices, 
and the press. These materials were downloaded from www.media.ge, an industry web 
publication. The study analyzed only the statements that were posted in full, ignoring the 
statements that were simply summarized. The study analyzed 17 statements: the 
memorandum of partnership and 11 statements by the Coalition for Media Advocacy; 
two statements by the It Concerns You, the Coalition’s joint campaign with election 
activists; two statements by the Georgian Platform of European Union’s Eastern 
Partnership Forum, with which the Coalition and other civil society organizations 
collaborated; and one petition by the group of media and civil sector organizations, which 
included the Coalition, to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to 
ensure that the “must carry” rule of mandatory distribution of broadcast signals by cable 
companies remained in force after the 2012 Parliamentary Elections. 
The statements were published approximately once a month (see Appendix C) 
and covered priority items on the activist agenda. The purpose of the Coalition for Media 
   
69 
 
Advocacy was addressed in one statement; the “must carry/must offer” legislation was 
addressed in three statements and in the petition to the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe; the ban on distribution of Maestro TV’s antennas was addressed 
in two statements; the fairness of coverage and media access during the elections was 
addressed in three statements; the restrictions of video recording at the Parliament of 
Georgia, the beating and intimidation of journalists during the May 26 demonstrations, 
the arrest of four photographers on espionage charges, the blackmailing of journalist 
Tedo Jorbenadze, the removal of newspaper distribution kiosks, the financial audit of the 
Palitra Media House, and the proposed auction of the main TV broadcast tower in Tbilisi 
were covered in the remaining seven statements (see Appendix C, Table C.1).  
 Mobilizing frames found in MDM statements. The study analyzed these 
materials for the presence of mobilizing master frames described in the literature 
(Benford, 1997) and for any movement-specific frames. A mobilizing master frame has 
been defined as a broad, generic frame that punctuates, attributes, and articulates 
problems and has relevance across countries and contexts (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow 
& Benford, 1992). The study drew from the typology of social movement master frames 
by Benford (1997) to create an initial coding scheme. This coding scheme contained 
rights, injustice, justice, democratization, rule of law, free speech, and transparency 
frames. As coding progressed iteratively, the coding scheme was further revised. The 
study dropped the justice frame, which refers to the restoring justice and dignity of the 
oppressed as irrelevant to the Georgian media context, re-conceptualized the 
transparency frame as access to information –transparency and access to ownership 
information, and incorporated six new frames: fair elections, access to information – 
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plurality, public interest, responsible government, it concerns you, and public 
engagement.  At the final stage, the coding scheme was streamlined by merging the 
public engagement frame with the public interest frame and the access to ownership 
information frame with the access to information –transparency frame. A qualitative 
analysis software program, QDA Miner, was used for the analysis of data. 
 The analysis demonstrated that the most frequently used mobilizing frame—
which was used in the largest share, or roughly one fifth, of the movement statements—
was the free speech frame (RQ1) (see Appendix D for the list of frames and keywords). 
Combined usage of access to information – plurality and access to information – 
transparency frames also accounted for one fifth of the analyzed statements. Fair 
elections and responsible government frames were used less frequently, or in roughly one 
sixth of the material, and injustice and rule of law frames each appeared in approximately 
one tenth of the material. Rights, it concerns you, public interest, and democratization 
frames were used in less than one tenth of the material each. While quantitative 
characteristics of the sample lack statistical precision, which, of course, is unattainable in 
qualitative analysis, these quantitative data suggest that the key mobilizing frames 
launched by activists of the media democratization movement were free speech, access to 
information – transparency, access to information – plurality, responsible government 
and fair elections (RQ1). 
 Other analyses showed that some of the frames were used across the range of 
topics and issues explicitly addressed in the statements, while others were topically more 
restricted. The free speech frame, for instance, was present in most of the statements, 
regardless of topic. The rule of law frame was also applied to a range of topics. The 
   
71 
 
access to information - plurality and fair elections frames were used in the context of 
elections. The injustice frame was used mostly in statements about physical violence and 
intimidation of journalists. 
 The distribution of frames in time also revealed a pattern. The free speech and 
rule of law frames were evenly spread over the two-year period of this study. The access 
to information – plurality and fair elections frames were only used in 2012, the election 
year. 
 Rationale behind framing choices.  Overall, the movement’s use of mobilizing 
frames in its published statements is in line with the social movement literature.  
According to Benford and Snow (2000), movements intend to achieve one or all of these 
key framing tasks: identifying the problem and articulating blame (a diagnostic task); 
articulating solutions (a prognostic task); and motivating supporters and recruits (a 
motivational task). Frames used by the Georgian activists pursue diagnostic and 
motivational tasks. Some of the frames, such as the injustice frame, identify problems in 
the Georgian media environment and pinpoint the responsible party—in the case of the 
injustice frame, the government of Georgia. Some other frames, such as it concerns you, 
pursue motivational tasks. It concerns you signals that issues in the Georgian media 
environment are relevant to journalists and non-journalists alike, motivating supporters 
and potential recruits. The responsible government frame serves a dual purpose: 1) as a 
diagnostic frame, it articulates the responsibility of the government for restricting the 
freedom of media; and 2) as a motivational frame, it attempts to make the government act 
towards the elimination of problems it has created. In the discourse framed as responsible 
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government, the government of Georgia is called upon, asked, pressed, and otherwise 
motivated to take action. 
 The Georgian activists interviewed in this study were clearly influenced by the 
strength and reach of master frames, which carry meanings across countries and contexts 
(Benford & Snow, 2000). Master frames link together events that appear not to be 
meaningfully connected, providing rationales for collective action (Snow & Benford, 
1992).  Free speech, access to information - transparency, and access to information - 
plurality frames linked issues in Georgia’s media environment, such as the problematic 
distribution of broadcast signals around Georgia or the lack of information about media 
owners, with other sociopolitical issues, such as people’s right to participate in politics 
and make informed choices in elections, forming a coherent argument about 
democratization in all spheres of public life. These frames linked the country’s priorities -
- building a successful and democratic statehood, holding fair elections, forming 
responsible citizenry -- to the concept of freedom in the press. Georgian activists’ use of 
frames is comparable with the framing practices of free speech movements in transitional 
contexts (Mauersberg, 2012; Postigo, 2012). These movements accentuate frames related 
to various aspects of freedom of speech: free press, access to information – transparency, 
access to information – plurality. The free speech frame in this study referred to the right 
of individuals and media to express, produce, and distribute information, while the access 
to information – transparency and access to information – plurality frames dealt with 
access to information, a more recently articulated component of the freedom of speech 
framework (Postigo, 2012). Typically, the Coalition statements featured all three 
elements of the free speech framework. Sometimes, two or all three of these frames were 
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used in a single paragraph, as in the August 2012 statement by the Georgian Platform of 
the Eastern Partnership below: 
We are concerned with the decision to ban distribution of TV company 
Maestro’s satellite antennas. This action is unacceptable as it limits 
constitutional rights and freedoms, including the freedom of speech and 
expression, the freedom to access and distribute information, and 
ownership rights, and is in conflict with the existing legal framework.  
(Mchedlidze, 2012, August 30)  
 The top five frames found in the studied statements– free speech, access to 
information – transparency, access to information – plurality, fair elections, responsible 
government – are interconnected and related to the concept of democracy. As mentioned 
above, three frames reflect different aspects of the freedom of speech concept, an 
essential element of democracy. The fair elections frame is conceptually linked to access 
to information – transparency and access to information – plurality as aspects of a fair 
electoral process, which is essential to democracy.  
 A careful reading of the statements in the context of Georgian politics helps us 
understand the use of frames in a more nuanced way. In response to criticism over its 
media policies, the government of Georgia crafted two arguments: a) freedom of 
expression in Georgia is legislatively guaranteed and exercised by all citizens 
(Mchedlidze, April 30) and b) plural and diverse sources of information exist in the 
country (Mchedlidze, 2010, February 18). Through the use of the access to information – 
transparency frame, the activists argued that the freedom of expression for news media 
made little sense without the media’s free access to facts and public information. The 
activists also questioned the information plurality argument by stressing citizens’ access 
to plural sources was uneven and unavailable in different regions of the country--hence, 
the use of the access to information – plurality frame. The presence of two justifications 
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for the unimpeded access to information – transparency and pluralism -- underscores the 
importance of the issue to activists. As is characteristic of master frames (Snow & 
Benford, 1992), the access to information – transparency and access to information – 
plurality frames easily aligned with the election context. The access to information – 
transparency frame shaped discourse about the need for the Georgian government to 
handle the elections in a transparent way, while access to information – plurality spoke of 
the need to facilitate voters’ choices by providing plural sources of information. 
The emergence of the fair elections frame in the activists’ discourse is related to 
the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Georgia. Fair elections was a powerful and 
culturally resonant frame in Georgia and the rest of the former Soviet Union. One of the 
oldest election monitoring organizations in Georgia is named International Society for 
Fair Elections and Democracy. The Coalition for Media Advocacy and the It Concerns 
You campaign relied on the fair elections frame to suggest that the media environment, if 
not improved, would create problems for the elections. For example, the Coalition 
stressed in the statement dated September 24, 2012, that “ensuring transparency of the 
elections is important, because only a transparent process can lead to public trust in the 
election results” (Tsiklauri, 2012, September 24). Similarly, the It Concerns You 
campaign also insisted in the statement dated September 30, 2012, that the “must 
carry/must offer” rule continue beyond Election Day on the grounds that “the disregard 
of these principles would negatively affect media and election environments” 
(Mchedlidze 2012, September 30).  
The activists recognized the power of the fair elections frame and wanted to 
leverage the interest in fair elections into support of media reform. The government of 
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Georgia as the protest target, the Georgian people, international organizations, and the 
media – all were sensitive to the fair elections frame. The government of Georgia had 
declared on multiple occasions that it had a strong interest and intention in holding free 
and fair elections in 2012. President Saakashvili had vowed to hold “the best elections 
ever” (24 Saati, 2012, September 7). The fairness of the elections was closely monitored 
by foreign governments and international human rights watchdogs, to whom the elections 
were a proxy indicator of Georgia’s democratic progress. “Georgia is an important 
nation, which holds an important place in the Caucasus as a beacon of democracy and we 
are here to protect this beacon,” said the President of the Parliamentary Assembly for the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Riccardo Migliori, ahead 
of the 2012 elections (Resonansi, 24 August).  
The responsible government frame also shows the activists addressing key 
constituents in the framing process. The Coalition adopted the strategy of active 
engagement with the government. By using the responsible government frame, the 
Coalition suggested the government was responsible for the problems in the media and 
pushed it to take action. For example, the It Concerns You activists addressed the 
government to deal with the Maestro case in the statement dated July 12, 2012: “Once 
again, we call on the government of Georgia to take all available measures to ensure that 
the citizens have access to plurality of information, to produce without delay the evidence 
it holds to justify the ban on the distribution of satellite antennas imported by TV 
Maestro” (Mchedlidze, 2012, July 12). 
  One feature of the activists’ framing strategy was the use of multiple frames in a 
single document, sometimes in a single paragraph. At times, frames were simply 
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deployed one after the other. More often, multiple frames formed a coherent and 
multifaceted argument. Here’s how the Coalition for Media Advocacy used 
democratization, free speech, access to information – transparency, access to 
information – plurality, and rights frames to argue against the government’s decision to 
restrict video recording in the Parliament in the statement dated February 9, 2012: 
The coalition believes that the decision will be a step backwards in 
protecting democracy, transparency and freedom of expression and will 
limit citizens’ right to access objective information about elected members  
of the Parliament. (Tsiklauri, 2012, February 10) 
There are several possible explanations for the Coalition’s use of multiple frames 
in a single statement. One explanation is that the activists were aiming to reach all 
constituents through a single message. Another explanation is framing uncertainty. The 
Coalition for Media Advocacy was a young organization -– all statements analyzed here 
are produced in Coalition’s first year and a half in operation – and it may have failed to 
rally member organizations behind one or two key frames. One activist told the 
interviewer to go find “old statements” to see “what words we used there,” failing to 
recall framing decisions in the early period of activism (S. S., personal interview, March 
12, 2014). Activist organizations typically spend time developing a common 
understanding of goals and key frames among members (Powel, 2011). A single, 
unifying frame – it concerns you – emerged towards the end of the timeframe of this 
study, supporting our view that the activists’ framing was a work-in-progress.  
Characteristically, the activists’ key frame (Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 
2014), it concerns you, has not been sufficiently elaborated in the Coalition for Media 
Advocacy and the It Concerns You materials. This frame underlined the agency and 
purpose of citizen involvement in the media democratization movement, but the need for 
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citizens to get involved in public affairs was not stressed in statements. The frame was 
present just in the name of the campaign, but not all of its materials. 
Part Two: In-Depth Interviews 
The study thematically analyzed in-depth interviews with movement activists and 
participating journalists to clarify meanings, motivations and thought processes attached 
to the mobilizing frames and the media democratization movement. Activist journalists 
participating in the coalition were also asked whether they had covered the movement 
and, if yes, the nature of their experience. The study interviewed news producers and 
reporters outside the Coalition, who had covered the activism for the broadcast and print 
press. The interviews were semi-structured and built around three research questions: 
RQ2 about activists’ vision of the goals and importance of the media democratization 
movement; RQ3 about activists’ rationale for framing choices; and RQ4 about activist 
journalists’ and news producers’ and reporters’ experiences covering the media 
democratization movement. The latter question was to be further explored in the context 
of the findings of the quantitative analysis of the news media coverage of the media 
democratization movement (these findings are discussed in the following chapter). 
The study conducted seventeen interviews with activists and news journalists. 
One request for an interview was declined by a television producer. An interviewer, hired 
by the study, conducted all interviews in person, using an agreed-upon interview 
protocol. Twelve interviews were with activists and five with news producers and 
reporters on the beat. Of the 12 activists, 11 were the leaders and representatives of 
member organizations in the Coalition and one represented the Coalition’s partner 
organization in the It Concerns You campaign. By professional background, eight 
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activists had experience as journalists, with five then working as journalists. Four 
activists were civil sector professionals: two headed media development programs at 
major foundations (one of the two also worked in academia), one coordinated democracy 
programs at a major foundation, and one was a media lawyer. For the sake of privacy, 
these individuals will be referred to as “magazine publisher,” “regional publisher,” 
“editor in chief,” “independent journalist,” “investigative journalist,” “head of 
association,” “media rights activist,” “election activist,” “media developer,” “media 
academic,” “democracy specialist,” and “media lawyer.”  
News journalists were reporters and producers employed by the five news 
organizations sampled for the quantitative content analysis of the Georgian media. They 
were reporters in pro-government, pro-opposition, and ideologically independent 
newspapers11 and producers at government-controlled stations.12  The decision to 
interview TV producers instead of TV reporters was related to producers’ greater role in 
selecting topics and determining the angle of coverage. 
                                                 
11 This categorization is based on newspapers’ editorial slant in the coverage of 2012 
elections (www. mediamonitoring.ge), published watchdog reports, newspapers’ 
acceptance of various forms of funding from the government or the opposition. The 
Georgian newspapers do not declare editorial support for political candidates or parties. 
12 This categorization of Georgian TV stations’ editorial slant in the coverage of the 2012 
elections (www. mediamonitoring.ge), watchdog reports, and the political positions and 
ties of owners: business partners of government officials in one station and a key 
opposition figure in another. 
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The activists, including activist journalists, and news producers and reporters 
seemed open and motivated to discuss the movement and its importance. They willingly 
provided details about goals, strategies, and tactical moves and gave a rich description of 
attitudes, experiences, emotions, and norms in response to the research questions posed 
by the study. These questions are addressed in some detail in the following four sections: 
“goals and importance of the media democratization movement,” “rationale behind 
framing choices,” “views of activist journalism and news reporters about MDM.” These 
sections correspond to RQ2-4, and draw heavily on the spoken words of activists, 
including activist journalists, and news reporters themselves (see Table 4.1) 
 
Table 4.1: Research questions, themes and sub-themes in in-depth interviews 
 
Goals and importance of the media democratization movement (RQ2) 
Theme 1. Strengthening press freedom 
Sub-theme 1.1 Seeing media in distress 
Sub-theme 1.2 Having professional and personal stake in MDM 
Sub-theme 1.3: Engaging voluntarily, sincerely, and spontaneously in MDM 
Theme 2. Building stronger, more involved society 
Sub-theme 2.1. Perceiving problems in the governance and the society 
Sub-theme 2.2. Movement to join forces with other activists and energize the 
public 
Sub-theme 2.3. Facilitating fair elections 
Rationale behind framing choices (RQ3) 
Theme 1. Frames to target the government 
Theme 2. Frames to target the international community 
Theme 3. Frames to target the people 
Theme 4. Frames to target members of the media 
Theme 5. Counter-frames and marginalization 
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Views and experiences of activist journalists and news reporters (RQ4) 
Theme 1. Debate about the expression of activism in journalism 
Theme 2. News producers and reporters about MDM and its media coverage 
Theme 3. Special relationship between the independent media and the civil sector 
 
 Goals and importance of the media democratization movement (RQ2). The 
analysis of interviews showed differences and similarities in activists’ understanding of 
the goals and importance of the media democratization movement. Two themes emerged 
from the analysis. The first theme, the improvement of the media environment, was a 
logical and understandable goal for the members in the media democratization 
movement. The second theme -- energizing publics and increasing their involvement and 
influence in public affairs – was a natural extension of improvements in media’s capacity 
to inform citizens. Together, these two goals – improving media’s capacity to inform 
citizens and strengthening citizens’ involvement in public affairs – were intended to 
advance the democratization of Georgian society. They closely tracked the movement’s 
overall goal of the democratization of Georgia. In this discourse, the activists articulated 
the links between free media, free and participatory publics, and a stronger democratic 
society. The interviewees articulated the achievements of the activism – the adoption of 
“must carry/must offer” rules of mandatory distribution of TV signal by cable operators, 
progressive changes in media ownership legislation, better distribution of media content 
in the regions – as improvements in Georgia’s media environment and society at large.  
 Theme 1: Strengthening press freedom. The freedom of the press was the highest 
order issue for the activists, the majority of whom were professional journalists. Activist 
journalists, who had experienced government oppression first hand, used their own and 
colleagues’ experiences in the interviews as evidence. Most journalists said they had 
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never before been involved in activism and that problems the Georgian media faced made 
them mobilize. They said the restoration of a “healthier, less censored environment” 
(S.S., personal interview, March 12, 2014) in the media was their goal (RQ2), and that, 
first and foremost, they wanted to improve their own professional environment (N. Z., 
personal interview, March 15, 2014; S.S., personal interview, March 12, 2014; Z. K., 
personal interview, March 13, 2014). Non-journalists in the sample saw problems of the 
media as indicative of the lack of Georgian society’s overall health. All activists said 
their efforts were voluntary, unpaid, sincere, individualized, and unscripted. 
 Sub-theme 1.1: Seeing media in distress. The majority of activists said they 
became convinced -- sometime around 2007 and 2008 -- that the problems in the 
Georgian media were not diminishing but growing. “We realized that we were in very 
bad shape,” said an influential magazine publisher in Tbilisi.   
We were losing freedom. Journalists were in trouble. We discovered the 
invisible mechanisms of censorship were at work. Nobody was slamming 
into newsrooms anymore, but we were still in trouble. Financially, the 
independent media were near collapse. In national televisions, journalists 
had no freedom and were not producing quality journalism, let alone 
investigative journalism. (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014). 
 A veteran independent journalist, who had been involved in the emergence of 
independent journalism in post-Soviet Georgia and actively involved in the 
democratization effort since then, said the level of monopolization and government 
control was so high that “the media were not a problem for the government anymore” 
(Z.K., personal interview, March 13, 2014). Among many specific issues, the 
interviewees identified four key areas of concern: transparency and access to public 
information, non-transparent ownership in the broadcast media, the lack of plural sources 
of information in various regions of the country, and the lack of independence of public 
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broadcasting. They believed these problems stifled the development of media and 
journalism in Georgia. The metaphors activists used -- roadblock, cordon, closed doors—
reflected their perceived gravity of the situation.  
 An experienced investigative journalist, who had been in the profession for almost 
a decade, used the roadblock metaphor to describe her feelings in May 2007, when she 
realized she might no longer be able to practice investigative journalism. Her story of 
dealing with the ownership takeover at her employer’s organization, the lack of access to 
public information, and distributional hurdles is a good illustration of problems in the 
Georgian media and journalism in that period. 
The problems in this journalist’s professional life started in 2004, when the 
ownership at her employer, a national broadcast TV station, changed abruptly. The new 
owners, who were business partners of the then-minister of defense, ordered all 
investigative documentaries produced by her unit to be taken off the air. The team 
continued receiving salaries and to be listed as official staff, but all production was 
stalled.  
One day, …[a new owner] came to the office, carrying a black suitcase … 
[A colleague] introduced me. [The owner] said he knew me well. A few 
days later, we learned that [TV station] was no longer interested in 
investigative journalism, as this genre was not in demand with the 
audiences. (That is what they always say.) We were instead offered to 
produce a game show…Our sources were calling, demanding that we act 
upon stories they had told us. ‘Help,’ they were saying. ‘We are robbed. 
We are sent to prison.’ We were trying to hide from these pervasive phone 
calls. (N. Z., personal interview, March 15, 2014) 
 Realizing she had no professional future at the station, the journalist left and 
started an independent documentary studio. But her problems did not end. She had a hard 
time accessing public information and getting government officials to talk. At one point, 
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her request for the government to release the names of TV station owners was refused on 
the grounds that the government restricted the release of ownership information to the 
public. Her subsequent attempts to investigate suspicious takeovers of businesses by 
individuals close to the government met with failure. Distributing independently-
produced documentaries was another problem. At first, none of the TV stations would 
show the documentaries, so the journalist screened investigations to small groups of 
friends and supporters in rented cinema halls. Later, small, Tbilisi-based independent TV 
stations picked up the documentaries, but their signal could not reach beyond certain 
parts of Tbilisi. Cable operators did not include these outspoken media stations in their 
distribution packages. For the investigative journalist, it meant her work would not reach 
broad audiences. 
 The ownership takeovers such as the one described by the investigative journalist 
were changing the face of the industry. The professional cleansing of TV stations -- an 
effective, non-violent way of silencing journalists -- was happening across the country. 
The practice triggered polarization. Some TV stations were becoming more and more 
supportive of the government, and others increasingly critical. New owners in TV 
stations preferred to stay in the shade and had companies registered in off shore zones 
(Freedom House, 2009, IREX, 2009). While names of these owner companies were listed 
publicly, information on the ownership structure and beneficiary owners was unavailable. 
The lack of complete disclosure of ownership meant there was no way of knowing 
whether these beneficiary owners held more than one broadcast license, a practice banned 
on anti-monopoly grounds (T.K., personal interview, March 26, 2014; Z. K., personal 
interview, March 13, 2014). The lack of financial transparency meant the owners could 
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easily subsidize TV stations instead of operating them for profit, which, if disclosed, 
would raise alarms about their non-commercial, political interests (Z. K., personal 
interview, March 13, 2014). The editor-in-chief of a Tbilisi-based daily and the veteran 
media activist said non-transparent TV ownership negatively influenced the industry. The 
anonymous owners were “setting the rules and information policies from behind the 
curtain” (L. T., personal interview. April 4, 2014). These owners, a group associated with 
the government, were gradually taking over the broadcast media to influence the media 
content, “destroying the trace” of transactions in off shore zones, according to the 
independent journalist (Z. K., personal interview, April 4, 2014).  
 The lack of transparency in the government and access to public information was 
another major problem in the Georgian media (Freedom House, 2005, 2011). The lack of 
access to documents and sources meant journalists had to produce one-sided, factually 
incomplete reports and face criticism and distrust of the public (R. M., personal 
interview, April 20, 2014). Newspaper reporters in pro-government, pro-opposition and 
ideologically independent media, interviewed by the study, thought the lack of access to 
public information and officials was their biggest problem. They suffered from the 
capriciousness of politicians. “We asked, pleaded, stood at their doors, trying to get them 
to comment. This was a catastrophe,” said the reporter at independent Resonansi (R. M., 
personal interview, April 20, 2014). The reporter working for 24 Saati, pro-government 
newspaper, said the officials privileged major television stations (D. G., personal 
interview, April 21, 2014). He said all public events were scripted. Officials would make 
statements in front of TV cameras and then withdraw without taking questions. The 
media, he said, were essentially given ready-made reports to air, and many went along 
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with this practice. (The interviewee put the most blame on editors and producers, who he 
thought were siding with the government. Reporters, he said, joked about the practice but 
were afraid to voice criticism.) The interviewee thought this practice went against the 
public interest and limited substantive coverage of public affairs (D. G., personal 
interview, April 21, 2014).  
 Problems in production were aggravated by distribution issues. The independent 
journalist used the cordon metaphor to describe problems small independent and 
oppositional TV stations faced in trying to reach audiences outside Tbilisi. Cable 
operations, especially in the region, were willing or pressured to exclude these outspoken 
TV stations from their distribution packages. The government had called these stations 
“hostile to the government” (Mchedlidze, 2010, February 18). Many Georgians who 
relied on cable to receive broadcast signals had no access to these critical stations. The 
experienced producer of pro-opposition 9th Channel said the lack of distribution outside 
the capital Tbilisi made her task of producing news extremely difficult. People in the 
regions were unwilling to talk to journalists whose work they could not see on their 
screens (T. R., personal interview, April 10, 2014). In the regions, small TV stations were 
experiencing similar distributional hurdles. The head of a media association interviewed 
by the study said a local station, if it dared to air serious criticism or exposure of the 
government, would be switched off by a local cable operator at the government’s request 
(N. K., personal interview, March 24, 2014).  
 The print media, too, faced distributional problems. The mayor’s office in Tbilisi 
put limitations on street sales, and successful newspapers had to deal with unexpected tax 
audits. “We were witnessing absolutely irrational orders, aimed against the media,” said 
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the reporter at pro-opposition newspaper Alia (T. O., personal interview, May 3, 2014). 
Independent newspapers and magazines experienced severe financial problems because 
businesses were unwillingness to advertise with critical media (S. S., personal interview, 
March 12, 2014).  
 The magazine publisher summed up the mood in the media by saying it was 
independent media’s “common vital interest to have a healthy media environment,” in 
which “all of us would survive” (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014) (RQ2). The 
key assumption of the study – that certain media in transitional systems occupied 
disadvantageous positions in relation to others and were therefore likely to question the 
status quo and strive for the change – appears to hold in these interviews. 
 Sub-theme 1.2: Having professional and personal stake in MDM. In their 
interviews, activists, including activist journalists, relied heavily on their professional and 
personal experiences and stressed familiarity with the problems they had set out to 
eliminate. Activist journalists said they turned to activism to be able to carry on with 
professional duties and careers in the future. Activists from other professional venues 
stressed activism was a natural extension of their support and involvement in the media. 
The strength of professional and personal investment in the movement’s goals is one of 
its distinct features (RQ2). The regional publisher said the Coalition for Media Advocacy, 
the movement’s organization, was a platform to deal with participants’ real problems.  
Usually, coalitions get together and start pondering over what issues to 
engage. In our case, it was different. We did not have to ask questions. 
The identification of issues came first, and the creation of the Coalition  
followed. (I. M, personal interview, April 18, 2014)  
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 The following statement from the investigative journalist reflects dominant 
feelings among professional journalists involved in activism:  
 The media were losing their function. I could no longer be an 
investigative journalist. I was not providing people with information, how 
could I? I could not steal information, nor invent it. I needed information 
to analyze and inform the society. To solve the problem, I started 
investing much energy into activism. (N. Z., personal interview, March 
15, 2014) 
 The investigative journalist said she saw activism as “a way out” of her troubles, 
“the job” she had to do. Citing Lenin, who famously pledged to “follow a different path” 
to freedom, the investigative journalist said the activism was her path to unrestricted 
access to public information and freedom to pursue investigative journalism. After 
attending an advocacy seminar organized by the US Government for Georgian media 
professionals, the journalist used a leftover travel allowance to legally register a new 
advocacy organization13.  
  The strength of journalists’ personal motives did not mean they were on a 
personal crusade against the system. Most activist journalists said that the problems that 
affected them and the industry negatively influenced the Georgian society (Z. K., 
personal interview, March 13, 2014). Citizens needed free and independent media to get 
information about the government and public affairs. The independent journalist, who 
said he personally had as much stake in the media reforms as any other journalist, 
claimed that the problems in the media environment that the activist journalists were 
trying to resolve were important to the society at large.  
                                                 
13 Non-profit organizations in Georgia require legal registration with the Public Registry.  
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I am producing a talk show…which airs on TV Maestro…I of course want 
as many people as possible to watch my program. So, if Maestro gets 
distributed via cable under the “must carry” rule, it is very good for me, 
right? But is it only good for me? Isn’t it good for the pluralism in 
general? (Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014) 
 The independent journalist said he and his colleagues started getting together 
regularly sometime in 2010 to discuss the state of media. Their group designed a proposal 
for a comprehensive program of reforms. Another group of journalists gathered at the 
offices of the magazine publisher. “We were meeting regularly,” She said, “… some 10-
20 people, different types, to discuss the events in the media and politics.” (S. S., 
personal interview, March 12, 2014). This group, which included the investigative 
journalist, formed an advocacy organization and began lobbying for changes in the 
Georgian Public Broadcaster. These professional interests and streams of activism 
matched with the interests of media developers in revitalizing stalled media reforms 
(RQ2). A media lawyer, who was responsible for organizational matters at the Coalition 
for Media Advocacy and later led one of its member organizations, said the civil sector 
organizations decided to join forces after seeing that huge resources they had been 
investing in the media environment were not leading to substantial improvements in the 
media sector. These organizations hoped the coalition work would improve the efficiency 
of media assistance programs (T. K., personal interview, March 26, 2014). The Open 
Society Georgia Foundation, also known as the Soros Foundation, chose media advocacy 
as its key area of engagement (H. J., personal interview, March 25). It proposed the idea 
of a coalition, which media professionals enthusiastically embraced. The activists saw the 
coalition as a “common platform for action” (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014). 
The Coalition for Media Advocacy, launched on April 13, 2011, declared it would 
support media freedom and access to information, protect media organizations, and 
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initiate media legislation, setting in motion sustained activism in these areas. It brought 
together a “hybrid expertise” (H.J., personal interview, Mach 25, 2014) of law, 
management, and journalism professionals, which helped widen its focus and the concept 
of reforms.  
Sub-theme 1.3: Engaging voluntarily, sincerely, and spontaneously in MDM. 
Most activists in the study repeatedly said they joined activism spontaneously, without a 
plan, and that their effort was unfunded and sincere. If, initially, decision making and 
planning in the movement were rather informal, in later months, closer to the elections, 
the activism became highly organized (T. K., personal interview, March 26, 2014). The 
picture that emerged from interviews was of the dynamic growth and professionalization 
of activism from its inception in 2010 to the formation of the Coalition for Media 
Advocacy in 2011 and the launch of the It Concerns You campaign in 2012. The 
Coalition’s key campaign, It Concerns You, was highly coordinated (T. B., personal 
interview, April 12, 2014). The organizational and decision-making procedures became 
formalized, and the framing work more elaborated towards the end of 2012. 
 The media academic said “the members of the coalition have invested their time, 
and this human investment, not funding, resulted in the crystallization of true interest… 
[Members were] genuinely concerned, emotional and personally affected by these 
problems” (T. Z., personal interview, April 2, 2014). The media lawyer said members 
were attracted by the organization’s lack of hierarchy and collegial, consensual decision- 
making process (T. K., personal interview, March 26, 2014). “The greatest attraction for 
me was the spontaneity, sincerity and intensity of the process,” said the magazine 
publisher, who was one of the first to join the Coalition for Media Advocacy (S. S., 
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personal interview, March 12, 2014). She used the words idealist, civic, and enthusiasm 
to describe the media activism. She said activists were involved in practically all aspects 
of the collective action, from making videos to writing text and organizing events. She 
would start a day with updating followers about the day’s events on Facebook, and end 
by providing an account of achievements at friendly media studios. “The actions were 
very spontaneous and need-based. Every day we were planning what to do tomorrow, 
[moving] from one event to another, from one action to another,” she explained. The 
activism had a strategic line but individualized and “creative” tactics. “I was running 
around like a crazy person to go everywhere I was needed, to get posters and whistles, to 
attend Thursdays [meetings of the Coalition for Media Advocacy]… It took much energy 
away from me, and it took my time,” said the investigative journalist (N. Z., personal 
interview, March 15, 2014). 
 Others saw the movement as more organized program, with the strategic line but 
room for tactical maneuvering. The media developer and democracy specialist saw the 
process as organized but flexible and “lively” (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 
2014). They said the Coalition for Media Advocacy, and especially the It Concerns You 
campaign, had a strategic line, with issues and actions arranged in priority order and 
responsibilities assigned to particular actors. Tactical maneuvering was important to 
respond to the evolving circumstances in politics and the society (T. B., personal 
interview, April, 12, 2014; Z.K., personal interview, March 13, 2014). The democracy 
specialist recalled how, after planning and executing street actions, the activists would 
receive phone calls from the government and invitations to negotiate, “to trade” (T. B., 
personal interview, April 12, 2014). If negotiations stalled, the activists would go back to 
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their street action or engage in some other form of pressure to get the government to talk 
again (T. B., personal interview, April 12, 2014). Other factors requiring tactical 
maneuvering were internal frictions between the Coalition members (H. J., personal 
interview, March 25, 2014). The newspaper editor in chief likened activism to the game 
of chess, in which theories and previous games matter, but very important decisions are 
often made on the spot.  The independent journalist said there was nothing spontaneous 
in the activism: “To come up with the slogan, It Concerns You, we met three for about 
three to four hours, until the slogan was born. When this many journalists and civil sector 
organizations are engaged in extensive brainstorming over one slogan, how is that 
spontaneous?!” (Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014). 
 Theme 2: Building stronger, more involved society. While media freedom, 
understandably, emerged as the leitmotiv in this study, the society and active publics 
became the second overarching theme. The activists, who mobilized over media 
problems, began seeing these specific problems in the wider context of societal problems. 
They realized problems in the media environment had two sources: unjust decisions in 
the government and citizens’ inability to watch the government and lead in public affairs. 
The media activists saw the need to consolidate with other issue groups and broaden the 
movement. The initial concern over building a healthier media environment developed 
into demands for a more vibrant, free, and participatory environment in the country. This 
focus on public participation is reflected in activists’ key slogan, it concerns you. 
 Sub-theme 2.1: Perceiving problems in governance and society. Some activist 
journalists went to great lengths in describing problems in Georgian politics, linking 
issues in the media and political environments. Asked about her personal motives to 
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become an activist, the publisher said she was concerned about her business and the 
overall situation in the country. While the failure of her business could have been 
tolerated, she could not tolerate the failure of her country (I. M., personal interview, April 
18, 2014). The publisher of the Tbilisi-based magazine used the metaphors monopolized 
and closed to describe the Georgian politics and the society in the years 2007 and 2009: 
 There was no movement, and we were somehow reconciled with the idea 
that it was all over. The political space -- leverages and resources -- was 
fully monopolized [by the government]. We were “offsite”…because 
whomever was not with them [the government] was [considered to be] 
against them. We were facing this closed system…The opposition was 
weak, and the government very strong and vertically integrated. The 
government monopolized it all. We were in the standoff with this system, 
and what possibly could we do? Our civic spirit was awakening. We 
realized we needed to do something, or we would have to live in this 
system for many more years (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014) 
 She recalled her and colleagues’ rage and mobilization experienced over the 
government’s mishandling of massive political street protests in November, 2007. 
Another tipping point was the war with Russia in August 2008. By that time, the 
publisher’s “illusions” about “the young, overzealous government, making mistakes in 
the pursuit of fast reforms” were all gone. “The war was the last drop. We realized we 
were in trouble. The war rang the alarm,” she said (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 
2014). For others, the shocking injustice was the closure of TV Imedi amid accusations of 
instigating unrest in November, 2007. The media developer called the closure “an 
irreparable, unforgivable mistake” and “crossing of the line” in the eyes of 
democratically minded citizens (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014). The media 
academic was appalled by the arrest of photographers in 2010 (T. Z., personal interview, 
April 2, 2014). All activists placed the blame squarely on the government of Georgia (L. 
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T., personal interview, April 4, 2014; N. Z., personal interview, March 15, 2014; S. S., 
personal interview, March 12, 2014; Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014). 
 Another source of trouble in Georgian society was an inactive citizenry and its 
lack of leadership in public affairs. People were passive and hard to mobilize (I. M., 
personal interview, April 18, 2014; T. Z., personal interview, April 2, 2014; Z. K., 
personal interview, March 13, 2014). Even civil sector organizations and some media 
were inactive.  
People were helpless. On one occasion, we organized a street protest…My 
journalist had been insulted by the police chief, and we stood in protest in 
front of the police building. We asked civil sector organizations and the 
media to join us…‘if you do not want to be beaten by the police, stand by 
us,’ we told them …The building was made of glass, and we saw how they 
[the police] were taking our pictures and registering our identities. I 
myself took a picture of our crowd. In these pictures, you can see that only 
a few people were facing the glass building. Others stood with their backs 
to the police, trying to avoid being recognized. These were people from 
civil sector organizations and the media! (I. M., personal interview, April 
18, 2014) 
 The editor-in-chief echoed the idea. He said the Georgians did not have much 
experience of “positive involvement…in the country’s affairs. They were taking part in 
the elections but were not involved in small, local problems” (L. T., personal interview, 
April 4, 2014). There were many reasons for the lack of engagement. The activist 
journalists saw the link between the government’s media and information policies and the 
passivity of citizens. The restrictions of media content distribution amounted to depriving 
viewers of choices and of a supply of plural information. People lived in the reality 
constructed by government-loyal TV stations. The regional publisher recalled how these 
television stations painted a picture of a thriving economy and development around the 
country, and how citizens in the regions would compare these pictures with their own 
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deteriorating conditions and think their problems were singular. Often, these citizens 
blamed local authorities for not keeping up with the pace in the rest of the country (I. M., 
personal interview, April 18, 2014).  Not knowing who stood behind these TV stations 
made citizens vulnerable to propaganda and manipulation. The producer of pro-
opposition 9th Channel said: 
If I need to know what food I am eating --genetically modified, bio, 
natural – and the package tells me that, I also need to know what 
newspaper I am reading. Is it liberal? Left- or right-oriented? [I need to 
know] who is the owner and what interests he has. (T. R., personal 
interview, April 10, 2014) 
 Sub-theme 2.3: Facilitating fair elections. The media democratization movement 
mobilized at a decisive moment in Georgia’s history – the watershed elections of 2012, 
the first truly competitive and fair elections in which the sitting government peacefully 
ceded powers to the opposition. The movement, which energized the society, increased 
the level of fairness and public engagement in elections. While most activists agreed the 
movement played a role in the elections, not all thought facilitating fair elections was 
their goal (RQ2). At one extreme, the investigative journalist said the elections were 
entirely unrelated to the protest (N. Z., personal interview, March 15, 2014). At the other, 
the election activist in the It Concerns You campaign said the elections were the end goal 
of activism and the reason behind the campaign and its “must carry” initiatives (M. P., 
personal interview, April 7, 2014). Other activists said they tried to leverage the attention 
to the election for the media causes, but they had mobilized for neither the fair elections 
(S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014) nor the enforcement of the “must carry” rule 
in the context of the elections (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014; S. S., personal 
interview, March 12, 2014; Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014). Offering his take 
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on the issue, the editor-in-chief said facilitating fair elections was as much a goal as 
enforcing positive media reforms (L. T., personal interview, April 4, 2014) and that the 
“must carry” rule was as important during the elections as it was in other periods. Indeed, 
the activists pushed to extend “must carry/must offer” rules beyond the election period, 
and mandatory distribution of all broadcast signals is now a standard, year-round 
modality in the broadcast sector of Georgia.  
 The producer of pro-opposition 9th Channel said the media activism was 
inseparable from the election activism. These two efforts formed “extraordinary and tense 
pre-elections dynamics”. She said the society “was full of expectations” and eager to 
follow the elections, but the government was trying to limit information. The media were 
caught in the middle, and all its troubles came from government’s action to prevent 
voters from getting information. The producer likened the adoption of the “must carry” 
rule, which came as a “complete surprise,” to the cracking of an “old, thick layer of ice” 
in the Georgian society (T. R., personal interview, April 10, 2014).  
 Several activists went so far as to assert that the opposition would not have won 
the elections had it not been for the media activism and the “must carry” rule. The 
election activist recalled the 2008 presidential elections, which she believed were carried 
by the opposition but the victory was not sealed in the results (M. P., personal interview, 
April 7, 2014). She was referring to the extraordinarily close presidential elections of 
2009, in which President Saakashvili won by a small margin. Because the success of a 
contender against an incumbent, suspected of vote rigging, depended on a massive 
turnout of voters and their use of ballots, the It Concerns You campaign played a role in 
the victory of the opposition by mobilizing voters (M. P., personal interview, April 7, 
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2014). “The citizens were very active, attentive and convinced that they were to change 
something in their life,” said the election activist (M. P., personal interview, April 7, 
2014). Her views were echoed by other interviewees (L. B., personal interview, March 
16, 2014; N. K., personal interview, March 24, 2014). Offering a view from the outside, 
the reporter at independent Resonansi said the “must carry” rule determined the outcome 
of the elections. She cited a moral shock and a major swing in voter attitudes prior to the 
elections, when the news of prisoner abuse broke on one of the opposition channels. The 
reporter said this news would not have reached the majority of Georgians had it not been 
for the unlimited signal distribution under the “must carry” rule, adopted into law on 
activists’ demands. 
 Without agreeing on the intent of activists, most activists and news producers and 
reporters agreed that the media democratization movement played a role in the outcome 
of the 2012 Parliamentary Elections. “Our activism has not directly influenced the 
elections. And it has not changed the system. What it did, importantly, was to provide a 
good lesson of active involvement in public affairs,” said the media developer (H. J., 
personal interview, March 25, 2014).  
 Sub-theme 2.2: Movement to join forces with other activists and energize the 
public. While the media democratization movement did not have any stated political 
goals, many activists saw their goal as strengthening civil society and enhancing the 
political involvement of citizens and greater practice of “direct democracy” (L. T., 
personal interview, April 4, 2014) (RQ2). The Coalition was to provide “a good lesson of 
activism” to the people (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014), “to strengthen civic 
skills and consolidate activists” (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014), and, in 
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general, set “new rules of the game in Georgia” (L. T., personal interview, April 4, 2014) 
(RQ2). 
 It was first order task for activists to join forces with other activists. The problems 
in the Georgian media were “complex and interconnected” (Z. K., personal interview, 
March 13, 2014), and inseparable from other issues in the governance and the society. 
Most activists interpreted problems in the media as “flaws in the system” (S. S., personal 
interview, March 12, 2014). These problems could not be aided in isolation from other 
issues. To attack the system and “snatch away” new rights in the media and other spheres 
(S.S., personal interview, March 12, 2014), it was necessary to join forces with other 
activists in environmental, urban, and student movements. The magazine publisher said 
activists who joined forces over media issues started adopting ownership of a wider range 
of problems and joined the wider stream of civic activism. Soon, “the protest events were 
happening at multiple locations,” she said. While, initially, no more than 50 people would 
show up, the movement was gaining strength like “a wave” (S. S., personal interview, 
March 12, 2014). The wave metaphor is very close to the description of a protest cycle 
(Tarrow, 1983) as “sequences of escalating collective action that are of greater frequency 
and intensity than normal, that spread around various sectors and regions of society” 
(Snow & Benford, 1992, p.141).  The mobilization and consolidation of protest groups 
produced the It Concerns You campaign, a major mobilization of activists and citizens 
around the country, launched in February 2012, nine months after the launch of the 
Coalition for Media Advocacy. 
  In assessing the achievements of the Coalition, the publisher said it changed the 
political culture. Citizens developed a stronger sense of civic responsibility and became 
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more involved with politics, and more vigilant about the abuse of power (S. S., personal 
interview, March 12, 2014). The magazine publisher said she started self-identifying as a 
member of the civil society, not as the “mass” (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 
2014). The Coalition promoted cooperation and internal cohesion in civil society (T. K., 
personal interview, March 26, 2014) and overcame polarization and zero sum attitudes in 
Georgian politics (L. T., personal interview, April 4, 2014). The civil sector also learned 
to work closely with the public and to value its trust and support (H. J., personal 
interview, March 25, 2014). A stronger, more involved society was the key long-term 
outcome of the media activism in 2010 - 2012, said the election activist, whose hopes for 
the further betterment of the country were pinned on the civil sector (M. P., personal 
interview, April 7, 2014).  
The activism of the civil sector organizations strengthened the society. I 
can say that the civil sector has never been so united, energetic, active, and 
productive. I hope it will stay that way. I genuinely think that our 
movement and campaign helped the society mature. It may be a very bold 
thing to say, but we increased civic mindedness of people, who were either 
indifferent or thought their activism would lead nowhere, or were afraid to 
talk out loud. (M. P., personal interview, April 7, 2014) 
 Rationale behind framing choices (RQ3). Activists the study interviewed 
devoted much time to explaining their strategies and tactics but said very little about their 
framing choices. When asked what frames they used, most were unable to recall any 
framing decisions or rationale behind most slogans, metaphors, or other techniques of 
constructing issues in the public discourse, with a few notable exceptions. Some activists, 
especially professional journalists, appeared to deliberately shrug off frames as public 
relations work. Others may not have been familiar with the concept of “frames” and 
misunderstood the question. Activists’ lack of experience and message-level 
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coordination, the informality of the Coalition, and professional and ideational diversity 
among the Coalition’s member organizations explain the lack of rationalization of 
framing work, especially, at the early stages of activism. Most of the analysis below came 
from indirect clues about the framing work in activists’ interviews. The only detailed, 
focused account of a deliberate framing process was about the elaboration and rationale 
behind the key campaign, the It Concerns You. The It Concerns You campaign, which 
started when the activism strengthened and matured, demonstrated greater 
professionalism in the framing work. 
 The picture of the framing process that emerged from interviews is in line with 
the literature about social movements’ framing work. Social movements are typically 
interacting with four constituencies: followers, the media, targets of protest and 
references groups of targets of protest (Lipsky, 1968). The Georgian media 
democratization movement has addressed the government of Georgia as the target of 
protest, active citizens and activists in other movements as followers, the international 
community as the government’s reference group, and the media as colleagues and the 
party invested in the media reforms. 
 Theme 1: Frames to target the government. The activists said they were 
“working at all levels – with the civil sector, [national] media, regional media, 
international organizations, embassies, -- all” (T. K., personal interview, March 26, 
2014). Still, the key target of their protest (Lipsky, 1968) was the government of Georgia. 
The government, said the media development specialist, was not tolerating opposition, 
was not listening to the civil sector concerns, and was avoiding dialogue (H. J., personal 
interview, March 25, 2014). The government’s first reaction to activists’ initiatives was 
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always “no,” and it felt that “the doors were closed” (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 
2014). The government did not much care about the independent press or hold it in high 
regard (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014). The president of Georgia repeatedly 
said that the Georgian press was “ruthless” and “unprofessional” (Mchedlidze, 2010, 
February 18). Even after the government started negotiating with activists, the process 
developed slowly. The magazine publisher recalled dealing with a highly placed 
parliamentarian, whom the activists “chased everywhere,” waiting for him to log into his 
Facebook account well after midnight. The parties distrusted each other.  
He was telling us he was on our side, and that [our proposal] would not 
work, would not make it through the Parliament. He wanted to be appear 
as a good fellow, but he was a typical party executive who would never 
make a step against his interests and against his party interests. (S. S., 
personal interview, March 12, 2014)   
 To reverse the process, the activists apparently started to adopt language their 
target would understand (N. Z., personal interview, March 15, 2014). Their key message 
for the government was the country and its interests (RQ3). “We were telling the 
government that the issues [in the media] were important, and that it would be bad for the 
country if they [the government] took no action,” said the investigative journalist (N. Z., 
personal interview, March 15, 2014). She also highlighted international standards, telling 
the government that transparency “was a standard and journalists’ basic right” (N. Z., 
personal interview, March 15, 2014). The head of the media association said: “[we told 
the government] ‘if you deal with the problem, it will positively affect your image, while 
you will not lose much’” (N. K., personal interview, March 24, 2014). Other activists said 
they stressed “democracy” and “plurality” because these concepts reflected the 
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government’s own declarative goals for the country (L. B., personal interview, March 16, 
2014). 
  This strategy of deploying universally accepted master frames of democracy – 
whether rationalized or not -- was effective. The government was clearly sensitive to 
Georgia’s image as a rights-based democracy. It wanted to position Georgia as an 
aspirant member in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European 
Union and was aware of the importance the international community attached to media 
rights and freedoms.  
 The activists also targeted the government with the fair elections frame (RQ3). By 
using the fair elections frame, the Coalition was again attempting to leverage the 
government’s desire to appear democratic in the eyes of the world.  
 As is clear from the above excerpts, the Coalition for Media Advocacy chose to 
actively engage the government, which possessed the ultimate power to enact positive 
reforms in the media sector. Typically, social movements rely on extra-institutional 
tactics, such as street protests and strikes, to reach their goals (Goodwin, 2013). However, 
social movements also effectively employ institutional channels of pressure (Snow & 
Benford, 1992; Lofland, 1985), such as court cases (Fuchs, 2013) or lobbyism 
(Mauersberger, 2012). Georgian’ activists’ strategy of directly engaging the government, 
parallel to street protests and public mobilization, proved effective. This strategy ties 
logically with activists’ choice of responsible government, fair elections, free speech, and 
access to information frames.  
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  Theme 2: Frames to target the international community. Lipsky (1968) wrote 
that movements, which lack bargaining power, typically try to activate third parties, or 
groups, that are referent groups for protesters’ targets and possess sufficient bargaining 
power to exert influence over the target. The protesters often engage in actions aimed at 
eliciting sympathy and support among these referent groups of targets of protest. The 
target of the Georgian media democratization movement – the government of Georgia – 
was highly sensitive to Georgia’s standing in the international community and susceptible 
to the opinion of the international community. The activists apparently tried to leverage 
this sensitivity. By pressing free speech, access to information - transparency and access 
to information - plurality frames -- internationally understood concepts of freedom and 
democracy -- the activists were trying to engage the international community. By 
employing the fair elections frame in the discourse about media reforms, the activists 
alerted the international community that “monopolized media would create problems at 
the upcoming elections, because the access to information would be lacking” (S. S., 
personal interview, March 12, 2014). They hoped that the international community would 
utilize its own channels of pressure on the government, which it did. Ambassadors of 
foreign countries, including the United States, made many statements in support of 
legislative proposals of activists (Tsiklauri, 2012, May 31). In 2009, the European Union 
started the human rights dialogue with the Georgian government, in which participating 
civil rights and media organizations produced more than a dozen recommendations to 
improve the media environment (EU Human Rights Dialogue, 2009). The EU forwarded 
these recommendations to the government of Georgia. Involving the international 
community was highly effective strategy, as stressed by many activists and news 
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producers (G. L., personal interview, May 5, 2014; S. S., personal interview, March 12, 
2014)  
 Theme 3: Frames to target people – It Concerns You.  Members of the public 
were the important audience for the activists, as potential recruits, followers, supporters 
or, simply, sympathetic bystanders (Lipsky, 1968). Initially, activists’ strategy had been 
to mobilize “active people” -- students, media, academic, diplomats, civil sector leaders -- 
instead of attempting mass mobilization (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014; T. Z., 
personal interview, April 2, 2014). Most activists recalled meetings and discussions with 
these socially active groups (L. T., personal interview, April 4, 2014; S. S., personal 
interview, March 12, 2014). The media academic said it was a clever strategy, as massive 
mobilization was unattainable, while recruiting mobilized publics seemed an easier task. 
The strategy of recruiting activists from other or former movements has been one of the 
frequently used tools in mobilizers’ toolkit (Goodwin, 2013).  
 However, as the activism grew and the It Concerns You campaign decided to 
build awareness of media problems among mass publics, the activists re-aligned their 
frames. This pattern of frame re-alignment to respond to the changing context is well 
documented in the literature (Zuo & Benford, 1995). It was necessary to talk about the 
media issues “in a very clear language” (Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014). 
Problems in the media, obvious to professionals, were not fully understood by the public 
(H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014) 
 The lack of access to public information is not only a journalist’s problem. 
It is citizens’ common problem. That he [citizen] does not know who 
owns televisions, and what interests these people have, and why they 
invest money and what money they invest [is bad.]… The citizens should 
know. It was our principle when starting the campaign [It Concerns You]. 
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It is one thing that I, as a journalist, am interested in, but, as a citizen, I 
want all other citizens to think [about these problems] too. (Z. K., personal 
interview, March 13, 2014) 
 The election activist, who traveled around the country to meet people, said it was 
not as hard to explain the essence of issues in the media to the people as it was to 
demonstrate why and how these issues mattered to them.  
These issues [proposed amendments to restrict the right of political 
gathering, must carry rule] were rather difficult to explain. If we stuck to 
the legal language, and dwelled on the details of amendments, nobody 
would understand a thing. The government would adopt the law, and 
nothing would change. Our purpose, the good work we did, was to get 
these key messages to the people: that their electoral choices could be 
ignored [in rigged elections], they could have been labeled as political 
activists and unjustly prosecuted. [We told them] anyone had the right to 
listen to alternative opinions. All of it was simple and tangible and 
relevant. Our slogan said just that -- It concerns any one of us…Crafting 
slogans, delivering messages, streamlining the campaign gave results. 
Every citizen we would meet at various places, from big cities to small 
villages, had a reaction. True, they were not standing with us in the streets, 
but they were aware, they understood and supported us. (M. P., personal 
interview, April 7, 2014) 
 Making issues relevant and understandable to the recruits in the context of their 
daily experiences, that is, increasing their experiential commensurability -- one of the key 
tasks in framing (Benford & Snow, 2000) – was clearly achieved by the movement. Still, 
the activists needed a potent motivational frame (Snow & Benford, 2000) that would 
stress the public’s ownership of problems in the media. It concerns you was designed 
with that purpose. The frame shaped the media issues as relevant to most people in 
Georgia. The people were told they could not see many Georgian channels available 
elsewhere because the government wanted to keep them in the dark and that they ought to 
support the “must carry” proposal. The people were learning that they could not even 
watch their own, local stations, because the government disliked what these stations said 
and pressed local cable providers to block their distribution (N. K., personal interview, 
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March 24, 2014). “We were explaining to them [to people] that our common right [to 
information] was restricted, that we all needed information, which was withheld from 
us,” said the investigative journalist. “We were trying to build discontent, not artificially, 
but by making people aware of their problems, and they were getting angry” (N. Z., 
personal interview, March 15, 2014). The magazine publisher said the people did not 
need much articulation of the problems. She said they were already unhappy. Instead, 
they needed to be told to take charge (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014): “Here, 
you need to sign a petition, then, you need to hold a meeting, and later, we need to 
change a legislation” (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014). 
 The slogan it concerns you was created as the elections drew nearer. The 
independent journalist recalled the focus group work that went into the choice of the 
slogan. The activists tested several slogans (Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014). 
The winner, it concerns you, was authored by a popular Georgian poet (T.B., personal 
interview, April 12, 2014). The independent journalist said the slogan became the brand 
of activism. He thought it was a very well-chosen, innovative, elastic frame, which 
incorporated not only media but also election-related issues and had the potential to cover 
other concerns in the future:  
 We were telling [the people]: instead of blindly following us, we are 
telling you, it concerns you! If it does, you need to read this booklet, see 
that social ad, listen to our suggestions, and meet us. There were many 
discussions in Tbilisi and all over Georgia. We’ve been everywhere and 
met everyone. We were telling them, ‘start thinking. If it concerns you, 
then express your protest’. (Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014)  
 Theme 4: Frames to target members of the Media. The activists spoke at great 
length about the media’s attitudes towards the activism and verbalized their strategies in 
dealing with various media groups. Again, they said very little about the choice of frames 
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to target members of the media. The media developer said the activists were counting on 
the support of the independent media in Tbilisi and the regions and disregarding the 
controlled media (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014). She said activists’ media 
relations were well-conceived and planned. The assumption of this study that the activists 
would try to exploit tensions in the “media-state dynamics” (Mauersberger, 2012, p. 588) 
and differences in the media (Weaver & Scacco, 2013) was supported in the interviews. 
The comment below illustrates activists’ solid understanding of the balance of forces in 
the Georgian media: 
In our media campaigns, we were not counting on them [government-
controlled media] as our allies.  Our campaign relied on online and print 
media and social networks. These were little oases [of independent 
journalism], invested in our cause. Regional media too…I mean those 
media organizations in the regions that had not betrayed journalism and to 
whom values, which united us, were real and important, and who were 
ready to protect these values. They were our allies. (H. J., personal 
interview, March 25, 2014)  
 9th Channel producer’s comments echo the idea about shared values between 
activists and journalism professionals.  
We had a good relationship with the third sector. Generally speaking, the 
third sector is the media’s ally, both because it has the rights agenda, 
which includes media rights, and because it shares the media’s interest in 
the transparency of information. No other group has such a vested interest 
in transparency. (T. R., personal interview, April 10, 2014) 
 The important finding, reflected in this and other statements in this section, is 
about the shared ideational base between the media and the civil sector, acknowledged by 
both sectors. Activists’ free speech and access to information-transparency frames were 
likely to resonate with journalists, for whom these concepts were an important part of the 
professional value system and who had experienced problems accessing and distributing 
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information. These frames undoubtedly helped activists communicate their concerns in a 
language understandable to the members of the media.  
 Theme 5: Counter frames and marginalization. Some activists spoke about 
counter frames deployed by the government in an attempt to marginalize their efforts. 
The publisher recalled the government’s “sustained campaign” to politicize the protest by 
linking it to the oppositional parties and their leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili. According to 
the publisher, this strategy alienated many potential recruits, who were weary of being 
associated with partisanship and politics. Politicizing the protest, a tactic described by the 
publisher, is a proven marginalization technique (Chan & Lee, 1984).  The government 
also marginalized people in the middle, who were not taking political sides. The 
publisher said these individuals were called a derogatory name of “shuashists” (people in 
the middle). The label implied conformism and self-serving positioning in the middle. 
The United National Movement was trying everything in its power to 
make these labels stick…The system tried to marginalize and neutralize us 
and was doing it by various means – by influencing the public opinion on 
Facebook, by blowing our mistakes out of proportion. The system was 
working against the active people who opposed it. (S. S., personal 
interview, March 12, 2014) 
 The activists thought government-controlled media and the Georgian Public 
Broadcaster were complicit in the marginalization. Government-controlled televisions 
were siding with the government and not talking to the activists (N. Z., personal 
interview, March 15, 2014). “All doors were closed. [Pro-governmental] televisions were 
filming us from behind our backs not to show our faces on the screen. News about us 
lasted seconds and were aired during the third block [towards the end of the newscast]. 
Meetings and demonstrations were not covered at all,” said the magazine publisher (S. S., 
personal interview, March 12, 2014). Invitations for pro-governmental stations to attend 
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activists’ events “fell on deaf ears” (I. M., personal interview, April 18, 2014). In stories 
aired by the public broadcasting, “activists would appear out of nowhere, blow a whistle, 
and disappear. Nobody would understand [from the news] why these people blew 
whistles in the first place,” said the head of media association (N. K., personal interview, 
March 24, 2014). This excerpt evidences the marginalization by framing a protest as a 
meaningless show, a spectacle (Dardis, 2006; McLeod & Hertog, 1999).  
 However, other activists said the pro-governmental media spared the activists and 
never really marginalized the Georgian media democratization movement. The 
democracy specialist said she had not encountered any resistance or any serious 
marginalization from pro-governmental stations (T. B., personal interview, April 12, 
2014). “We have been spared terrible lies,” she said. The media developer echoed her 
thought:  
I would not say the national broadcasters managed to discredit the process. 
It did not happen. Perhaps they decided not to [go against us]. My 
colleagues may disagree, but based on what we’ve been hearing from 
these channels over the years, their rhetoric about our activism was 
relatively mild. They did hit Maestro [Tbilisi-based independent station] 
hard over its litigation with the government, though. (H. J., personal 
interview, March 25, 2014) 
 The head of a media association summed up the situation, saying that supportive 
media supported and followed activists’ news agenda, whereas unfriendly media ignored 
activists’ news and themes (N. K., personal interview, March 24, 2014). Pro-
governmental media covered the Coalition and It Concerns You campaign “as any other 
news, in a superficial way,” said the election activist (M. P., personal interview, April 7, 
2014). 
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 Views and experiences of activist journalists and news reporters (RQ4). The 
study spoke with activist journalists and news producers and reporters about journalists’ 
involvement in activism, the ethical issues involved in covering activism while being 
involved in it, their personal level of involvement in activism, and their coverage of the 
media democratization movement and experiences on the beat. 
 Activist journalists interviewed by the study thought there was no conflict 
between practicing journalism and engaging in activism (RQ4). However, they admitted 
having given the subject much thought. Most were trying to draw a line between the 
expression of activism and bias. They said activism was to be expressed in blogs and 
editorials but not in news reporting. Activists were not to cross the line between activism 
and politics.  
 The opinions of news producers and reporters, who were not part of the media 
democratization movement and covered it as a beat, diverged along ideological lines. 
Producers and reporters at independent and pro-opposition newspapers and TV stations 
were supportive of the expression of activism in reporting. They said their own position 
on the issue had always emotionally colored their reporting. However, producers and 
reporters at pro-governmental media, while expressing support for professional 
journalists’ right to activism and to holding strong position on issues, rejected the 
expression of activist positions in journalism as unprofessional. They said activist 
journalists could better serve their cause by covering issues objectively and substantively, 
incorporating both supporters’ and opponents’ issue positions. 
 Theme 1: Debate about the expression of activism in journalism. Most 
journalists who took part in activism said they had not experienced conflict over their two 
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roles as activist and journalist. One activist said her “trick” was to be aware of the role 
she was playing at a given moment, and stay within its boundaries (N. Z., personal 
interview, March 15, 2014). During reporting, an activist journalist would have to abstain 
from advocacy, and, while advocating, abstain from reporting, she said. The magazine 
publisher said trying to remain neutral was as pointless as masking one’s interest in an 
issue with the pretense of neutral reporting. She thought it was acceptable and even 
important for activists to express positions (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014). 
She said extraordinary circumstances, such as the abuse of rights and freedoms, 
warranted a diversion from journalistic standards. “When you are pressured, to try to 
stand aside, attempt to be an unbiased arbiter and not to express your opinion [is 
nuisance]. Of course you should express your position!” said the magazine publisher. She 
said she had been criticized for blending the line between activism and journalism by 
journalism purists, whom she despised, calling “sterile types in their comfort zones, on 
the Mount Olympus” (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014). (The metaphor sterile 
in activists’ discourse is contrasted to activist and engaged.)  Most activist journalists 
stressed the duties of citizenship were of a higher order than professional standards of 
journalism.  
 Asked if he had expressed his activism in writing, the editor-in-chief said he 
“naturally” had (L. T., personal interview, April 4, 2014). He said he wrote editorials and 
defended his position on issues. But his newspaper provided both activists’ and 
opponents’ view. The editor-in-chief said newspaper’s coverage was balanced, but not as 
much to meet the standard as to produce “interesting” journalism. The editor in chief said 
it was in the interests as activists to stimulate public discussion of their proposals, and to 
   
111 
 
invite opponents’ criticism of potential flaws. Reflecting the range of views in journalism 
was also more democratic. “If you advocate democracy, you should stand by its rules 
yourself,” said the editor in chief (L.T., personal interview, April 4, 2014). The 
independent journalist echoed these views. He too made his activist position clear when 
hosting a show or writing an opinion piece, but thought journalists had no right to be 
biased against and inattentive to opposite views. Representing all points of view and 
facilitating discussion on important issues was a journalist’s role. He also said this was 
not always possible. “Georgia is not a sterile country, and the process [of activism in 
journalism] is not totally clean” (Z.K., personal interview, March 13, 2014).  
 People appreciate activism, said the magazine publisher (S. S., personal interview, 
March 12, 2014). She thought the trust in her magazine was rising because of her strong 
position on issues. People would call from all over Georgia, and ask her reporters to take 
up their local issues. She called this practice “civic journalism in action.” She said she 
valued close engagement with readers that her activism had led to. 
 While many activist journalists expressed the support for registering activist 
positions in their journalistic work, some said their issues would best be served by 
objective, comprehensive reporting and substantive journalism. The head of a media 
association, a former journalist, said journalists were not to express activism in their work 
(N. K., personal interview, March 24, 2014). The media rights activist, another former 
journalist, said journalists were tempted not to tolerate problems and engage in advocacy 
reporting, but her advice would be not to express activism in reporting (L. B., personal 
interview, March 16, 2014). Only through objective reporting could journalists earn trust 
and support from their viewers and readers. “Anyone can say blah-blah-blah. What 
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makes difference [in journalism] is [reporting of] facts,” (L. B., personal interview 4, 
March 16, 2014). 
The study sought views of news producers and reporters regarding the expression 
of activism in journalism, and Georgian media’s activist coverage of the media 
democratization movement. The views of news professional diverged along ideological 
lines, with those in pro-opposition and independent press supporting activism expression 
in journalism, and those in pro-government media rejecting the practice. Producers and 
reporters at independent and pro-opposition newspapers, and the pro-opposition 
television, were under impression that the entire journalistic community supported the 
media activism, some more openly than others. The reporter at opposition-aligned Alia 
recalled the signing of petition to free photographers accused of espionage, organized by 
the Coalition for Media Advocacy. She said every reporter at the event signed the 
petition, including reporters in government-controlled televisions. To protect them from 
possible repercussions, the activists later deleted their names (T. O., personal interview, 
May 3, 2014). Contrary to these views, the reporter at pro-government 24 Saati said he 
had not observed any “enthusiasm” for the media activism among his colleagues on the 
beat. He said the journalists were just doing their jobs and covering the actualities, 
without doing much beyond that. They were not advocating issues or supporting activists. 
The producer at pro-opposition 9th Channel said her television and other pro-
opposition independent stations were all involved in the advocacy to support “must 
carry/must offer” proposal, and “supported” the Coalition for Media Advocacy’s efforts 
“with providing coverage and otherwise” (T. R., personal interview, April 10, 2014). The 
activist journalists said in their interviews that they were frequent guests at opposition-
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owned and pro-opposition stations. “Sometimes they’d “sweep all of us in,” said the 
investigative journalist (N. Z., personal interview, March 15, 2014). “We were sitting at 
their studios every day. They were like our home. At the end of the day, we’d go to one 
of these TV stations, or to some radio station, and discuss what we’d done during the 
day,” recalled the magazine publisher (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014). The 
reporter at independent Resonansi said her newspaper did not encourage opinionating, 
but she made her position felt in the coverage anyway (R. M., personal interview, April 
20, 2014). She said the activism to democratize media was “a different kind of issue” for 
news reporters, because it was about their own working environment. The reporter said 
she mostly wrote reports but also issue-based stories, in which she analyzed the reforms 
activists were proposing in legal or economic terms. She said her analysis was balanced, 
sometimes even negative, but admitted she could not cover these issues without emotion, 
because she had personally experienced governmental pressures and stood to benefit 
from improvements in the media environment. 
Yes, I was advocating, naturally. How could I not? I have a problem. 
This work [activism] will solve my problem. In this circumstances,  
one advocates or else there will be no change. (R. M., personal  
interview, April 20, 2014)  
The reporter who worked for pro-opposition Alia spoke about her involvement in 
activism in general terms. She said journalists’ position on issues would always shaped 
their stories, and her stories were no exception. A position “comes across in the way 
situations are summarized, in the use of words. Even if one tries to be disengaged, one’s 
sympathy or antipathy usually comes across in reporting,” she said (T. O., personal 
interview, May 3, 2014). The reporter fully supported activists’ agenda. She said the 
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media activism of 2010- 2012 was “one of her strongest experiences in the recent years” 
(T. O., personal interview, May 3, 2014). 
 By contrast, the reporter employed at pro-government 24 Saati said he had never 
advocated while reporting, nor had he attended any street action. He said he did not see 
the point in activist journalists’ involvement in collective action, because all Georgian 
journalists were free to express their opinion in the press. He thought journalists could 
serve their causes by writing substantively about them, and that was how he saw his role 
(D. G., personal interview, April 21, 2014).  
Asked to comment on his station’s coverage of the media activism, the producer 
at pro-government Rustavi 2 TV, said the coverage was factual but devoid of advocacy. 
“We recorded comments of participants of the [It Concerns You] campaign but also 
comments from sources on the other side. We were sharing their [activists’] information. 
But we were not involved in the campaign.” He said the station “tried to stay away from 
activism… because we think it is not our role” (G. L, personal interview, May 5, 2014). 
He acknowledged the perception of his station as supportive of the former government, 
but thought the television provided professional news, and followed news standards. He 
also acknowledged the station had an ideological position, which he called “a political 
taste.” “Let’s agree it is a matter of political taste if a station feels greater sympathy 
towards one political party than towards another,” he said, adding these sympathies were 
acceptable “as long as that station follows professional standards” (G. L., personal 
interview, May 5, 2014). He thought some other TV stations, perceived as independent, 
were neither independent nor unbiased. Speaking apparently of Tbilisi-based TV stations 
Maestro TV and Kavkasia, the producer said these stations were positioning themselves 
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as independents but were supporting the opposition and trying to influence voters.  He 
admitted Rustavi 2 had itself engaged in similar politically-motivated activism in the 
past, and thought these stations were doing the same. Rustavi 2 has openly called on its 
audiences to engage in the Rose Revolution of 2003, and has greatly contributed to the 
rise to power of President Saakashvili’s National Movement party in the 2003 
parliamentary elections (Kandelaki, 2006). 
 Theme 2: News producers and reporters about MDM and its media coverage. 
The views of news producers and reporters about the media democratization movement, 
activists’ agenda and motives, and the activism in general again diverged along 
ideological lines. The reporter at pro-opposition Alia said the activism was “a universal 
tool” for people to demand that their long-held concerns be answered. She added she felt, 
while covering activists’ street action, that their protest was real, and that protesters were 
not forcing supporters to show up, as in some other, “mock protests” (T. O., personal 
interview, May 3, 2014). The reporter was happy that the civil society was stronger, and 
capable of dealing with society’s problems. “Our civil society is very strong, to the envy 
of all other countries. It has proven its worth during the attacks on the press”, she said 
(T.O., personal interview, May 3, 2014). The reporter in the independent newspaper 
enthused about the media democratization movement and the reforms it achieved, which, 
in her view, brought professionalization of the media and greater responsibility on the 
part of news media (R. M., personal interview, April 20, 2014). She said her enthusiasm 
was shared by the entire professional community: 
 I personally cannot recall a single journalist who would be against 
[proposed reforms.] Anyone knows for fact that if one group is trying to 
control [parts of media] today, someday they [other media] too will face 
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the same problem. Plus, it was in the interests of media that the public 
have access to information. Whether these attitudes were expressed openly 
or hidden is a different matter. Still, I do not remember any resistance. On 
the contrary, all my colleagues had positive emotions. (R. M., personal 
interview, April 20, 2014) 
 By contrast, the reporter in pro-government 24 Saati, while acknowledging 
problems in the media environment and generally positive outcomes of the media 
democratization movement’s latest activism, was skeptical about activists’ motives. He 
thought one of activists’ key demands -- the “must carry” regulation -- was politically 
motivated. His said the demand for mandatory distribution of broadcast signals by cable 
operators aimed at providing supporters of the political opposition with access to the 
oppositional stations based in Tbilisi. He lamented the public was not interested in an 
objective, unbiased journalism, or in supporting the freedom of the press. “The people 
just want to see activities of one [political] party, and the criticism of another party. They 
are not really concerned about the freedom in the media” (D. G., personal interview, 
April 21, 2014). On the brighter side, the reporter noted the “must carry” legislation 
“facilitated the reflection of political reality in the media,” and produced a positive 
psychological effect of greater freedom in the society. 
In his coded, imprecise language, the producer at pro-government Rustavi 2 said 
those media that engaged in activism were serving their owners’ and managers’ political 
and business interests rather than the cause of media democratization. 
Any head of a station can sign petitions and take part in processes [of 
activism], but if he abuses the privilege of access to the nation-wide 
audience [by steering his station to engage in activism] in favor of his own 
interests, it is another matter. (G. L., personal interview, May 5, 2014)  
 The producer said his news staff, “generally neutral” while reporting on the media 
democratization movement, “had questions” in the case of Maestro TV’s satellite 
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antennas. He said journalists had asked questions about the origins of these antennas, 
which the station intended to distribute free of charge to thousands of viewers. The 
question was how the television, which was not profitable, bought this much technology. 
The antennas, according to the Georgian government, were bought for the Maestro TV by 
the billionaire opposition figure, Bidzina Ivanishvili, to increase Maestro’ reach around 
Georgia (Freedom House, 2013). The producer said his TV station served the public 
interest when asking these questions, but angered colleagues at the Maestro TV (G. L., 
personal interview, May 5, 2014).  
 However, the producer said he was fully behind activists’ other demands, such as 
the “must carry” rule and the media ownership transparency. He said he could never 
understand why the government was restricting broadcast media distribution or making 
ownership in the media non-transparent, which led to speculations and distrust of his 
station. He said the government should have allowed all TV stations to distribute signals 
nationwide and that his station was not afraid of competition. Indeed, the station 
maintained its top ratings well after the competing stations reached nationwide audiences 
under the “must carry” rule. The market should have been allowed to regulate itself, he 
said (G. L., personal interview, May 5, 2014).  
 In general terms, the producer thought the recent media activism was “a very well 
planned and organized campaign and advocacy by very smart people,” but it was not a 
social movement.  He doubted the real goal of the It Concerns You campaign was to 
increase the freedom of speech and the level of information available to people in the 
regions “who were well informed already.” Again, resorting to imprecise, convoluted 
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language, he expressed his doubts that the activists cared more about the political goals, 
such as helping the opposition win the elections, than the freedom of the press. 
I do not know what their goal was. For me, the goal, at least in the short 
term, without doubt, was…I’ll put it straight, [the goal of improving the 
freedom of press, as stated by activists] was a fake one. Could the goal 
have been to [serve] the interest of some political force, which wanted to 
win the elections? However, if we look at [activists’ goals] in the long 
term, continued enforcement of the “must carry” principle after the 
elections positively affected the media environment. (G. L., personal 
interview, May 5, 2014)   
 The “must carry/must offer” rule, which discriminated private cable providers by 
regulating them to distribute the content that was commercially unattractive, benefited the 
media environment, concluded the producer. Greater competition in the broadcast sector 
forced his station to improve and innovate.  Citizens had greater choice of information as 
a result.  
 Theme 2: Special relationship between the independent media and the civil 
sector. Some of the activists in the sample said they had been involved in collective 
action since their first steps in independent journalism. The editor-in-chief said his 
personal involvement in activism has been long-standing. The first legislative proposal he 
had co-authored in 1990 was on the freedom of political gathering. He and other 
journalists had promoted the freedom of information legislation, modeled after American 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), since 1995 (L. T., personal interview, April 4, 
2014). The independent journalist said he had been advocating for journalists’ rights all 
his professional life (Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014). These comments 
corroborate findings in the literature that there have been historical links between 
independent journalism and the civil sector in Georgia (Topuria, 2000).  




 In this chapter, I have analyzed mobilizing materials produced by the activists 
involved in the Georgian media democratization movement in the years 2010 through 
2012. I also conducted and analyzed in-depth interviews with twelve activists and five 
news producers and reporters. The activists were all leaders in the organizations united in 
the Coalition for Media Advocacy, a social movement organization (SMO) for the media 
democratization movement. News producers and reporters had written or produced 
materials about activism for five Georgian media organizations, sampled by the study.  
 The study found that activists’ statements relied on master frames related to the 
concept of democracy, such as free speech, access to information – transparency, access 
to information – plurality, responsible government, and fair elections. The activists’ 
innovative frame, it concerns you, also related to a particular aspect of democracy, 
responsible and participatory self-rule. Often, activists used several frames in one 
statement, which reflected both lack of coordination and frame alignment and Coalition 
members’ desire to make all important points and reach all key constituents in a single 
communication. 
In in-depth interviews, the study sought to answer the following research 
questions about goals and importance of the media democratization movement, as 
interpreted by activists (RQ2), activists’ rationale for framing choices (RQ3), and activist 
journalists’ and news professionals experiences covering the media democratization 
movement and their views about journalists’ involvement in activism and the media 
democratization movement.  
   
120 
 
 As evident from interviews, the activists were clearly motivated by two goals: 
improving the media environment in which their own professional practice was situated 
and strengthening the society in which the public would actively participate in policy- 
and decision-making (RQ2). These two goals were interconnected and formed the logic 
of democratization. The improvements in the media’s capacity to inform citizens would 
lead to citizens’ empowerment and greater participation, while greater participation of 
citizens would strengthen the society based on democratic deliberation and informed self-
rule. Activists’ goals were reflected in the frames they had used in statements (RQ3). 
Activists used frames stressing freedom of speech and media -- free speech, access to 
information- transparency, access to information-plurality – and frames stressing 
participatory governance -- responsible government, it concerns you, fair elections.  
While interviewees may not have articulated why they used these frames, they outlined 
their communication strategies and the context of activism in which these frames made 
perfect sense. They said they had reminded the government of its responsibility to uphold 
internationally accepted standards of free speech and democracy, which is analyzed as 
necessitating responsible government, free speech, access to information - transparency 
frames. The activists said they targeted the international community in hopes it would 
pressure the government into greater acceptance of the activists’ demands. They said they 
reminded the international community, and, through them, the government of Georgia, 
that the free press providing plural information to the voters was essential to conducting 
free and fair elections; hence, the use of fair elections and access to information - 
plurality frames (RQ3).  
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 The activists provided a good explanation of the key frame, it concerns you, as 
reflecting their emphasis on democratizing society and strengthening public participation 
(RQ3). While the Georgian public was generally supportive of the freedom of press, 
specific problems in the broadcast sector were initially irrelevant to the majority of 
people. By using the it concerns you frame, the activists sought to increase people’s 
ownership of media issues.  
 The participants gave rich descriptions of experiences, emotions, attitudes, and 
norms in response to the question about the journalistic coverage of the media 
democratization and expressions of activism in journalism (RQ4). Their views ranged 
from total rejection of advocacy journalism to the acceptance of the decision for the 
entire media organizations to engage in activism. News producers and reporters were 
split along ideological lines in their attitudes towards activism, the media democratization 
movement and the activism in general, and towards the expression of activism in 
journalism. The news producers and reporters at independent and pro-opposition 
newspapers and pro-opposition television supported the media democratization 
movement and themselves engaged in activism. The pro-government media abstained 
from activism and advocacy reporting, and thought activists had political motives for 
pursuing the media democratization agenda. The pro-government media said the activists 
were supporting the political opposition in the elections. However, they acknowledged 
that the problems that existed in the media environment, and that, overall, reforms pushed 
by activists had improved the media environment. 




Movement Coverage in the Georgian Media: Quantitative Analysis  
  
 The purpose of the quantitative analysis of Georgian media’s coverage of MDM 
was: 1) to identify the dominant tone and frames of coverage of MDM across the major 
news organizations in the country, and 2) to analyze whether political factors, such as 
news organizations ties with the government or the opposition (or lack thereof), and 
frames constructed by activists influenced the news coverage. The study theorized that 
political factors influence media’s application of mobilizing and demobilizing frames 
such that pro-opposition media would cover social movements extensively and 
positively, and use mobilizing frames, while pro-government media would either ignore 
or negatively cover social movements, and apply demobilizing frames. The study posed a 
research question about the independent media’s coverage of MDM. The study also 
theorized that movement actors stood a greater chance of pushing their frames into the 
pro-opposition media, and the independent media, than pro-government media. 
Descriptive 
 The study analyzed 152 newspaper and 400 TV stories about MDM, produced 
from July 1, 2010, to October 1 2012. Pro-government 24 Saati wrote 42 stories; 
Independent Resonansi wrote 87 stories; Pro-opposition Alia carried 23 stories; Rustavi 2 
television aired 95 stories; 9th Channel aired 176 stories; and Kavkasia aired 129 stories. 
News coverage of the media democratization movement was operationalized as the 
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stories about the Coalition for Media Advocacy (SMO), the It Concerns You (the 
movement’s key campaign), the “must carry/must offer” and media ownership and 
financial transparency regulations (the movement’s key legislative proposals), and 
movement’s key case to lift government’s ban on the free-of-charge distribution of TV 
Maestro’s antennas to the population.  
 The news organizations produced three types of stories: a) stories focused on 
MDM, b) stories that mentioned MDM in the discussion of the media environment, 
together with other media issues, and c) stories about various sociopolitical topics that 
mentioned MDM in connection with these issues.  As shown in Table 5.1, independent 
Resonansi was most likely to devote an entire article to MDM (74.7%), followed by pro-
government 24 Saati (59.5%) and pro-opposition Alia (52.2%, chi2=14.77, p=.02). 
Resonansi and Alia were more likely to cover the movement as part of the general 
discussion about the media and its problems -- in 12.6% and 13% of articles, respectively 
-- than 24 Saati (2.4%, chi2=14.77, p=.02). Pro-government 24 Saati was most likely to 
mention the media democratization movement in passing, as part of the broader 
discussion about politics or the society (38.1%), than Alia (34.8%) or Resonansi (12.6%, 
chi2=14.77, p=.02). Pro-opposition 9th Channel was most likely to focus the story on 
MDM (83.5%), followed by pro-government Rustavi 2 (77.9%) and independent 
Kavkasia (69.8%, chi2=18.65, p=.00) (see Table 5.2).  Kavkasia was most likely to 
mention the media democratization movement as part of the broader discussion about 
problems in the media (19.4%), followed by 9th Channel (4.5%) and Rustavi 2 (0.0%, 
chi2=18.65, p=.00)). Pro-government Rustavi 2 was more likely to talk about MDM in 
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passing, as part of the discussion about other issues, such as politics or international 
affairs (22.1%) than Kavkasia (19.4%) or 9th Channel (11.9%, chi2=18.65, p=.00). 
Table 5.1. Focus of coverage of MDM by newspapers 












MDM 25 (59.5%) 12 (52.2%) 65 (74.7%) 
Media, mentions MDM 1 (2.4%) 3 (13.0%) 11 (12.6%) 
Other, mentions MDM 16 (38.1%) 8 (34.8%) 11 (12.6%) 
  chi2=14.77, p<.05 
 
Table 5.2. Focus of coverage of MDM by TV stations 








MDM 74 (77.9%) 147 (83.5%) 90 (69.8%) 
Media, mentions MDM 0 (0.0%) 8 (4.5%) 14 (10.9%) 
Other, mentions MDM 21 (22.1%) 21 (11.9%) 25 (19.4%) 
  chi2=18.65, p<.001 
 The media varied in terms of focus on the media democratization movement’s 
organization, key campaign, key legislative proposals and the case. As shown in Table 
5.3, the Coalition for Media Advocacy did not get much publicity in the media. Pro-
government 24 Saati and pro-opposition Alia named the Coalition in but two stories, or in 
4.8% and 8.7% of materials, respectively, and independent Resonansi printed 10 stories 
about the Coalition (11.5%). The It Concerns You was covered more extensively, or in 
roughly one third of materials by 24 Saati (31%), Alia (26.1%), and Resonansi (26.4%). 
The differences across newspapers’ coverage of the Coalition for Media Advocacy and 
the It Concerns You campaign were not statistically significant. Issue-wise, pro-
government 24 Saati was most likely to cover the “must carry” rule (85.7%), followed by 
Resonansi (33.3%) and Alia (17.4%, chi2=39.93, p=.00), and least likely to cover 
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ownership and financial transparency in the media (7.1%), compared to Resonansi 
(29.9%) and Alia (17.4%, chi2=8.91, p=.01). The coverage of the Maestro TV case was 
spread more evenly -- Alia spoke about the Maestro in 31%, 24 Saati in 39.1%, and 
Resonansi in 29.9% of materials -- such that the differences were not significant. As 
shown in Table 5.4, pro-government Rustavi 2 was least likely to talk about the Coalition 
for Media Advocacy (3.2%), with independent Kavkasia providing slightly more (3.9%) 
and pro-opposition 9th Channel five times more frequent coverage (19.2%, chi2=7.23, 
p=.02). The It Concerns You campaign received the most mention from pro-opposition 
9th Channel (20.5%), with slightly less frequent coverage in independent Kavkasia 
(18.6%) and six times less frequent coverage in pro-government Rustavi 2 (3.2%, 
chi2=15.08, p=.00). Pro-opposition 9th Channel was most likely to cover the Maestro 
antennas case (47.2%), followed by independent Kavkasia (34.9%) and pro-government 
Rustavi 2 (11.6%, chi2=34.44, p=.00). Rustavi 2 led the coverage of the media ownership 
transparency proposal (29.5%), followed by Kavkasia (19.4) and 9th Channel (2.3%, 
chi2=41.45, p=.00). Note, pro-opposition 9th Channel provided little coverage of the 
transparency issue because the station was launched well after the media ownership 
legislation was adopted by the government in 2011. All three channels covered the “must 
carry” legislation extensively – Rustavi 2 in 66.3%, 9th Channel in 58.5%, and Kavkasia 
in 55% of materials – but the differences were not statistically significant. 
 

















The Coalition for Media 





It Concerns You 13 (31.0%) 6 (26.1%) 23 (26.4%) .32 .85 
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Must carry rule 36 (85.7%) 4 (17.4%) 29 (33.3%) 39.2 .00 
Maestro TV antennas case 13 (31.0%) 9 (39.1%) 26 (29.9%) .73 .69 
Media ownership/financial 





      



























It Concerns You 3 (3.2%) 36 (20.5%) 24(18.6%) 15.08 .01 
Must carry rule 63 (66.3%) 103(58.5%) 71 (55.0%) 2.95 .29 














Hypotheses and Research Questions 
 Tone. This study analyzed the tone of coverage of the media democratization 
movement across types of news organizations. It proposed (H1a) that pro-government 
media would be more likely to use a negative tone about the media democratization 
movement than pro-opposition media. H2a suggested that pro-opposition media were 
more likely to use a positive tone about the media democratization movement than pro-
government media. RQ5a asked about independent media’s tone of coverage of the 
media democratization movement compared to other media types.   
 In general, a positive tone was prevalent in the coverage of the media 
democratization movement across all media (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6). Pro-opposition Alia 
used a positive tone in nearly all articles (91.3%), with independent Resonansi (78.2%) 
and pro-government 24 Saati (64.3%) also mostly positive. Newspapers produced very 
few negative stories: Alia and 24 Saati wrote one negative article (or 4.3% and 2.3%, 
respectively), and Resonansi none. Pro-government 24 Saati wrote 33.3% of materials in 
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neutral tone, compared to independent Resonansi 21.8% and pro-opposition Alia 4.3% 
(chi 2 =10.23, p<.05) (see Table 5.5). As shown in Table 5.6, pro-government Rustavi 2 
used a positive tone in the majority of stories (83.2%), as did pro-opposition 9th Channel 
(81.3%) and independent Kavkasia (82.3%). TV stations produced very few negative 
stories -- 5.3% for independent Rustavi 2, 3.4% for pro-opposition 9th Channel, and 1.6% 
for independent Kavkasia – and about the same share of neutral materials -- 11.6% for 
Rustavi, 15.3% for 9th Channel and 15.5% for Kavkasia. 
 To test the hypotheses and answer research questions about the tone of coverage, 
the study used Pearson’s chi square test. As per Table 5.5, the test showed significant 
differences in newspapers’ tone of coverage of the media democratization movement: 
pro-government 24 Saati used negative tone slightly less frequently (2.4%) than pro-
opposition Alia (4.3 %), even though both wrote no more than one negative articles. H1a 
was not supported. Alia used a positive tone more frequently (91.3%) than 24 Saati 
(64.3%, chi2==10.23, p=0.03). H2a was supported for the newspaper sample. As shown 
in Table 5.6, TV stations did not significantly differ by tone of coverage of the media 
democratization movement. H1a and H2a were not supported in the TV sample.  
 Answering RQ5a, independent Resonansi , which used a positive tone in 78.2% 
of stories and did not produce a negative article, was more likely than 24 Saati (64.3%) 
but less likely than Alia (91.3%) to be positive regarding MDM and less likely than both 
newspapers to produce negative stories about MDM (chi2=10.23, p=0.03) (see Table 5.5). 
The tone of coverage of MDM by independent Kavkasia --82.3% positive and 1.6% 
negative stories –did not differ from the tone used by pro-government and pro-opposition 
stations in statistical terms (Table 5.6). 
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Negative 1 (2.4%) 1 (4.3%) 0 (0.0%) 
Neutral 14 (33.3%) 1 (4.3%) 19 (21.8%) 
Positive 27 (64.3%) 21 (91.3%) 68 (78.2%) 










pro-opposition TV  
(n=176) 
independent TV  
(n=129) 
Negative 5 (5.3%) 6 (3.4%) 2 (1.6%) 
Neutral 11 (11.6%) 27 (15.3%) 20 (15.5%) 
Positive 79 (83.2%) 143 (81.3%) 107 (82.9%) 
chi 2 =3.11, p<.6   
 Frames. This study analyzed dominant frames across news organizations, key 
mobilizing and demobilizing frames, and the usage of movement-advanced frames. 
 Dominant frames. H1b proposed that pro-government media would be more 
likely to use demobilizing frames about the media democratization movement than pro-
opposition media. H2b proposed that pro-opposition media were more likely to use 
mobilizing frames about the media democratization movement than pro-government 
media.  RQ5b asked about independent media’s use of mobilizing and demobilizing 
frames as compared to other media. 
 One of the key findings of this study was the extensive use of mobilizing frames 
across dominant types of media in Georgia, which were used much more frequently than 
demobilizing frames (see Table 5.7 and Table 5.8). Pro-government 24 Saati used 
mobilizing frames in 95.1% and demobilizing frames in 35.7% of materials (chi2=21.33, 
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p=00), based on McNemar’s chi square test; Pro-opposition Alia used mobilizing frames 
in 95.6% and demobilizing frames in 13% of materials (p=00); Independent Resonansi 
used mobilizing frames in 91.1% and demobilizing frames in 34.4% of articles 
(chi2=47.17, p=.00); Pro-government Rustavi 2 used mobilizing frames significantly 
more frequently (96.8%) than demobilizing frames (13.7%, chi2=77.01, p=00); Pro-
opposition 9th Channel used mobilizing frames in 93.8% and demobilizing frames in 
19.9% of materials ( chi2=126.00, p=00); Independent Kavkasia used mobilizing frames 
in 99.2% and demobilizing frames in 23.3% of materials (chi2=96.01, p=00). The 
analysis was based on McNemar’s chi square test. 
 






Pro-government newspaper  40 (95.1%) 15 (35.7%) 21.33 .00 
Pro-opposition newspaper 22 (95.6%) 3 (13%)  .00 
Independent newspaper 80 (91.1%) 29 (34.4%) 47.17 .00 
 





Pro-government TV 92 (96.8%) 13 (13.7%) 77.01 .00 
Pro-opposition TV 165 (93.8%) 35 (19.9%) 126.00 .00 
Independent TV 128 (99.2%) 30 (23.3%) 96.01 .00 
 
 As per Table 5.9, Pearson’s chi square test showed no significant differences 
between pro-government and pro-opposition newspapers’ use of mobilizing frames. H1b 
and H2b were not supported in the newspaper sample. As to the TV sample, pro-
government Rustavi 2 used more mobilizing frames (96.8%) than pro-opposition 9th 
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Channel (93.8%, chi2=6.30, p=.04), but the differences in TV stations’ use of 
demobilizing frames were not significant. H1b and H2b were not supported in the TV 
sample (see Table 5.10). 
 Answering RQ5b, there were no significant differences between independent 
Resonansi‘s and other newspapers’ use of mobilizing and demobilizing frames. 
Independent TV Kavkasia used mobilizing frames (99.2%) more often than pro-
government Rustavi 2 (96.8%) and pro-opposition 9th Channel (93.8%) (chi2=6.30, 
p=.04) (see Table 5.10).  
 















Mobilizing  40 (95.2%) 22 (95.7%) 80 (92.2%) .71 .70 
Demobilizing 15 (35.7%) 3 (13%) 29 (33.3%) 4.13 .13 
 













mobilizing   92 (96.8%) 165 (93.8%) 128 (99.2%) 6.30 .04 
Demobilizing  13 (13.7%) 39 (22.2%) 30 (23.3%) 3.60 .16 
 
 Key mobilizing frames. The media gave preference to some mobilizing frames, 
and neglected others. All newspapers used free speech, rule of law, access to information 
- pluralism, and it concerns you frames more often than others, however, each newspaper 
type emphasized one other frame (see Table 5.11). TV stations’ top frames were the free 
speech and the rule of law frames.  
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 Pro-government 24 Saati used free speech frame (71.4%), access to information – 
pluralism (61.9%), rule of law (54.8%), it concerns you (31.1%), and fair elections 
(59.5%) frames more often than other frames, based on McNemar’s chi square test. Pro-
opposition Alia used free speech frame (56.5%), injustice (39.1%), rule of law (39.1%), 
access to information – pluralism (30.4%), and it concerns you (26.1%), frames as its top 
frames. Independent Resonansi used the free speech, rule of law (51.7% each) and access 
to information – pluralism (44.2%) frames most frequently (see Table 5.11). pro-
government Rustavi 2 used rule of law (73.7%), free speech (60%) access to information 
– plurality (52.1%) fair elections (51.6%), access to information – transparency (25.3%) 
as its top frames (see Table 5.12). Pro-opposition 9th Channel used the free speech frame 
most often (80.6%), followed by the access to information – plurality (44.9%), rule of 
law (42.6%), fair elections (38.6%), access to information – transparency (25.3%), and 
injustice (25%) frames. Independent Kavkasia’s top frames were free speech (73.6%) and 
rule of law (64.3%), access to information – plurality frames (52.7%), fair elections 
(50.4%), and injustice (27.1%). Other frames were used by newspapers and TV stations 
in less than 20% of materials (see Table 5.12).  
Table 5.11 shows the results of framing differences across newspapers, based on 
Pearson’s chi square test. Pro-government 24 Saati used two frames more frequently than 
other newspapers: access to information – plurality (61.9%), which 24 Saati used more 
frequently than independent Resonansi (44.2%) and pro-opposition Alia (33.3%, 
chi2=6.55, p=.04), and the fair elections frame (59.5%), which 24 Saati again used more 
often than Resonansi (30.4%) or Alia (8.7%, chi2=17.57, p=.00). Pro-opposiiton Alia 
used injustice frame more frequently (39.1%), than independent Resonansi (18.4%) or 
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pro-government 24 Saati (11.9%, chi2=7.1, p=.02). Independent Resonansi used the 
access to information – transparency (25.3%) frame more often than pro-opposition Alia 
(13%) or pro-government 24 Saati (4.8%, chi2=8.58, p=.01).  
Framing differences across TV stations, based on Pearson’s chi square test, are 
shown Table 5.12. Pro-government Rustavi 2 used the rule of law frame (73.7%) more 
often than independent Kavkasia (64.3%) and pro-opposition 9th Channel (42.6%, 
chi2=28.48, p=.00). Rustavi 2 also used the fair elections frame (51.6%) more often than 
Kavkasia (50.4%) and 9th Channel (38.6%, chi2=6.00, p=.05), and the access to 
information – transparency (25.3%) frame, more frequently than Kavkasia (12.4%) and 
9th Channel (1.7%, chi2=36.23, p=.00). Pro-opposition 9th Channel used the free speech 
frame (80.6%) more frequently than independent Kavkasia (73.6%) and pro-government 
Rustavi 2 (60%, chi2=13.36, p=.00), and movement-advanced it concerns you frame 
(20.5%) more frequently than Kavkasia (18.6%) and Rustavi 2 (3.2%, chi2=15.08, 
p=.00). Independent Kavkasia used the injustice frame (27.1%) most often, followed by 
9th Channel (25%) and Rustavi 2 (2.1%, chi2=25.60, p=.00). Kavkasia also used the 
rights frame (14.8%) more often than 9th Channel (8.5%) and Rustavi 2 (1.1%, 
chi2=12.98, p=.00), as well as the democratization frame (14%) more often than Rustavi 
2 (9.5%) and 9th Channel (4.5%, chi2=8.33, p=.01) (see Table 5.12). 
 















Free speech 30 (71.4%) 13 (56.4%) 45 (51.7%) 4.53 .1 
Access to info – 
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Fair elections 25 (59.5%) 2 (8.7%) 29 (33.3%) 17.57 .00 
Rule of law 23 (54.8%) 9 (39.1%) 45 (51.7%) 1.54 .46 
It Concerns You 13 (31.1%) 6 (26.1%) 23 (26.4%) .32 .85 
Injustice 5 (11.9%) 9 (39.1%) 16 (18.4%) 7.19 .03 
Democratization 2 (4.8%) 3 (13%) 10 (11.5%) 1.75 .41 
Access to info – 





Rights 0 (0.0%) 2 (8.7%) 5 (5.7)% 3.16 .20 
 
 













t TV  
(n=129) 
chi2 p 
Rule of law 70 (73.7%) 75 (42.6%) 83 (64.3%) 28.48 .00 
Free speech 57 (60.0%) 141 (80.6%) 95 (73.6%) 13.36 .00 
Access to info – 





Fair elections 49 (51.6%) 68 (38.6%) 65 (50.4%) 6.00 .05 
Access to info – 





Democratization 9 (9.5%) 8 (4.5%) 18 (14.0%) 8.33 .05 
It Concerns You 3 (3.2%) 36 (20.5%) 24 (18.6%) 15.08 .00 
Injustice 2 (2.1%) 44 (25.0%) 35 (27.1%) 25.60 .00 
Rights 1 (1.1)% 15 (8.5%) 19 (14.8)% 12.98 .00 
 
 Key demobilizing frames. Demobilizing frames were used in moderation by the 
Georgian newspapers’ and TV stations’ in their coverage of MDM, which was one of the 
significant findings of this study (see the section Dominant Frames). From the range of 
demobilizing frames and devices applied to social movements (Chan & Lee, 1984; 
Dardis, 2008; Di Cicco, 2010; McLeod & Hertog, 1999), the Georgian media used the 
hinders free business, politicizing/scamming, hinders country, supports status quo and 
ineffective, impotent, counterproductive frames most often, but in moderation. The news 
organizations have not used many marginalizing frames described in the literature. In 
several stories, the news media used new frames, referring to the lack of compliance 
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between activists’ legislative proposals with the international practice (Gamisonia, 2012, 
June 15; 9th Channel, 2012, June 13) and with the existing legal framework in the country 
(Rustavi 2, 2012, June 22). 
 Based on McNemar’s chi square test, pro-government 24 Saati used the hinders 
free business (19%), politicizing/scamming (9.5%), supports status quo (7.1%), and 
hinders country (4.8%) frames most often. Pro-opposition Alia used the hinders free 
business, politicizing/scamming, hinders country, and ineffective, impotent, 
counterproductive frames evenly, in one article each. Independent Resonansi used the 
hinders free business (18.4%) and politicizing/scamming (14.9%) frames more often than 
others (see Table 5.13). Pro-government Rustavi 2 used the politicizing/scamming and 
hinders free business (7.4% each) frames more often than others, while pro-opposition 9th 
Channel used the politicizing /scamming (10.2%) and hinders free business (8.5%) 
frames most often. Independent Kavkasia used politicizing/scamming (10.1%) and 
hinders free business (8.5%) as its top demobilizing frames (see Table 5.14). 
 The comparison of demobilizing frames across newspapers and TV stations, 
based on Pearson’s chi square test, did not give statistically significant results. The pro-
government, pro-opposition, and independent media used demobilizing frames in similar 
ways, without significant differences along the lines of political preference.  
 
Table 5.13 Demobilizing frames by newspapers 
 










hinders free business 8 (19%) 1 (4.3%) 16 (18.4%) 
politicizing / scam 4 (9.5%) 1 (4.3%) 13 (14.9%) 
supports status quo 3 (7.1%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (2.3%) 
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hinders country 2 (4.8%) 1 (4.3%) 1 (1.1%) 
ineffective, impotent, 
counterproductive 1 (2.4%) 1 (4.3%) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
Other 1 (2.4%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
  
Table 5.14 Demobilizing frames by TV stations 
 










Politicizing / scamming 7 (7.4%) 18 (10.2%) 13 (10.1%) 
Hinders free business 7 (7.4%) 15 (8.5%) 11 (8.5%) 
Other 4 (4.2%) 2 (1.1%) 3 (2.3%) 
Ineffective, impotent, 
counterproductive 2 (2.1%) 5 (2.8%) 
 
5 (3.9%) 
Hinders country 0 (0.0%) 3 (1.7%) 0 (0.0%) 
Supports status quo 0 (0.0%) 2 (1.1%) 1 (0.8%) 
Bothersome, disruptive 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.6%) 0 (0.0%) 
 
 Movement-advanced frames. H1c proposed that pro-government media would be 
less likely to use movement-advanced frames than pro-opposition media. RQ5c inquired 
about independent media’s use of movement-advanced frames. 
 Pearson’s chi square test was used to test the hypotheses and answer the research 
question. As shown in Tables 5.11 and 5.12, all newspapers and TV stations used the key 
frame advanced by the movement – it concerns you. Newspapers devoted approximately 
the same share of materials, one fourth, to the frame such that the differences were not 
statistically significant. H1c was not supported for the newspaper sample. As per Table 
5.12, pro-government Rustavi 2 used movement-advanced frame-- it concerns you --six 
times less frequently (3.2%) than pro-opposition 9th Channel (20.5%, chi2=15.08, p=.00). 
H1c was supported for the TV sample (see Table 5.12). 
 Independent Resonansi‘s use of the it concerns you frame was not different from 
pro-government or pro-opposition newspapers use of the same frame. Independent 
   
136 
 
Kavkasia used movement-advanced frame less often (18.6%) than pro-opposition 9th 
Channel (20.5%), but more often than pro-government Rustavi 2 (3.2%, chi2=15.08, 
p=.00) (see Tables 5.11 and 5.12). RQ5c was answered.   
 Sources. This study identified and analyzed the media’s use of ten categories of 
sources: a) the activists of MDM (involved in the Coalition for Media Advocacy and It 
Concerns You campaign), b) activist journalists of MDM (involved in the Coalition and 
It Concerns You), c) other activists, d) other journalists, e) government officials & MPs 
from ruling party, f) opposition MPs, g) non-parliamentary opposition, h) diplomats & 
internationals, i) ordinary people, j) others. 
 The study hypothesized (H1d) that pro-government media would be more likely 
to use government officials as sources about the media democratization movement than 
pro-opposition media. H2d proposed that pro-opposition media were more likely to use 
activists more often as sources than pro-government media. RQ5d asked about 
independent media’s use of sources in comparison to other media types. 
 The media used most categories of sources, but some more often than others (see 
Tables 5.15 and 5.16). Based on McNemar’s chi square test, pro-government 24 Saati 
used “government officials & ruling party MPs” most frequently (59.5%), followed by 
“activists of MDM” (31%, p=.01), “journalists – others” (23.8%, p=.00), “activists – 
others” (19%, p=.00), “diplomats & internationals” (19%, chi2=8.82, p=.00), and 
“opposition MPs” (16.7%, p=.00), as its sources. Other sources were used in less than 
10% of materials, and 24 Saati did not speak to “ordinary people.” Pro-opposition Alia 
used “activists – other” (34.8%), “journalists – other” (34.8%), “government officials & 
ruling party MPs” (21.7%), and “ordinary people” (13%) most frequently as sources, 
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while other categories of sources were used in less than 10% of materials. Alia did not 
speak to “activist journalists of MDM”. Independent Resonansi used source categories 
“government officials & MPs from ruling party” (35.6%), “journalists – others” (31%) 
and “activists – other” (29.9%) most frequently, followed by “activists of MDM” (23%, 
chi2=2.70, p=.1), while Alia used other categories of sources in less than 10% of 
materials. (see Table 5.15). As shown in Table 5.16, pro-government Rustavi 2 used 
“government officials & ruling party MPs” as source most frequently (73.7%), followed 
by “opposition MPs” (33.7%, chi2=34.22, p=.00), “diplomats & internationals” (20.2%, 
chi2=32.44, p=.00), “journalists – other” (12.8%, chi2=54.15, p=.00), and other categories 
in less than 10% of stories. Rustavi 2 has not spoken to “activist journalists of MDM.” 
Pro-opposition 9th Channel spoke to “journalists – other” (33.5%) and “activists of 
MDM” (25.6%). most often, followed by “government officials & MPs from ruling 
party” (29.5%), “activists – other” (17.1%), “diplomats & internationals” (10.3%, 
chi2=20.77, p=.00) and other sources. Independent Kavkasia spoke to “government 
officials & MPs from ruling party” (45.5%) most often, followed by “journalists – other” 
(31.8%, chi2=3.41, p=.06), “activists - other” (29.7%, chi2=4.75, p=.02), “activists – 
MDM” (21.7%. chi2=17.52, p=.00), “opposition MPs (16.3%. chi2=47.17, p=.00), 
“diplomats & internationals” (14.7%, chi2=21.55, p=.00), and other categories (see Table 
5.16). 
 



































Activists - MDM  13 (31%) 3 (13%) 20 (23%) 2.69 .26 
Journalists – other 10 (23.8%) 8 (34.8%) 27 (31%) 1.06 .58 
Activists – other  8 (19%) 8 (34.8%) 26 (29.9%) 2.36 .30 
internationals  8 (19.0%) 0 (0%) 8 (9.2%) 6.1 .05 
Opposition MPs 7 (16.7%) 2 (8.7%) 15 (17.2%) 1.03 .59 
Opposition non-











Other sources 1 (2.4%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2.63 .26 
Ordinary people 0 (0%) 3 (13%) 1 (1.1%) 11.61 .01 
 
































Opposition MPs 32 (33.7%) 21 (16.3%) 13 (7.4%) 30.97 .00 
Diplomats & 





Journalists – other 12 (12.8%) 41 (31.8%) 59 (33.5%) 14.37 .01 
Activists – MDM 8 (8.4%) 28 (21.7%) 45 (25.6%) 11.48 .01 
Opposition non-





Activists  - other  7 (7.4%) 38 (29.7%) 30 (17.1%) 18.35 .00 
Ordinary people 3 (3.2%) 2 (1.6%) 10 (5.7%) 3.64 .16 
Activist journalists 





Other sources 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (2.3%) 5.20 .01 
  
 The study tested hypotheses and answered the research question based on 
Pearson’s chi square test. As shown in Table 5.17, newspapers’ use of two category of 
sources, “government officials & ruling party MPs” and a combined category of 
“activists (to include “activists of MDM”, “activist journalists of MDM,” and “activists-
other”) showed significant differences. Pro-government 24 Saati was nearly three times 
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more likely to use government officials as sources (59.5%) than pro-opposition Alia 
(21.7%, chi2=10.66, p=.00). There were no differences in newspapers’ use of combined 
“activist” category. H1d was supported, and H2d was not supported for the newspaper 
sample. In the TV sample, pro-government Rustavi 2 was twice more likely to use 
government officials as sources (73.7%) than pro-opposition 9th Channel (29.5%, 
chi2=49.38, p=.00), while pro-opposition 9th Channel was three times more likely to 
speak to activists than pro-government Rustavi 2 (15.8%, chi2=24.12, p=.00). H1d and 
H2d were supported for the TV sample (see Table 5.18).  
 As an answer to RQ5d, independent Resonansi used government sources more 
often (35.6%) than pro-opposition Alia (21.7%), but less frequently than 24 Saati (59.5%, 
chi2=10.66, p=.00). The differences between Resonansi’s, Alia’s and 24 Saati‘s use of 
activists as sources were statistically not significant (see Table 5.17). Independent 
Kavkasia used government sources more often (45%) than pro-opposition 9th Channel 
(29.5%) but less frequently than pro-government Rustavi 2 (73.7%, chi2=49.38, p=.00); 
Independent Kavkasia spoke to activists more often (46.5%) than either 9th Channel 
(40%) or Rustavi 2 (15.8%, chi2=24.12, p=.00) (see Table 5.18). 
 





















officials & MPs 











Activists 20 (47.6%) 11(47.8%) 52 (59.8%) 2.19 .33 
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Activists 15 (15.8%) 70 (40.0%) 60 (46.5%) 24.12 .00 
  
 Frequency, briefness and placement of coverage. The study analyzed 
frequency, briefness, and placement of stories about MDM across types of news 
organizations. 
 Frequency. H1e proposed that pro-government media would cover the media 
democratization movement less frequently than pro-opposition media. RQ5e posed a 
question about the volume of independent media’s coverage of the media 
democratization movement.   
 As shown in Table 5.19, pro-government 24 Saati, and its weekly, Weekend, 
produced 42 stories about the media democratization movement during the timeframe of 
the study, from July, 2010, to October, 2012. In this period, a total of 814 issues of 24 
Saati and Weekend were published. Pro-opposition Alia, and its weekly, Kronika, 
produced 23 stories about MDM per 580 issues of Alia and Kronika published during the 
timeframe. Independent Resonansi and its weekly, Mteli Kvira, produced 87 stories per 
814 issues published during the timeframe of the study. Story per issue ratio was .05 for 
24 Saati, .04 stories per issue for Alia, and .11 stories for Resonansi. H1e was not 
supported for the newspaper sample. As shown in Table 21, TV stations aired 400 stories 
about the media democratization movement during the timeframe of the study, from July, 
2010, to October, 2012. Pro-government Rustavi 2 produced 95 stories per 10,793 news 
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programs aired during the timeframe of the study (to include 12 daily newscasts, a 
business edition, and a weekly analytical program). Pro-opposition 9th Channel aired 176 
stories per 1825 programs (12 daily newscasts) aired between its launch on April 30, 
2012 and Election Day of October 1, 2012. Independent Kavkasia aired 129 stories per 2, 
463 programs during the timeframe of the study (to include three daily newscasts). Story 
per newscast ratio was .008 for pro-government Rustavi 2, .09 stories per newscast for 9th 
Channel, and .05 stories per newscast for independent Kavkasia. Pro-opposition 9th 
Channel covered MDM more frequently (nearly one story per ten newscasts) than pro-
government Rustavi 2. H1e was supported for the TV sample (see Table 5.19).  
 As per RQ5e, independent Resonansi wrote more frequently about the media 
democratization movement (1 article per ten issues published) than pro-opposition Alia 
(.04 per issue) or pro-government 24 Saati (.05 per issue). Independent Kavkasia covered 
MDM more frequently (.05 stories per newscast) than pro-government station (.01 stories 
per newscast), but less frequently than pro-opposition 9th Channel (.09 stories per 
newscast) (see Table 5.19).   
 

























# of issues/ 
newscasts  814 580 814 10792 1825 2463 
# of stories 
about 




ratio .05 .04 .11 .008 .09 .05 




 Brief versus lengthy coverage. H1f proposed that pro-government media would 
be more likely to provide brief coverage of the media democratization movement than 
pro-opposition media. H2f proposed that pro-opposition media would be more likely to 
provide lengthier coverage of the media democratization movement than pro-government 
media. RQ5f inquired about the briefness versus depth of the coverage of the media 
democratization movement in the independent media. 
` The briefness (or length) of coverage was operationalized as genre-based 
treatment of the subject – MDM. The use of newspaper briefs and TV voice/overs, a 
shorter genre, indicated briefness of coverage, whereas the use of newspaper stories, 
interviews, opinions and editorials and TV packages, referred to lengthy coverage.  
 As shown in Table 5.20, newspapers used several genre to treat the subject. Pro-
government 24 Saati limited the coverage of the media democratization movement to 
news briefs in 35.7% or materials, while pro-opposition Alia wrote only one news brief, 
amounting to 4.3% of articles. Independent Resonansi used news briefs in 18.4% of 
materials. Pro-opposition Alia wrote more stories (69.8%) opinions (13%) and interviews 
(13%) than pro-government 24 Saati, which wrote 64.3% stories, but did not write 
opinions or interviews. Independent Resonansi wrote slightly fewer stories (63.2%) than 
Alia or 24 Saati, and less opinions (5.7%) and interviews (3.4%) than Alia (chi2=25.14, 
p<.01) However, Resonansi editorialized (6.9%) on the subject of media democratization, 
while other newspapers have not. In the TV sample, shown in Table 5.21, pro-
government Rustavi 2 used voice over (V/O) in 60% or materials, pro-opposition 9th 
Channel in 57%, and independent Kavkasia in 55%. Rustavi 2 aired packages in 34.7% 
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cases, while 9th Channel used packages in 26.9% and Kavkasia in 38% of cases. 9th 
Channel had anchors read stories in 11.4% of cases, while Rustavi 2and Kavkasia did so 
in in 2.1% and 7% of cases, respectively. Rustavi 2 aired one interview (2.1%), 9th 
Channel five interviews (2.1%), and Kavkasia none (see Table 5.21). 
  
Table 5.20 Genre by newspapers 
 









News brief 15 (35.7%) 1 (4.3%) 16 (18.4%) 
Story 27 (64.3%) 16 (69.6%) 55 (63.2%) 
Opinion 0 (0.0%) 3 (13%) 5 (5.7%) 
Interview 0 (0.0%) 3 (13%) 3 (3.4%) 
Editorial 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (6.9%) 
Other 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (2.3%) 
 chi2=25.14, p<.01 
 











V/O 57 (60.0%) 100 (57.0%) 71 (55.0%) 
Package 33 (34.7%) 47 (26.9%) 49 (38.0%) 
Anchor’s text 2 (2.1%) 21 (11.4%) 9 (7.0%) 
Interview 1 (2.1%) 5 (2.9%) 0 (0.0%) 
Other 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (6.9%) 
 chi2=16.06, p<.05 
 To test hypotheses and answer research questions, the study used Pearson’s chi 
square test. The study grouped “stories”, “opinions”, “interviews”, “editorials” and “other 
genre” into the category “stories” and compared it to the category “news briefs.” As 
shown in Table 5.22, government-leaning 24 Saati produced news briefs more often 
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(36.7%) than opposition-leaning Alia (4.3%, chi2=9.66, p=.01). H1f was supported. 
Opposition-leaning Alia produced more “stories” (95.6%) than government-leaning 24 
Saati (64.3%, chi2=9.66, p=.01). H2f was supported for the newspaper sample. In the TV 
sample, regrouping TV packages and interviews into a new category “in-depth stories”, 
and comparing its use to the combined use of voiceovers (V/O) and anchors’ texts -- 
“brief news” genre -- did not produce significant differences across TV stations, based on 
Pearson’s chi square test. H1f was H2f were not supported for the TV sample (see Table 
5.23). 
 Answering RQ5f, independent Resonansi was less likely to use news briefs 
(18.4%) than 24 Saati (36.7%) but more likely than Alia (4.3%, chi2=9.66, p=.01). It was 
less likely than Alia (95.6%) and more likely than 24 Saati (64.3%) to produce “stories” 
(81.7%, chi2=9.66, p=.01) (see Table 5.22). TV stations’ use of genre were no different in 
terms of statistical significance (see Table 5.23). 
 
Table 5.22 Brief news and longer stories by newspapers 
 









News brief 15 (35.7%) 1 (4.3%) 16 (18.4%) 
Story  27 (64.3%) 22 (95.7%) 71 (81.6%) 
  chi2=9.66, p<.01 
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News brief 59 (62.1%) 122 (69.3%) 80 (62.0%) 
Stories  36 (37.9%) 54 (30.7%) 49 (38.0%) 
  chi2=2.29, p<.31 
 
 Placement. H1g proposed that pro-government media would place the coverage 
of MDM less prominently in terms of assigned newspaper space and airtime than pro-
opposition media. H2g proposed that pro-opposition media would place the coverage of 
MDM more prominently in terms of assigned newspaper space and airtime than pro-
government media. RQ5g inquired about independent media’s placement of MDM 
coverage in terms of prominence of assigned page space or airtime. 
 As shown in Table 5.24, newspapers differed in terms of newspaper space 
assigned to the stories about media democratization movement. Pro-government 24 Saati 
placed materials on the front page in 59.5% of cases, while pro-opposition Alia did not 
(0.0%, chi2=36.82, p=.00). H1g was not supported. Pro-government 24 Saati was less 
likely to put materials about MDM on less prominent pages 6-16 (0.0%) than pro-
opposition Alia (21.7%, chi2=36.82, p=.00). H2g was not supported in the newspaper 
sample. In the TV sample, pro-government Rustavi 2 aired 20% of stories during less 
prominent morning news segment, while pro-opposition 9th Channel did not air stories 
about MDM in the morning (chi2=71.44, p<.00). Pro-opposition 9th Channel aired 60.2% 
of stories during the primetime hours, compared to pro-government Rustavi 2 (49.5%, 
chi2=71.44, p=.00). H1g and H2g were supported for the TV sample. Independent 
Kavkasia did not air stories in the morning, and aired 74.4% of stories during the 
primetime segment, that is, more often than pro-government Rustavi 2 (49.5%) and pro-
opposition 9th Channel (60.2%, chi2=71.44, p=.00) (see Table 5.25). 




Table 5.24. Story placement by newspapers 
 









Front page 22 (59.5%) 0 (0.0%) 18 (20.9%) 
Pages 2-5 15 (40.5%) 18 (78.3%) 42 (48.8%) 
Other pages 0 (0.0%) 5 (21.7%) 26 (30.2%) 
 chi2=36.82, p<.00 
 
Table 5.25. Story placement by TV stations 
 









Morning 19 (20.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Afternoon 29 (30.5%) 70 (39.8%) 33 (25.6%) 
Evening 47 (49.5%) 106 (60.2%) 96 (74.4%) 
 chi2=71.44, p<.00 
Discussion  
 This study analyzed the coverage of the media democratization movement, an 
emergent movement concerned with free speech and democratization in Georgia, across 
different types of news organizations to identify dominant tone, frames, sources, and 
other elements of the coverage and explain them in the context of news organizations’ 
political ties (or lack thereof) with the government and the opposition. 
 A large amount of the literature posits that social movements receive 
demobilizing, marginalizing coverage in the media, because the media resist social 
change (Chan & Lee, 1984; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Gitlin, 1980; Olien et al, 1995). 
Other literature (Harlow & Johnston, 2011; Weaver & Scacco, 2013) maintains the recent 
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trend of media diversification and the diffusion of Internet media lead to more neutral and 
fair coverage of social movements in some media. 
 This study, in very broad terms, was based on theorizing that dynamic changes in 
emergent democracies, such as Georgia, led to great disparities among political elites and 
the media, and the emergence of a new type of independent media, open to change and 
sympathetic to social movements.  Social movements in these environments have the 
independent media, but also opposition media, as their natural allies against the 
government and the system. Based on this theorizing, the study hypothesized more 
positive and supportive coverage of social movements in the media aligned with the 
opposition and in the independent media, and more negative coverage in government-
aligned media. The hypothesized positive coverage of Georgia’s media democratization 
movement was also based on the literature, which predicts more favorable treatment of 
emergent movements than of established movements (Gitlin, 1980).  
 The key finding of the study is largely positive coverage of the media 
democratization movement. Newspapers and TV stations across the political spectrum 
used mobilizing frames more often than demobilizing frames, and applied a positive tone 
in the majority of stories. Demobilizing, marginalizing frames -- powerful weapons 
against protest around the world -- were applied rarely, and often side-by-side with 
mobilizing frames. The study has explained this finding based on aspects of political and 
media environment in Georgia.  In 2010-2012, the government was facing strong political 
opposition, and the media were split into pro-government, pro-opposition, and centrist, 
non-engaged groups. The opposition, and pro-opposition media, supported the media 
democratization movement as a strong challenge to the government they hoped to defeat. 
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The independent media had their own reasons to support the movement. Both 
independent and pro-opposition media experienced government pressures, were in a 
disadvantageous position compared to pro-government media, and stood to benefit from 
the reform of media environment proposed by activists. As to the positive tone and 
mobilizing frames in pro-government media, it appears to be the result of two factors: a) 
citizens of Georgia have shown strong respect for the freedom of speech and press -- 
every seventh citizen polled in 2013 said freedom of media was the most important issue 
facing the country (Navarro & Woodward, 2013) – making marginalization of activists 
demanding greater press freedom unacceptable to readers and viewers, and b) the 
government accepted and legitimized the media democratization movement demands for 
greater transparency in ownership and financing of media, and for mandatory distribution 
of broadcast signals by cable operators. (The government has not responded to the 
activists’ demand to lift the ban on distribution of Maestro TV’s antennas.) In April 2011, 
the government adopted new ownership transparency legislation, and, in June 2012, 
adopted into law the “must carry/must offer” principles of mandatory distribution of 
broadcast signals by cable operators. The coverage in pro-governmental media focused 
on the government’s response to the activists’ demands, and, in general, on government’s 
media democratization reform; hence, the use of positive tone and mobilizing frames. 
This explanation is corroborated by more frequent use of government officials as sources 
by the pro-government media than by the pro-opposition or the independent media. 
Rustavi 2 used government sources in 73.7% of stories, and pro-government 24 Saati in 
59.5% of stories, more often than other news organizations.   
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 Despite overall positive coverage, all news organizations used marginalizing 
frames. The government attempted to “change the conversation,” that is, reframe 
activists’ demands such that their argument would lose its intended meaning. For 
instance, the key demobilizing frame has been hinders free business, which reframed 
activists’ demands for transparency in the media ownership and financing, and for the 
“must carry” regulation, in terms of the free market. The discussion framed as hinders 
free market treated media as businesses, and labeled activists’ demands for disclosure of 
proprietary information, such as ownership and financial flows, as intrusive and 
unjustifiable burdens on free businesses. The media’s use of politicizing/scamming frame 
portrayed activists as politically motivated individuals, and their demands as a political 
game.  
 As theorized by the study, there were differences in the treatment of MDM across 
types of media. These differences -- some more obvious than others-- played out in the 
choice of specific frames, genre, sources, page space and airtime. In many cases, the 
news organizations used frames in line with their political alliances and tastes. In general, 
the media carry some and ignore other frames, advanced by social actors, and deploy 
their own frames (de Vreese, 2012; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Pro-opposition and 
independent media carried activists’ frames, and aligned more or less closely with their 
discourse.  Pro-governmental media, which refrained from direct attacks and slandering 
of the movement, used frames preferred by the government, and reduced the movement’s 
importance by shaping stories in the brief genre of news briefs and airing TV stories 
during less-popular morning newscasts. Pro-government newspaper 24 Saati shaped 
35.7% of its stories as news briefs (two to three short paragraphs), compared to pro-
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opposition Alia (4.3%) or independent Resonansi (18.4%). Pro-government 24 Saati also 
wrote fewer stories about MDM (64.3%) than pro-opposition Alia (69.9%). While 24 
Saati placed stories about MDM on the front page significantly more often than two other 
newspapers, stories shaped as news briefs lacked prominence. 24 Saati was also less 
likely to focus on the movement, and instead discussed MDM in connection with other 
issues. For instance, 24 Saati discussed the movement’s issues in terms of their 
importance for conducting fair elections, which was the government’s preferred 
discourse. In the months prior to the 2012 parliamentary elections, the government 
adopted the “must carry” regulation, framing it as a major initiative to ensure the fairness 
of the election. Pro-government 24 Saati used frames associated with the elections -- fair 
elections and access to information – plurality -- two and six times more often than 
independent Resonansi and pro-opposition Alia, respectively, and covered the “must 
carry” regulation twice more often than other MDM issues (85.7%) and more frequently 
than other newspapers. 24 Saati, which used government officials as sources in 59.5% of 
articles, essentially covered the government’s role in media democratization in Georgia.  
 Pro-government TV station Rustavi 2 also gave predominantly positive coverage 
of the media democratization movement. However, the coverage was limited to 8 stories 
per 1,000 newscasts (.008 stories per newscast), and was almost ten times less frequent 
than the coverage of MDM on pro-opposition 9th Channel (.09 stories per newscast, that 
is, 9 stories per 100 newscasts). 9th Channel, the station launched by the opposition on 
April 30, 2012, that is, five months ahead of the parliamentary elections, produced twice 
as many stories as Rustavi 2 during the period sampled in the study. The literature 
describes marginalization by not mentioning key players in a movement, aimed at 
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reducing their importance and disassociating them from issues (Gamson & Modigliani, 
1989). “Sealing off” (Gitlin, 1980) information about the movement, rather than openly 
slandering the protesters, appeared to have been Rustavi 2’s strategy. Rustavi 2 spoke to 
activists in only 15.8% of cases, compared to government officials featured in 73.7% of 
stories, and did not speak to a single activist journalist, a vocal and strong group in 
MDM. The station aired MDM stories in less-popular morning newscasts, which other 
two stations never did, and was least likely in the TV sample to air MDM stories in 
primetime. Rustavi 2 was most likely to mention MDM issues in stories focused on other 
issues, such as politics or the elections. Rustavi 2 covered the Coalition for Media 
Democracy and the It Concerns You campaign less often than two other stations. It 
covered the media ownership issue more frequently than other stations – Rustavi 2 was 
itself accused of non-transparent ownership, and responded to these allegations in the 
coverage – and was least likely to cover the issue of Maestro TV’s antennas. Rustavi 2’s 
preferred frames were rule of law, fair elections, – the frames used by the government in 
its own discourse on reforms -- and the access to information - transparency frame, 
related to the media ownership transparency coverage. Rustavi 2 was least likely to use 
activist-advanced it concerns you frame. Rustavi 2 abstained from demobilizing frames, 
airing them in no more than 13.7% of stories.    
 Pro-opposition media, consistent with theorizing in this study, supported the 
social movement. Not only did these media use predominantly positive tone and 
mobilizing frames, but they also supported the movement in their decisions about specific 
frames, tone, genre, frequency, space and airtime of coverage. Almost entire coverage in 
pro-opposition Alia (91.3%) was positive, exceeding the frequency of positive stories in 
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pro-government 24 Saati (64.3%) and independent Resonansi (78.2%). Alia wrote most 
frequently in the longer genre -- stories, opinions and interviews – among newspapers 
sampled. Pro-opposition 9th Channel’s frequency of coverage -- nearly one story per ten 
newscasts aired -- was significantly higher than two other two stations’ frequency of 
coverage (8 stories per 1,000 newscasts for Rustavi 2 and 5 stories per 100 newscasts for 
Kavkasia.). 9th Channel mentioned the Coalition for Media Advocacy (10.2%) and the It 
Concerns You (20.5%) much more often than other stations, aired stories in primetime 
and gave voice to activists more frequently than pro-government Rustavi 2 (but less 
frequently than independent Kavkasia). In its choice of frames, 9th Channel was closer to 
activists’ discourse than Rustavi 2. 9th Channel accentuated free speech, the activists’ top 
frame, more often than other stations. 9th Channel was also most likely in the TV sample 
to use activists’ key frame, it concerns you. The producer at 9th Channel, interviewed by 
the study, was a member in one of the organizations of the Coalition for Media 
Advocacy, which have undoubtedly positively affected the coverage. 9th Channel used 
demobilizing frames from government’s discourse, but in a small share of stories 
(10.2%). 
 Certain features of the coverage in pro-opposition media, especially Alia, hinted 
at the political motivation behind the support to the movement. Alia used injustice frame 
more often than two other newspapers, and covered MDM in the broader discussion of 
media problems. Alia was apparently painting a picture of injustices in Georgia in broad 
strokes, reflecting the oppositional political discourse. The strongest oppositional player, 
the “Coalition – Georgian Dream,” was trying to entice the protest vote ahead of the 2012 
parliamentary elections. Their meetings and demonstrations were taking place throughout 
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Georgia, with the “Coalition - Georgian Dream” employing collective action strategies 
more often than normal whistle-stop campaigning. According to the international 
observers, the campaign was “polarized, tense, and characterized by the use of harsh 
rhetoric and a few instances of violence” (Department of State, 2012). According to some 
observers, the fate of the elections was decided in favor of the opposition when pro-
opposition 9th Channel aired the story about injustices and tortures in the Georgian 
prisons. The injustice frame used by Alia tapped into the oppositional rhetoric. Issue-
wise, Alia focused on government’s seizure of thousands of Maestro TV’s antennas 
slated for free-of-charge distribution  – the most flagrant and tangible injustice -- and 
wrote about it more often than about other two issues of MDM. Pro-opposition Alia and 
9th Channel were least likely to talk to the government sources. Alia wrote about MDM 
no more frequently (4 per 100 issues) than pro-government 24 Saati (5 per 100 issues), 
and most of its coverage occurred in 2012, that is, during the height of the political 
campaign. 9th Channel provided all its coverage in 2012, the year in which the station was 
launched. 9th Channel was closed shortly after the opposition won the elections. 
 Georgia’s independent media have had the closest connection to activists. Over 
the years, the civil sector provided assistance, advice and protection to the media, and 
voiced its concerns, while the media have dutifully covered the civil agenda. Both the 
editor in chief of Resonansi and news director of Kavkasia were members of 
organizations which formed the Coalition for Media Advocacy. The study found 
supportive and positive, if restrained, coverage of MDM in independent Resonansi and 
Kavkasia.  While independent Resonansi covered MDM most frequently -- Resonansi 
published one story about MDM per ten issues and focused stories on MDM more 
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frequently than other two newspapers -- Resonansi’s treatment of the media 
democratization was not as enthusiastic and positive as pro-opposition Alia’s. Resonansi 
wrote fewer positive stories (78.2%) than Alia (91.3%), (but more than pro-government 
24 Saati, which was positive in 64.3% of articles). Resonansi wrote fewer stories of the 
longer genre than Alia, (but also fewer news briefs than 24 Saati,) and placed the 
coverage of MDM less prominently – the stories were printed on Resonansi’s inside 
pages -- than two other newspapers. Independent Resonansi appeared interested in 
reflecting discourses around MDM more fully than other newspapers. Resonansi used 
government officials as sources many times more often than Alia (but less often than pro-
government 24 Saati), and has spoken to at least one category of activists (“activist 
journalists of MDM”) more often than other newspapers. Resonansi also covered all three 
issues of MDM evenly. The frame it used more often than other newspapers was access 
to information – transparency. 
 Independent Kavkasia, also covered the movement frequently and positively, but 
less frequently (5 stories per 100 newscasts) than 9th Channel (9 stories per 100 
newscasts). Kavkasia was more likely than other TV stations to report about MDM in 
primetime. Two-thirds of Kavkasia’s stories about MDM were aired in its evening 
newscasts. Independent Kavkasia focused more often than other TV stations on MDM in 
the context of other problems in the media. Like Resonansi, Kavkasia gave voice to both 
the government and the activists. The station spoke to the government in about half of its 
stories, almost twice more often than pro-opposition 9th Channel (but less often than pro-
government Rustavi 2), and spoke to activists more frequently than other TV stations. 
Like Resonansi, independent Kavkasia spread its coverage among all three issues of the 
   
155 
 
media democratization movement more or less evenly. Being under greater pressure than 
independent Resonansi – the pressures on the broadcast media were stronger than on the 
print press -- independent Kavkasia used the injustice frame more frequently (27.1%) 
than either pro-opposition 9th Channel (25%) or independent Rustavi 2 (2.1%). Kavkasia, 
as an outspoken critic of the government, was experiencing a host of problems, and, 
unlike rich 9th Channel, was less protected. Kavkasia’s top demobilizing frame, the 
ineffective, impotent, counterproductive frame, was associated with perceived lack of 
progress in the media democratization movement.  
Chapter summary 
 This chapter outlined the results of the quantitative content analysis of three 
Georgian newspapers and three TV stations. The study posed 12 hypotheses and 7 
research questions about the tone, frames, frequency, genre and prominence of coverage. 
Some theoretical predictions in the study were corroborated by the findings, while other 
were not. In general, politically engaged media stood by their respective parties in 
selecting tone (24 Saati, Alia), movement-advanced frames (Rustavi 2, 9th Channel), 
genre (24 Saati, Alia), sources (24 Saati, Rustavi 2, 9th Channel), and prominence 
(Rustavi 2, 9th Channel) of coverage of the media democratization movement. The 
independent media were most likely to hold a centrist position, which appeared less 
influenced by political actors than editorial positions of pro-government and pro-
opposition media. 






 This study analyzed the construction of reality around the media democratization 
movement (MDM) in Georgia. The movement, which has engaged with free speech and 
press issues since the early years of Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union, made 
great progress in the areas of journalists’ personal rights and legislative protections of the 
freedom and impendence of press (Topuria, 2000, L.T., 2014, April, 4; Z. K., personal 
interview, March 13, 2014) but lacked sustainability and coordination. In April 2011, the 
MDM formed an organization, the Coalition for Media Advocacy, and launched a 
sustained activist program to improve access to information for journalists and regular 
citizens. The movement successfully lobbied for the adoption of stricter ownership and 
financial disclosure requirements in the broadcast sector. It also launched a formal 
campaign, It Concerns You, pushing the government to adopt into law the “must carry” 
principle, which requires cable operators to distribute all TV signals and thus breaks the 
government’s effective stranglehold over nationwide news. In addition, the movement 
publicized the case of TV Maestro’s 140,000 satellite antennas, intended for distribution 
to viewers by pro-opposition Maestro TV, but seized by the government months prior to 
the 2012 Parliamentary Elections on the grounds that distribution amounted to vote 
buying (Freedom House, 2013; IREX, 2013)  The study pursued three goals: 1) to 
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identify the dominant tone and frames of coverage of the Georgian media 
democratization movement, operationalized as the coverage of the Coalition for Media 
Advocacy (MDM’s SMO), the It Concerns You (MDM’s campaign), the “must 
carry/must offer” and media transparency legislation, and the Maestro satellite antennas 
case (MDM’s issues), across types of news organizations; 2) to identify frames 
constructed by the media democratization movement; and 3) to analyze whether political 
factors, such as news organizations’ ties with the government or the opposition (or lack 
thereof), and frames constructed by activists influenced the news coverage. To enhance 
the analysis, the study interviewed activists and activist journalists about the goals of 
MDM and the rationale behind its framing choices. Finally, the study interviewed news 
producers and reporters who had covered MDM about their attitudes towards the 
movement and experiences on the beat. In sum, the study analyzed the construction of 
reality around the media democratization movements in two realms: the social movement 
and the news media.  
 To identify movement frames and clarify the rationale behind these frame 
choices, the study qualitatively analyzed 17 statements issued by MDM from April 13, 
2011, to October 1, 2012. It conducted 12 in-depth interviews with activists and activist 
journalists, who were leaders in founder organizations in the Coalition for Media 
Advocacy. For media frames, the study content analyzed 152 newspaper and 400 TV 
stories about MDM produced by pro-government newspaper 24 Saati and pro-
government Rustavi 2 television, pro-opposition newspaper Alia and pro-opposition 9th 
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Channel, and independent newspaper Resonansi and independent TV Kavkasia14 between 
July 1, 2010, and October 1, 2012. The study also interviewed two news producers, 
employed by Rustavi 2 and 9th Channel (the producer at Kavkasia TV refused to be 
interviewed) and three reporters employed by 24 Saati, Alia and Resonansi. 
 The literature on social movements and media, written from the social 
constructivist and conflict perspectives, posits that the news media’s alliance with 
powerful elites leads to demobilizing coverage of social movements as challengers of 
these elites and the existing social order. Media propaganda (Herman and Chomsky, 
1988), media hegemony (Gitlin, 1980), and media and conflict theories (Olien et al, 
1995), developed in the 1970s and onwards, explain media’s negative framing of social 
movements by media’s entrenched ties with the elites and their interest in maintaining the 
status quo. According to Gitlin (1977, 1980), structural influences, emanating from elite 
ownership of the media, interact with aspects of journalists’ professional codes and 
invariably lead to negative and marginalizing framing of social movements. The protest 
paradigm (Chan & Lee, 1984) builds on Gitlin’s ideas and posits that journalists’ 
coverage of protests is more diverse and determined by their ideologically-based 
“reporting paradigms.” More recent scholarship has found greater diversity in the 
                                                 
14 This categorization is based on newspapers’ and TV stations’ perceived editorial bias, 
documented by industry watchdogs (Freedom House, 2009-11) and on the monitoring of 
their coverage of the 2012 elections (www.mediamonitoring.ge). None of the newspapers 
or TV stations have explicitly endorsed either the government or the opposition in the 
2012 campaign or at any other times. 
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coverage of protests (Harlow & Johnston, 2011; Weaver & Scacco, 2013) and explained 
it by the recent trend of media diversification, the emergence of Internet-based media, 
and media’s greater ideological posturing. In non-Western contexts (Mauersberger, 2012; 
McCarthy et al, 2008; Yuan, 2013), those outlets in the media landscape oriented towards 
social change are more sympathetic towards movement causes.  
 This literature led to theorizing in this study that political factors, such as news 
organizations’ ties with the government or the opposition (or lack thereof) would 
influence the news media’s use of mobilizing and demobilizing frames. Pro-government 
media would be interested in the maintenance of the status quo and therefore would 
ignore or negatively cover social movements, using demobilizing frames. By contrast, 
pro-opposition media would be interested in social change, willing to cover social 
movements extensively and positively, and use mobilizing frames more often than 
demobilizing frames. The study asked whether the independent media, when 
experiencing government pressures and unfair competition from pro-government media, 
would also cover social movements positively and rely on mobilizing frames. The study 
took into consideration the independent media’s long-standing ties with the media 
democratization movement. The study hypothesized that movement actors stood a greater 
chance of pushing their frames into pro-opposition and independent media than pro-
government media. 
 The key finding of the study was the prevalent use of positive tone and mobilizing 
frames in the coverage of the media democratization movement across all types of media. 
Newspapers and TV stations across the political spectrum used a predominantly positive 
tone and more mobilizing than demobilizing frames. While the study theorized about 
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positive coverage of the movement in pro-opposition and independent media, it did not 
predict positive coverage in pro-government media.  The media democratization 
movement has been spared negative and marginalizing coverage, a proven weapon 
against social movements and social change around the world. Pro-opposition and 
independent media provided consistent, extensive, and enthusiastic coverage of MDM. 
Pro-government media focused predominantly on those MDM issues that were eventually 
endorsed by the government and covered them positively, relying on government 
sources. Pro-government TV simply remained silent most of the time, covering MDM ten 
times less frequently than pro-opposition station. This finding of predominantly positive 
coverage of the social movement is at odds with much of the early literature on social 
movements and media, which predicts consistently negative and marginalizing coverage 
of social movements (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Gitlin, 1980, Tichenor et al, 1970; 
Olien et al, 1989, 1994, 1995), and complies with more recent literature, which finds 
supportive coverage of social movements in some parts of media (Harlow & Johnston, 
2011; Mauersberger, 2012; Weaver & Scacco, 2013; Yuan, 2013).   
 The study explains the patterns of news coverage of MDM in the context of the 
news and political environment in Georgia, drawing on the conflict perspective of social 
movements. In dynamically changing, emerging democracies, such as Georgia, the elites 
and the news media are split. Parts of the news media align themselves with the 
government, while other parts side with the political opposition. There is no agreement 
between the government and the opposition about the need to maintain the status quo, 
and the two are not joining forces against social movements, as in more developed 
countries. On the contrary, the opposition works to weaken the government in alliance 
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with social movements. News organizations aligned with the government or the 
opposition have different editorial policies towards social movements, consistent with 
their political ties.  
 The strongest political opposition of the Georgian government, the Coalition – 
Georgian Dream, and the media it owned or worked with, supported the media 
democratization movement. The opposition was interested in helping activists expose 
violations of press freedoms in Georgia, which negatively affected the government’s 
image as a progressive and democratic force among Georgian citizens and the 
international community. The news producer at the pro-opposition TV station and the 
reporter at the pro-opposition newspaper, sampled by the study, said their news 
organizations supported the media democratization movement. The producer said the 
pro-opposition station helped MDM by “positive coverage and otherwise” (T. R., 
personal interview, April 10, 2014). The reporter at the pro-opposition newspaper 
admitted to having written positive, “emotionally colored” (T. O., personal interview, 
May 3, 2014) stories, taking part in protests, and signing petitions on behalf of activists. 
She said the media activism “was one of her strongest experiences in years” (T. O., 
personal interview, May 3, 2014). Her newspaper, Alia, was most likely among the 
newspapers in the sample to use a positive tone in coverage of MDM. Alia, by some 
accounts (Tsiklauri, 2012, June 2), received financial backing from the opposition. Pro-
opposition 9th Channel, a television launched by billionaire opposition leader Bidzina 
Ivanishvili, aired ten times as many stories in six months after its launch in April 2012 as 
pro-government Rustavi 2 during the timeframe of the study (July, 2010, to October, 
2012). 9th Channel exceeded independent Kavkasia in frequency of coverage of MDM. 
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The station used the activists’ top master frame, free speech, and the activists’ new frame, 
it concerns you, more often than the other stations. The news producer at 9th Channel said 
in the interview that her channel, and two other critical TV stations, TV Maestro and 
Kavkasia, had engaged in advocacy journalism and supported MDM. 
 The other type of news media analyzed by the study – the independents – have 
had long-standing strong ties with the civil sector (Topuria, 2000) and the media 
democratization movement. These media were new forces in the society and developed 
and gained strength as a result of the process of transition (Spark, 2008).  At the start of 
the latest wave of activism, which this study has analyzed, the media democratization 
movement established close ties with the independent media. Four influential media 
unions -- the Georgian Regional Media Association, the Georgian Association of 
Regional Broadcasters, the Regional Broadcasters’ Network, and the Georgian Charter of 
Journalism Ethics--became formal founders of the movement’s SMO, the Coalition for 
Media Advocacy. These unions, uniting hundreds of members from the independent 
media but also from the pro-opposition media, supported the movement and have 
undoubtedly positively influenced member journalists’ attitudes towards MDM. The 
reporter of independent Resonansi, interviewed by the study, said she could not “recall a 
single journalist who was against” MDM proposals (R. M., personal interview, April 20, 
2014). She said MDM was “a different kind of issue,” and she “could not” but provide 
supportive coverage (R. M., personal interview, April 20, 2014). But she also said her 
organization was against advocacy in reporting. The independent media have drawn solid 
support to the movement. Independent Kavkasia used mobilizing frames more often than 
other TV stations. Independent newspaper Resonansi used a positive tone in covering 
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MDM. The editor-in-chief of Resonansi said the coverage in the newspaper was balanced 
and that it described both activists’ and opponents’ views (L. T., personal interview, 
April 4, 2014). He said it was in the activists’ interests to stimulate public discussion of 
their proposals and invite opponents’ criticism of their potential flaws (L.T., personal 
interview, April 4, 2014). This and other features of coverage speak of more substantive 
discussion about MDM in the independent media, compared to the pro-opposition media. 
Resonansi and Kavkasia covered MDM both extensively and consistently during the 
period sampled by the study. Resonansi’s coverage had greater focus on MDM and its 
issues, than Alia’s, which covered MDM as one element of the generally problematic 
media environment in Georgia, or 24 Saati, which covered MDM as part of its elections 
and political coverage. Resonansi and Kavkasia spoke to activists more often than other 
stations and covered all three issues of MDM evenly, compared to selective coverage in 
other newspapers and TV stations. The two independent news organizations also sourced 
government officials more often than the pro-opposition media (but much less than the 
pro-government media), to reflect both the government’s and the activists’ discourse 
about MDM.  
 The pro-government media abstained from harsh rhetoric and slander in its 
coverage of the movement. The marginalization of activists for demands of greater 
freedom of media and information could upset readers in Georgian society, which 
strongly supported freedom of expression and press. Every seventh citizen polled in 2013 
said that the freedom and independence of media was the most important issue facing the 
country, ahead of jobs and lost territories (Navarro & Woodward, 2013). After two 
centuries of censorship under the Imperial and the Communist regimes, Georgians were 
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highly protective of their right to free expression and information. This may explain the 
lack of negative coverage in the pro-government media. “We have been spared terrible 
lies,” said an activist about the pro-government media (T. B., 2014, April 12, 2014). 
However, the pro-government media in the sample tried to belittle the movement actors 
and limit information about its activities. The activists complained that pro-government 
TV stations did not film their faces nor give them a voice in coverage (S. S., personal 
interview, March 12, 2014). The content analysis of the news coverage of the movement 
corroborated this story. Pro-government Rustavi 2 television did not interview or 
otherwise use as a source a single activist journalist, and such journalists were a vocal 
and influential group within the movement. Rustavi 2 also used other activists as sources 
less often than other TV stations. It covered the movement during less popular morning 
newscasts more often than other TV stations. The producer at Rustavi 2 said the 
television covered protesters and their issues but did not provide supportive reporting. 
This producer was in general against advocacy journalism and expressed skepticism 
about activists’ motives. He thought pro-opposition and independent television stations 
were acting in alliance with the political opposition (G. L., personal interview, May 5, 
2014).  
 Rustavi 2 used demobilizing frames less often than other TV stations, but limited 
coverage to some nine stories per hundred newscasts. This strategy of no mention, of 
“sealing off” news about a movement (Gitlin, 1980), has been described as one of the 
marginalization techniques in the literature. Pro-government 24 Saati, which covered 
MDM quite extensively (24 Saati’s coverage was more frequent than pro-opposition 
Alia’s but less frequent than Resonansi’s), limited one-third of its coverage to news 
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briefs, that is, to two to three paragraphs. Both Rustavi 2 and 24 Saati relied heavily on 
government sources compared to other types of media. Pro-government media was the 
least likely to talk about the Coalition for Media Advocacy, the social movement 
organization for MDM. Rustavi 2 was less likely than other TV stations to talk to 
activists in general. According to Gamson and Modigliani (1989), the media rarely 
covered key players in the movement, in attempts to disassociate them from issues. 
 From the social constructivist perspective, the media coverage is explained as a 
framing contest, in which frames deployed by a social movement compete with counter 
frames by the government or other social actors and news media’s own frames. On the 
whole, MDM was successful in crafting its messages and pushing them into the media. 
The movement pursued two goals, as reported by the activists (H. J., personal interview, 
March 25, 2014; I. M., personal interview, April 18, 2014; N. Z., personal interview, 
March 15, 2014): a) improving the media environment in which their own professional 
practice was situated, and, b) strengthening the civil society in which energized citizens 
would participate and play a greater role in society (I. M., personal interview, April 18, 
2014; M. P., personal interview, April 7, 2014; S. S., personal interview, March 12, 
2014). Two other important insights gained in interviews were that the activism grew out 
of the professional protest of journalists, who were unable to practice journalism freely, 
and that the activists coordinated closely with other socially active groups to jointly 
“snatch away” (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014) concessions in the media and 
other areas. Activists’ actions, especially towards the end of the period sampled by this 
study, were goal-oriented, had clear strategies, and a measure of tactical flexibility and 
“creativity” (L. T., personal interview, April 4, 2014). The activists’ strategy was to 
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mobilize supporters and third parties, subvert opponents, and attract positive media 
coverage, the routine strategy of social movements (Lipsky, 1968). 
 The media democratization movement’s goals and strategies was reflected in the 
frames it deployed in movement statements. The MDM primarily used overarching 
master frames linked to the concept of democracy, such as free speech, access to 
information – plurality, access to information – transparency, fair elections, rule of law, 
and responsible government frames. These frames were highly resonant in Georgian 
society, in which the overwhelming majority of the population supported democratic 
transformation (Navarro & Woodward, 2013). The activists chose key frames with key 
audiences in mind. The activists directly addressed the government in an effort to make it 
shoulder responsibility for problems and solutions in the media environment and to reach 
the international community as a third party and reference group for the government. All 
frames linked with the concept of democracy spoke to the government and the 
international community. The government tried to project the image of Georgia as the 
fastest developing democracy in the post-Soviet world. It vowed to conduct the best and 
most competitive and fair elections in years. The international community, acting on the 
theoretical belief (Huntington, 1968) that several consecutive changes of government 
through fair elections were necessary to consolidate democracy in Georgia, was keenly 
watching the 2012 Parliamentary Elections.  By deploying the fair elections frame, the 
movement leveraged interest in fair elections among the government and the international 
community (S.S., personal interview, March 12, 2014).  
 Fair elections and rule of law frames were picked up by the pro-government 
media. Rule of law was Rustavi 2’s top frame, and the station used rule of law and fair 
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elections frames more often than other television stations. 24 Saati also used these 
frames, and the related access to information – pluralism frame, as its top frames, and 
used them more frequently than other newspapers. The activists’ interviews gave 
evidence of their targeting the government and the international community in framing 
work. They said they tried “talking the language” of the government (N.Z., personal 
interview, March 15, 2014) and deliberately linked media issues with the elections to 
build support among the international community (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 
2014). This strategy of targeting the government and its preferred discourse has been an 
effective framing strategy in previous protests (Zuo & Benford, 1995; Noonah, 2012).  
 Activists also targeted citizens as potential recruits and followers (Lipsky, 1968). 
In this task, the activists primarily relied on a new and innovative frames, it concerns you. 
It concerns you accentuated citizens’ responsibility to deal with the problems in the 
media environment. According to activists, the problems in the media were easy to 
understand, but the population did not relate them to their daily lives (M. P., personal 
interview, April 7, 2014), nor did they know what to do about them (S. S., personal 
interview, March 12, 2014). It concerns you, an easy-to-understand, resonant, elastic 
motivational frame, told the citizens to mobilize and engage. It helped the activists reach 
and mobilize everyday citizens and connect them with the activist agenda (M. P., 
personal interview, April 7, 2014). 9th Channel, the pro-opposition television station, used 
the frame most frequently, closely followed by the independent Kavkasia, but the 
independent and pro-opposition newspapers were no different from the pro-government 
newspaper in the use of the it concerns you frame. The activists were proud of the frame 
(T. B., personal interview April 12, 2014) and believed it applied to other contexts 
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beyond the news media and could spur further mobilization (Z. K., personal interview, 
March 13, 2014). 
 Activists’ frames also resonated with members of the news media across the 
political and ideological divide. The free speech, access to information – transparency, 
and access to information – plurality frames connected with journalists’ professional 
values of free expression and access to information, transparency, and pluralism. All 
newspapers and TV stations used these frames. The news producer at the pro-opposition 
station said the media and social movements shared values, such as a high regard for 
rights and transparency (T. R., personal interview, April 10, 2014). She said “no other 
group [but activists had] such a vested interest in transparency.” The activist from the 
Open Society (Soros) foundation in the Coalition for Media Advocacy said the 
organization targeted the independent media in its media campaigns and counted on their 
support (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014). 
 Other than being elastic and wide in scope, the frames activists chose were timely 
and culturally resonant. The activists were willing to adapt frames to changes in the 
political and social context (Markowitz, 2009; Noonan, 1995; Zuo & Benford, 1995). The 
issues in the Georgian media environment identified and prioritized by activists – 
freedom of content production and distribution, access to public information and 
transparency of the government, access to plural sources of information in the regions -- 
were initially framed as free speech, access to information – transparency and injustice 
issues. As the elections approached, the movement dropped the “injustice” frame and 
adopted the fair elections frame, reframing the need for the freedom of media as essential 
to conducting fair elections and introduced the access to information – plurality frame, 
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accentuating the need to have free and plural sources of information for voters around 
Georgia.  
The picture that emerged from interviews is that of a dynamic process of growth 
in the media democratization movement. The latest phase of activism, which started as 
the activity of a few informal groups in 2010, went on to become a formal coalition of 
media and civil sector organizations in 2011, and produced a highly organized and highly 
effective campaign, the It Concerns You campaign, in 2012. The framing work of the 
activists, too, became more elaborate. While at the beginning, framing choices were 
spontaneous and basic, as evident from activists’ lack of recall of concrete frames or 
communicative devices employed by the Coalition for Media Advocacy, the framing 
decisions became formalized as the activism and campaigning grew. The key slogan, it 
concerns you, was born at the peak of activism in 2012.  
 The frames were advanced not only by MDM but also by the government and the 
media. These frames swayed the discourse in the media away from MDM’s frames. The 
government, through the media it controlled or worked with, was trying to “change the 
conversation,” that is, reframe activists’ demands such that they would lose the intended 
meaning. The government, for instance, deployed the hinders free business frame, which 
treated the media as businesses, and discussed activists’ demands – greater transparency 
of ownership and financial information in the broadcast media, mandatory distribution of 
all TV signals by cable operators – in market terms. In these terms, the disclosure of 
proprietary business information, such as ownership structure and finances, and the 
requirement for free cable businesses to distribute all broadcast content, were cast as 
intrusive and excessive regulations. The government’s other demobilizing frame, 
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politicizing/scamming, described activists as political players and their demands as moves 
to gain advantage over the political opponents. These and other demobilizing frames 
were carried by all news media, but much less frequently than mobilizing frames.  
 The key theoretical argument in this study – that pro-opposition, pro-government 
and independent news media diverged in their attitudes and coverage of MDM – was 
corroborated by the analysis of journalists’ views about MDM, its issues, and the 
activism in general. Reporters at pro-opposition and independent newspapers, and a 
producer at opposition-controlled 9th Channel, approved of both the activists’ agenda and 
even took part in street protests. These journalists had personally experienced 
government oppression and had many reasons to desire reforms in the media 
democratization sector. The reporter at independent Resonansi said this: “one advocates, 
or else, there will be no change” (R. M., personal interview, April 20, 2014). By contrast, 
the producers and reporters at the pro-government news media said they backed many of 
the activists’ issues but were not taking part in protests, were not advocating while 
reporting, and questioned activists’ sincerity and political neutrality. 
 To sum up, most theoretical predictions in the study were corroborated by the 
findings. The key finding of the study was the prevalent use of a positive tone and 
mobilizing frames in the coverage of the media democratization movement across all 
types of media. The study corroborated the recent findings of supportive coverage of 
social movements in those parts of news media that erre open and interested in social 
change (Harlow & Johnston, 2011; Mauersberger, 2012; Weaver & Scacco, 2013; Yuan, 
2013). It also found that the pro-government media abstained from marginalizing 
coverage of the movement.  This study explained the predominantly positive tone and 
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mobilizing frames in the news media’s coverage of MDM by aspects of the social 
conflict in Georgia and activists’ skill in constructing the movement through framing. 
However, the nature of the media democratization movement – its focus on the freedom 
of speech and press, which clearly overlapped with the interests of the professional 
journalistic corps in maintaining professional freedoms– may have been a factor leading 
to journalists’ positive and mobilizing coverage of the movement. Yet the positioning of 
the movement as a special cause for journalists, and the framing of its goals as shared 
goals between activists and journalists, was a calculated and deliberate strategy of the 
movement, as is argued in this study.  
 On the whole, politically engaged media stood by their respective political parties 
in selecting nuances of tone, frames, genre, sourcing, frequency, and prominence of 
coverage of the media democratization movement. the study concluded that social 
movements that manage to exploit tensions in the “media-state dynamics” 
(Mauersberger, 2012, p. 588) and differences in the media (Weaver & Scacco, 2013) in 
framing decisions have a better chance of gaining good access to audiences and fair 
coverage. On the whole, the Georgian media democratization movement was successful 
in crafting its messages and pushing them into the news media. The media 
democratization movement achieved its key goal, verbalized by activists as the 
improvement of the news media environment, and made serious advances towards its 
second goal, the improvement of participatory civil society. The media democratization 
movement taught “a good lesson of activism” (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014) 
to Georgian society.  
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1. Coder: Please, circle your name   1. Coder 1 2. Coder 2 
2. Date. Please, write down the date of publication or appearance of a story. (It is usually 
indicated the file name for materials downloaded from the Terramedia database). Format 
date as this: 27012012 (stands for 27 January, 2012).  
3. Source: Please, circle the newspaper or TV you are coding: .1 Alia, .2 Resonansi .3 24 
Hours, .4 Rustavi 2, .5 9th Channel, .6 Kavkasia  
4. General topic: 
.1 Media issues: code here a story about one of the five issues of interest to this study. 
These issues are: the Coalition for Media Advocacy, the It Concerns You campaign, 
“must carry/must offer” rule about mandatory distribution of broadcast signals by cable 
companies and mandatory offer of signal by all TV stations to all cable companies, 
Maestro TV satellite Antennas about the problems experienced by TV company Maestro 
and associated cable companies when distributing satellite antennas around Georgia, and 
the transparency of media ownership and financial flows in the media. 
.2 General media: code here materials that discuss broad media issues, general problems 
in the media environment, pressures on journalists, low professionalism, instead of being 
dedicated to one or few of the special media issues identified for this study (see 4.1 for 
the list of issues.) However, this article should mention these specific media issues 
briefly.  
.3 Other issues: code here any materials that are about politics, elections, economics, a 
society but mentions one or all of the specific media issues listed in 4.1.  
.4 Unrelated: please, check “yes” if an article or a story is unrelated, i.e. does not mention 
any of the issues mentioned in 4.1 Code “unrelated” if any of these issues are mentioned 
out of context of activism. e.g.: The minister of Justice appointed Ana Kevkhishvili, a 
former coordinator of the Coalition for Media Advocacy, (or former activist of It 
Concerns You campaign) as her new deputy. An article is unrelated if it mentions any of 
the issues in 4.1 but in the context unrelated to these specific media issues: e.g.: Media 
ownership in newspaper x has been revised due to the sale of its stock is unrelated, but 
Rustavi 2 ownership was transferred to Karamanashvili brothers from the previous 
owner, offshore company xxx, after the law on transparency of ownership was adopted is 
to be coded as 4.1, because it is related to the issue of transparency of ownership. 
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PLEASE STOP CODING IF AN ARTICLE OR A TV STORY IS UNRELATED. 
5. Specific media issues: Code here which of the specific media issues of interest to the 
study are present in the material. 
.1 It Concerns You: code here any material about the campaign, It Concerns You, or any 
materials that briefly mentions the campaign 
.2 Coalition for Media Advocacy: code here any material about the Coalition for Media 
Advocacy, or the material that mentions this organization. 
.3 Must carry/Must offer rule: code here materials that are about or briefly mention “must 
carry/must offer” rule, which requires mandatory distribution of all broadcast signals by 
cable companies in the same area and the mandatory offer of their content to all cable 
companies by TV stations covering the same area. In Georgia in 2012, this rule was 
adopted into the Election Law to be activated in the pre-election period.  
.4 Satellite antennas issue: Code here materials that are about or briefly mention the 
arrest of satellite antennas distributed around Georgia by the cable Company Global, TV 
company Maestro and some other organizations so that Maestro’s signal would get 
distributed around Georgia. The antennas were arrested as an instance of voter bribery  
.5 Transparency of media ownership and financial flows: Code here all materials that are 
about or briefly mention the issue of concealed ownership (offshore registration, unclear 
ownership structure) in TV companies or any other media or the related activism to 
change the Broadcast Law to allow for greater ownership transparency. Both 
requirements of ownership transparency and financial flow transparency were 
subsequently adopted into law. 
6. Newspaper headline, TV story title: please, write a headline in full. 
7. Type of newspaper story: please, circle the appropriate genre for a newspaper article 
you are coding:  
.1 News in brief: typically a brief is one to three paragraph-long news item, printed on the 
margins of the front page (but can also appear on other pages) and usually included into a 
bordered section with similar, brief items.  Most of news briefs do not have an author and 
are provided by the agency. 
.2 Story: a longer piece, addressing a topic at a greater length than brief news. It usually 
contains discussion, context, one or two sources, or two or more quotes from one source, 
and, often, has a story line.  Code here “lazy” stories, composed of brief introduction by a 
journalist, followed by a long, single direct quote from a source or two long direct quote 
from two sources. These stories are not formatted as questions and answers. Do not code 
these stories as interviews or opinions. 
.3 Opinion: refers to opinions of sources rather than an editorial staff.  Code here columns 
(SVETI) too. Do not code here “lazy” stories, composed of journalists’ introduction and 
directly quotes of expressed opinion or interview response by one or few sources.  
.4 Interview: refers to a question and answer piece. It may or may not be preceded by an 
introduction, and usually has journalists’ questions in bold print, followed by answers. 
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Do not code here “lazy” stories, in which journalists’ introduction or a single question is 
followed by a single, long direct quote but not formatted as questions and answers. 
.5 Editorial: is an unsigned piece by the editorial staff of newspaper, expressing a 
position or arguing a point.  In some newspapers, the editorial has a byline, that is, the 
name of the author, but in some other cases, there is no byline.  
.6 Other: please, circle here if none of the above applies, and describe, what it is. 
.2 N/A: code non -applicable, if you are coding a TV story. 
8. Newspaper story location 
.1 Page number: please, write down a page number on which an article appears.  If an 
article starts on page 2 and continues to page 6, put down “2”, that is, the page on which 
an article starts. A page number is usually included in the name of the file. CODE ONLY 
THE FIRST PAGE. 
.2 N/A: code non -applicable, if you are coding a TV story. 
9. Newspaper story length:  
.1 Length in paragraphs: please, record the length of the story in paragraphs of a 
newspaper article: please, circle the appropriate category based on the length of 
newspaper material in paragraphs.  
.2 N/A: code non –applicable, if you are coding a TV story. 
10. TV program: please, code, whether a TV story appeared in the news program aired 
during the morning, afternoon, prime time, or late night airtime segment.  
.1 Morning news (07:00 through 11:00) 
.2 Afternoon news (12:00, 13:00, 14:00, 15:00, 16:00, 17:00) 
.3 Prime time news (18:00, 19:00, 20:00, 21:00) 
.4 Late night news (22:00, 23:00, 24:00, 01:00) 
.2 N/A: code non –applicable, if it is a newspaper story. 
11. TV story type: Please, circle the appropriate genre for a TV story you are coding:  
.1 Voiceover: a sequences of images with a text read behind images. It may be that a text 
is read by the news anchor. 
.2 Package: A TV story, which usually features one or two sources, a journalist, and a 
story line. Often, a package has reporter’s “stand-up” shot.  
.3 Anchor’s text: code here if the story is simply read by the anchor, with no images, 
sounds or interviews. 
.4 Interview: code here if an anchor interviewing somebody in the studio or via “live” 
distance call. Code here if an anchor is interviewing a journalist, who reported a story. 
.5 Other: please, circle here if none of the above applies, and explain what it is.  
.2 N/A: code non –applicable, if it is a newspaper article. 
12. TV story length:  
.1 Length in minutes/seconds: please, write down the length of the story.  
.2 N/A: code non –applicable, if you are coding a newspaper story. 
13. Produced by:  
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.1 Staff reporters: code here if a newspaper story or a TV story has been produced by 
staff reporters. Usually, such a newspaper story has a byline.   
.2 News agency: code here is a story or TV report has been produced by a news agency. 
It is more typical of newspapers to carry agency stories. 
.3 International media story: code here if a story has been reprinted from an international 
newspaper or if a TV story is a foreign TV story dubbed in Georgian. More typical of 
newspapers to carry these types of stories. 
.4 Other: code if material is produced by other source than 13.1, 13.2, 13.3. It can be a 
social media post or blogpost reprint, or something similarly unordinary. Please, specify 
what it is. 
14. Sources: Please check if an article or a TV story has a source or sources belonging to 
any one of these categories. A source is defined as any subject in a newspaper story or a 
TV story other than an author/anchor, who is directly quoted, paraphrased or mentioned 
or whose sound bite is provided.  
.1 Activists - MDM: leaders of organizations participating in the It Concerns You or 
Coalition for Media Advocacy, or any member of these organizations, speaking on behalf 
of the coalition except for MDM activists who are professional journalists or heads of 
journalistic unions.   
.2 Activist journalists - MDM: code here those professional journalists, who were activist 
members of It Concerns You or Coalition for Media Advocacy. These included members 
of Media Club, also heads of media associations (see attached list for some of the names).  
.3 Activists - other: leaders or members of non-governmental organizations, who are not 
members of the Coalition or organizations in the Coalition. Code here public figures, 
such as writers, academics, artists, etc. 
.4 Journalists - other: journalists, editors, publishers, owners of media who are not 
identified as members of the Coalition even as they may be members in journalists 
unions. 
.5 Government officials/ruling party MPs: appointed officials, government servants, 
including those serving in quasi-governmental organizations, such as the Georgian 
Communications Regulatory Commission or the Ombudsman’s office. Code here 
parliamentarians from the ruling, United National Movement party. 
.6 Opposition MPs: members of parliament which represent political parties other than 
UNM. 
.7 Non-parliamentary party representatives: representatives of those political parties, 
which were not represented in the Parliament. 
.8 International community representatives/diplomats: foreign government officials, 
diplomats, representatives of international watchdog organizations, or international 
experts. Nationality-wise, these individuals can be foreigners but also Georgians, and 
need to be coded here as long as they work for and speak on behalf of an international 
organization or a government. Georgian chapters of international organizations are not to 
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be included here but under other civil society organizations (or coalition members, if an 
organization is the member). 
,9 Ordinary citizens: The Georgian citizens who are not identified as associated with 
organizations, and are not publicly active individuals, who need to be coded as 14.3. 
Usually, these sources are not identified by their names in the media, but are called 
“citizens,” “passers-by” or “dwellers of Tbilisi, Kutaisi, etc.” 
.10Others: Anyone who does not belong to any of the above categories. Please, describe 
the source. 
15: Dominant tone towards the organizations and issues of interest to the study, listed in 
4.1 (It Concerns You campaign, Coalition for Media Advocacy, Must Carry, Antennas, 
Ownership Transparency). If a story or TV report is about any of the above 
organizations/issues, determine whether each paragraph is negative, neutral or positive 
towards them. Count negative and supportive paragraphs and calculate their ratio. If the 
ratio reaches 2:1 in either direction, code an article or a TV story as negative or positive. 
If 2:1 ratio is not met, code the material as neutral. Some stories may be entirely neutral 
in reporting.  If an article or a story is not focused on these issues (which would be the 
case if you coded .4.2 or 4.3), but mentions them in passing, only look at the valance of 
those paragraphs that mention organizations/issues of interest to this study, and apply 2:1 
rule to those specific paragraphs.  
.1 negative: code here if at least 2/3 of paragraphs or more is negative. 
.2 neutral: code here if all paragraphs are neutral or there is an even number of negative 
and positive paragraphs. 
.3 positive: code here if 2/3 of paragraphs or more is positive. 
16. Mobilizing frames: identify frames that are intended or have a potential to mobilize 
the support for the organizations/issues of interest to this study (listed in 4.1). These 
frames can be deployed by the It Concerns You and the Coalition, but also by other 
parties, or even by reporters or editorial authors themselves. Please, look up the frame 
definitions in the table below and check the ones that best fit the reporting in a newspaper 
article or a TV story. You can code more than one frame. If a story is not about the 
organizations/issues of interest but only mentions those, only identify those frames that 
are present in the paragraphs about organizations/issues listed in 4.1. 
Mobilizing frames Definition 
.1 Rights Refers to general human rights and freedoms and equal 
opportunities for all social groups. The master frame stresses 
respect for shared principles of participation in the society 
and empowerment of all social groups to incorporate 
themselves in the public life and enjoy equal opportunities. 
The frame accentuates the rights that constitute the civil 
society.  
.2 Injustice Accentuates the injustice that a movement intends to address. 
It articulates a problem such that the conclusion that an 
authority system is violating the shared principles of the 
participants and provides a reason for noncompliance with 
the authority, or that some established practice or mode of 
thought is wrong and ought to be replaced. In most generic 
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sense, this master frame is about the conception of injustice, 
power and domination, be it inherent in people (race or 
gender) and identity politics, or in the system, or in conflicts 
between groups and denials of rights to some groups within 
otherwise just system.  
.3 Democratization
   
Refers to the process of transition from totalitarian and 
authoritarian systems to the democratic system and attendant 
processes, requirements and benchmarks. The aspects of the 
democratization frame overlap with the aspects of the rights 
frame, but the democratization frame accentuates the 
transformation of the society, of which the protection of 
rights is but one element. The frame covers all aspects of 
democracy as a political system, including the principle of 
informed public deliberation and government accountability.  
.4 Rule of law  Is used in framing movements’ goals as the improvement of 
the legislative system and the practice. For example, MDM’s 
legislative proposals can judged in terms of their legal worth, 
clarity, fit with the constitution, their implementation in 
practice, etc.  
.5 Fair elections Refers to the aspects of fair elections and the need to hold 
fair elections. 
.6 Free speech Refers to commonly understood, important and universally 
held value of freedom of expression and speech. It is a sub-
set of both the rights and democratization frames, but, for the 
purposes of this study, is assigned a separate code to refer to 
media’s and communicators’ rights. Any discussion of media 
free distribution of broadcast signal, newspaper content, 
licensing belong here.  
.7 Access to 
information – 
plurality 
This frame accentuates an access to information, which, 
together with free speech, is an element of the freedom of 
speech and expression framework. This frame discusses the 
same issues, as in free speech, but not from media’s, that is, 
communicators’ perspective, but from audience members,’ 
that is, recipients’ perspective. 
.8 Access to 
information – 
transparency 
This frame underlines the need for greater transparency and 
sincerity as opposed to conspiratorial and covert conduct in 
public affairs. The frame has been deployed in earlier studies 
of protests in Georgia (Manning, 2007). The discussion of 
media ownership and financial transparency belong here.  
It concerns you Refers to citizens’ responsibility, ownership and agency to 
deal with problems in their sociopolitical environment.  
Other Code any other frame that is not listed above here, and 
specify its meaning. 
17: Demobilizing frames: a demobilizing frame is a frame that is intended to or can 
potentially demobilize support for the Coalition for Media Advocacy, the It Concerns 
You campaign, and the specific issues they have been advocating (as listed in 4.1). These 
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frames can be deployed and voiced by the government, but also by other challenger 
parties. Please look up the frame definitions in the table and check the ones that best fit 
the reporting in an article or a TV story. You can code more than one frame. If a story is 
not about the organizations/issues of interest but only mentions those, look at the frames 
only in those paragraphs that mentions these issues. 
 
Demobilizing frames Definition 
.1 Supports status 
quo 
Refers to expressions of support for the maintenance of 
status quo versus changes proposed by activists; Supports 
any repressive measures against activists by a government, 
and, in general, government policies.  
.2 Hinders free 
business 
Refers to claims that protesters’ demands interfere with free 
market rules. e.g: The demands of legislative changes and 
more new regulations upset the free business of media. Any 
discussion that accentuates the business aspect of media, 
profits, and economic consequences of proposed media 
regulations belongs here.  
.3 Hinders country 
development, 
unpatriotic 
Accentuates the importance of fast economic, 
infrastructural, administrative development and state 
building, in general. These concerns are cited as justification 
for the authoritarian rule and mistreatment of activists. The 
essence of the frame is that developmental concerns are 
superior to other concerns, such as human or media rights. 
In this frame, a protest is unpatriotic, harmful for a country, 
and even treasonous.   
.4 Politicizing, 
political scam 
Defines any protest, even one that focus on community 
concerns, in political terms. Protesters are accused of having 
manifest or hidden political agendas and seeking political 
benefits for themselves more than seeking benefits for the 
people. Often, parties and politicians are implicated in 
stirring a protest in this frame, or, activism is assigned to 
manipulation from other countries and their special services 
(KGB). This frame is assumed that all activism is basically 
part of the fight between the opposition and the government. 
This frame, in general terms, equates activism with the 
intrigue or scam. 
.5 Immoral,  against 
tradition 
Defines protest as defying tradition and morality and 




Refers to general lawlessness, anarchy, violence, vandalism, 
crime, clashes with the police, police attacking 
demonstrations, arrests, cases brought against people, any 
other conflict between protesters and the police.  
.7 Freak 
show/carnival 
Appearance and dramaturgy- based coverage, which 
emphasizes physical or mental oddities among the 
protesters, such as body piercing, long hair, funny clothes, 
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bare feet, etc. The frame also emphasized protesters’ odd 
behavior, such as staging street action as theatrical 
performances, shows, flash mobs, carnivals; Any mentions 
of celebrity supporters of protest and their appearance at 
protests belongs here.   
.8 Romper 
room/idiots at large 
Stresses mental, ideological oddities of participants, their 
idealism, naiveté, unprofessional judgment, lack of 
understanding of the problem they are dealing with, etc. 




Refers to the use of public opinion polls to show public 
opposition to the protest. Public opinion is invoked to 
marginalize the position of protesters by implying that they 
do not speak for the majority of people or that they represent 
only a small, deviant group of population. Also, the frame 
refers to unsubstantiated references to the public opinion on 
the issue, bystanders’ and witness commentaries that 
amplify deviance of the protests compared to publicly held 
views or social norms. For example, the protests in Georgia 
in 2010 were marginalized through quoting residents in the 
protest area, who complained about the dirt and mess in the 
streets during the gatherings of protesters. 
.10 Counter 
demonstrations 
Describes counterdemonstrations against a protest event or 
against a cause of a social movement.  
.11 Bothersome, 
disruptive 
Refers to minor disruptions, such as traffic disruptions, 
garbage and sanitation problems, upset commerce, various 
other public costs related to demonstrations and other street 




Code here any references to ineffectiveness of a protest, it 
being ignored by its targets – the government, the public --
as well as comments that the activism will lead nowhere, 
and that is not effective.  
18. Dominant frames: Calculate the ratio of mobilizing frames, and if one frame 
corresponds to more than 70 percent of the materials, code  
.1= Single dominant mobilizing frame.  
.2=Single dominant demobilizing frame 
.3=Mixed mobilizing frame: code mixed mobilizing frame if none of the frames 
corresponds to more than 70 percent of material, and all the frames are mobilizing 
frames. 
.4=Mixed demobilizing frame: code mixed demobilizing frame if none of the 
frames corresponds to more than 70 percent of material, and all the frames are 
demobilizing frames. 
.5=Mixed mobilizing &demobilizing frame: code mixed mobilizing & 
demobilizing frame if none of the frames corresponds to more than 70 percent of 
material, and there are both mobilizing and demobilizing frames in the material.





1. Coder    1.    2.             .  
2. Date: _____________________________                                    . 
3. Media: .1 Alia__ .2 Resonansi__ .3 24 Hours__ .4 Rustavi 2__ .5 9th Channel__ .6Kavkasia TV   
4. General topic: .1=media issues in item 5__.2=other media issues (mentions item 5 media issues)__.3 other issues (mentions 
item 5 issues )  4. Unrelated_____PLEASE, STOP CODING IF UNRELATED! 
5. Media issues of interest to the study (you can check more than one)                  .       
.1 It Concerns You_________________  
.2 Coalition for Media Advocacy_____  
.3 Must Cary /must offer ___________ 
.4 Ban on antenna distribution ______________ 
.5 Media ownership & financial transparency______ 
6. Headline/ story title (please, write in full________________________________________________________            …      
7.Type of newspaper story 8. Newspaper story location 9. Newspaper story length    
.1 news in brief__  .1page number ____  .1 number of paragraphs____                        .       
.2 story_________  .2=N/A__   .2=N/A ____    
.3 opinion_______           
.4 interview_____        
.5 editorial______                                                                                         
.6 other_________       
.7 N/A          
10.TV program type  11.TV story type  12. TV story length                                      .   
.1=morning news___  .1=voiceover___  .1=length in minutes/seconds__  
.2=afternoon news___  .2=package___  .2=N/A 
.3=primetime news___  .3=anchor’s text___    
.4=late night news___  .4=interview____     
.5=unclear   .5=other_____ 
.6 N/A    . 6=N/A___      
.13 Produced by:    1. Staff___  .2. Agency ______ .3 Int’l story .4Other (please, specify)_______           . 
14. Sources (you can check more than one.)                                 .              
1= Activists - MDM ____ 
.2=Activist journalists – MDM____  
.3=other activists (than .1) ___________ 
.4=other journalists/owners (than .2)_______ 
.5=government officials, ruling party MPs_______ 
.6=Opposition MPs ____ 
.7=non-parliamentary political parties____ 
.8= international community/diplomats___ 
.9= ordinary citizens___ 
.10= other (specify)___
15. Dominant tone towards MDM (organization, campaign, or issues listed in item 11)                            : 
.1=negative___ .2 neutral___    .3=positive___ 




.4=rule of law_____________________________  
.5=fair elections_____________________________ 
.6=free speech_____________________________ 
.7=access to information - plurality____________ 
.8=access to information - transparency_________ 
.9=other (please, specify)____________________ 
17. Demobilizing frames (you can check more than one)                         :                                               
.1=support status quo________________________ 
.2=hinders free business________  
.3=hinders country development, unpatriotic______ 
.4=politicizing, scamming_____________________ 
.5=immoral, against tradition__________________ 
.6=violence, police confrontation______________ 
.7=freak show, weird show, carnival____________ 
.8 =romper room/idiots at large________________ 
.9=unfavorable polls, eye-witness______________ 
.10=counter-demonstrations__________________ 
.11=bothersome, disruptive__________________ 
.12=ineffective, impotent, counterproductive_____ 
.13=other (please, specify)___________________
18. Dominant frames 
.1=Single dominant mobilizing frame (specify)________ 
.2=Single dominant demobilizing frame (specify)______ 
.3=Mixed mobilizing frame_______________________ 
.4=Mixed demobilizing frame___________________ 
.5=Mixed mobilizing & demobilizing frames________





Statements by MDM 
 
Table C.1: List of MDM statements 
 





04.13.2011 Statement of intent upon 
launch of the Coalition 
for Media Advocacy  
Coalition for 
Media Advocacy 
Coalition for Media 
Advocacy denounced 
violence against journalists 
05.26.2011 Violence against 




The Coalition for Media 
Advocacy Statement on 








The Coalition for Media 
Advocacy statement 




Arrest of photographers 
Coalition for 
Media Advocacy 
The Coalition for Media 
Advocacy requests 
termination of Alpha Com 
auctioning. 




The Coalition for Media 
Advocacy responds to 
information in web edition 
Netgazeti 
11.21.2011  Blackmail campaign 




The Coalition for Media 
Advocacy expresses 
solidarity to the print 
media 
11.28.2011  Newspaper stands 




The Coalition for Media 
Advocacy statement 
regarding the adoption of 
the election legislation 
12.24.2011  Fair media coverage and 
transparency of the 
election process 





The Coalition for Media 
Advocacy Statement on 
legislative amendments to 
the Election Code 
01.12.2012  Fair media coverage and 




The Coalition for Media 
Advocacy addresses the 
Chairman of the Parliament 




Special Statement on the 
enactment of “Must 
carry/must offer” 
regulation 
06.08.201 mandatory broadcast 




The Coalition for Media 
Advocacy statement on the 






It Concerns You It Concerns You protests 













Must carry” rules of 
mandatory broadcast 





continued enforcement of 
“Must Carry” principle 
after the Elections  
09.04.2012  Must carry” rules of 
mandatory broadcast 




Call to Ensure 
Transparency on Election 
Day 
09.24.2012  Fair media coverage and 
transparency of the 
election process 
It Concerns You Special statement on 
continued enforcement of 
“Must carry / must offer” 
rules 
09.30.2012 mandatory broadcast 








Frames in MDM Statements 
 




Freedom of speech, freedom of media, free press, free 
distribution, unlimited distribution 
Access to information –
plurality 
Access to information, plurality, access to news, access to 
TV channels, plural views, alternative views, oppositional 
views 





Public information, publicly data, information about 
government, ownership information, transparency, 
transparent governance, ownership transparency, financial 




rule of law, legislation, law, legal framework, the 




democratization, democratic development, progress, 




fair elections, free and participatory elections, competitive 
elections, voters’ informed choice 
Injustice 
 








Right to information, basic human rights, democratic 




Government responsibility, government to act, 
government to solve issues, government action, addressing 
government 

















Topics – General sociopolitical 
1.00 
Topics – Unrelated 
.97 
Issues – It Concerns You 
.98 
Issues – Coalition 
.95 
Issues – Must Carry 
.98 
Issues – Maestro 
.93 
Issues – Transparency 
.98 
Story type/Newspaper – news in brief 
.98 
Story type/newspaper – stories 
.95 
Story type/newspaper – interview 
1.00 
Story type/newspaper – opinion 
1.00 
Story type/newspaper – editorial 
1.00 
Story types/newspaper – other 
1.00 
Location/newspaper – page number 
1.00 
Type TV program – morning 
1.00 
Type TV program –afternoon 
1.00 
Type TV program –primetime 
.98 
Type TV program – late night 
.98 
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Type TV program – unclear 
1.00 
Type Story/TV –voiceover 
.92 
Type story/TV – package 
.96 
Type story/TV – anchor’s text 
.97 
Type story/TV – interview 
.98 
Type story/TV -  
.98 
Sources – activists MDM 
.90 
Sources – activist journalists 
.78 
Sources – activists other 
.89 
Sources – journalists other 
.98 
Sources – Government 
.94 
Sources – MPs opposition 
.92 
Sources – non-parliamentary opposition 
.95 
Sources – international community 
1.00 
Sources – ordinary people 
.97 
Sources – other 
.97 
Tone – negative 
1.00 
Tone – neutral 
.81 
Tone – positive 
.72 
Mobilizing frames – rights 
.85 
Mobilizing frames – injustice 
.84 
Mobilizing frames – democratization 
.90 
Mobilizing frames – rule of law 
.93 
Mobilizing frames – fair elections 
.87 
Mobilizing frames – free speech 
.74 
Mobilizing frames – access to information plurality 
.91 
Mobilizing frames – access to information – transparency 
.89 
Mobilizing frames – other 
1.00 
Demobilizing frame – supports status quo 
1.00 
   
203 
 
Demobilizing frame –hinders free business 
.98 
Demobilizing frame – hinders country/unpatriotic 
.97 
Demobilizing frame –politicize, scamming 
.94 
Demobilizing frame – immoral 
1.00 
Demobilizing frame – violence 
1.00 
Demobilizing frame –freak show 
1.00 
Demobilizing frame – romper room, idiots 
1.00 
Demobilizing frame – polls, eyewitness 
1.00 
Demobilizing frame – counterdemonstration 
1.00 
Demobilizing frame –bothersome, disruptive 
1.00 
Demobilizing frame – impotent, ineffective 
1.00 
Demobilizing frame –other 
.95 
Dominant frame – single mobilizing 
.93 
Dominant frame – single demobilizing 
1.00 
Dominant frame – multi mobilizing 
.90 
Dominant frame – multi demobilizing 
1.00 
Dominant frame – mixed 
.88 
 
